on certainty 400-677

on certainty 400

19.3

400. Here I am inclined to fight windmills, because I cannot yet say the thing I really want to say.

‘I cannot say what I really want to say’ –

then you have nothing to say –

and going on about it –

doesn’t change the fact –

or make it impressive

on certainty 401

401. I want to say: propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language). –This observation is not of the form “I know…”. “I know…” states what I know, and that is not of logical interest.

propositions – per se –

that is – of any form –

are what we operate with

the proposition – is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

without foundation –

‘operating with thoughts’ –

this is a description –

of propositional use

if such a description is useful –

it will have currency –

but it is only a description –

and not the only one possible –

i.e. consider –

‘operating with brain-states’ –

‘operating with social constructs’

‘operating with imagination’

etc. etc.

the point is –

we operate with propositions –

and propositions –

have no definite description

Wittgenstein is right –

‘I know’ –

is of no logical interest –

but not because of the ‘I’ –

rather because of the ‘know’ –

the claim to know –

is a claim to an authority –

there is no authority –

beyond authorship –

and the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant –

it may well have persuasive effect –

but then we are dealing with –

rhetoric – not logic

on certainty 402

402. In this remark the expression “propositions of the form of empirical propositions” is itself thoroughly bad; the statements in question are statements about material objects. And they do not serve as foundations in the same way as hypotheses which, if they turn out to be false, are replaced by others.

…und schreib gerost

“Im Anfang war die Tat.” *

(* ...and write with confidence

"In the beginning was the deed."

Goethe, Faust I. Trans.)

a statement about a material object –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

as with any hypothesis

no statement – no hypothesis –

no proposition –

is ‘irreplaceable’

the basis – the ‘foundation’ –

of any proposal –

of any deed –

is uncertainty

on certainty 403

403. To say of man, in Moore’s sense, that he knows something; that what he says is therefore unconditionally the truth, seems wrong to me. – It is the truth only inasmuch as it is an unmoving foundation of his language-games.

there is no ‘unmoving foundation’ to language-games

the language-game – is the propositional game –

the proposition is a proposal

the proposition – the proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

if you wish to speak of the foundation of language-games –

what you are talking about –

is uncertainty

our language-games –

are games of uncertainty

on certainty 404

404. I want to say: it’s not that on some points men know the truth with certainty. No: perfect certainty is only a matter of their attitude.

you don’t know the truth with certainty –

you just adopt the attitude of ‘perfect certainty’ –

that is to say you pretend certainty –

certainty – the pretence –

and you  – the pretender

on certainty 405

405. But of course there is still a mistake even here.

if you operate with an attitude of certainty –

by definition – there can be no mistake –

you are certain

if you recognise that your attitude –

is open to question – open to doubt –

there will be no mistake –

what your attitude will reveal –

is uncertainties

on certainty 406

406. What I am aiming at is also the difference between the casual observation “I know that that’s a…”, as it might be used in ordinary life, and the same utterance when a philosopher makes it.

both are claims to an authority

the only authority –

is authorship

it is irrelevant and unnecessary –

to claim authorship –

of your assertions

beyond the claim of authorship –

any claim to an authority –

is false  –

such a claim –

may have rhetorical effect –

if so –

it is an effect based on –

deception

on certainty 407

407. For even Moore says “I know that that’s…” I want to reply “you don’t know anything!” – and yet I would not say that to anyone who was speaking without philosophical intention. That is, I feel (rightly?) that these two mean to say something different.

any claim to know –

is a claim to an authority

the only actual authority –

is authorship –

and that does not need to be asserted

when people say they know –

invariably the authority they claim –

is an authority beyond authorship –

an authority they don’t have

therefore the claim to know –

is false and deceptive

yes the claim to know –

may have rhetorical effect –

but if so it is an effect –

based on deception                                                                                                                                 

on certainty 408

408. For if someone says he knows such-and-such, and this is part of his philosophy – then his philosophy is false if he has slipped up in his statement.

                                                                                                                                  

if he makes this claim to know – and it is part of his philosophy –

then his philosophy is false

on certainty 409

409. If I say “I know that that’s a foot” – what am I really saying? Isn’t the whole point that I am certain of the consequences – that if someone else had been in doubt I might say to him “you see – I told you so”? Would my knowledge still be worth anything if it let me down as a clue in action? And can’t it let me down?

the ‘I know’ in ‘I know that that’s a foot’ –

is a claim of authority for the proposition –

‘that’s a foot’

the only authority is authorship –

and so ‘I know’ –

is irrelevant and unnecessary

if you are certain of the consequences of your statement –

you are a fool –

you can’t be sure what the consequences will be –

fair enough to take a punt –

and you can still say ‘I told you so’ –

if it turns out as you expected

there is no certain knowledge here –

there is only expectation

and the ‘ground’ of expectation –

is uncertainty

on certainty 410

20.3.

410. Our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it.

our knowledge –

just is the propositions – the proposals –

we operate with

and any proposition we operate with –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

as for ‘an enormous system’ –

this really just irrelevant rhetoric –

perhaps it gives the impression of substance –

of authority

we deal with reality – proposition by proposition

yes – you can systematize the propositions –

but any ‘system’ is no more than –

a description of use –

and like any description –

open to question – open to doubt –

the value we give ‘a particular bit’ –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

and this will be the case

whether you regard the ‘particular bit’ –

as in a system –

or not

on certainty 411

411. If I say “we assume that the world has existed for many years past” (or something similar), then of course it sounds strange that we should assume such a thing. But in the entire system of our language games it belongs to the foundations. The assumption one might say, forms the basis of action, and therefore naturally of thought.

and the assumption – like any assumption – is uncertain

on certainty 412

412. Anyone who is unable to imagine a case in which one might say “I know that this is my hand” (and such cases are certainly rare) might say that these words were nonsense. True, he might also say “Of course I know – how could I not know?” – but then he would possibly be taking the sentence ‘This is my hand” as an explanation of the words “my hand”.

the point is that in any situation the preface ‘I know’ –

is illogically irrelevant and misleading –

it’s only value is rhetorical –

whether you can imagine the sentence –

or not

and yes – ‘this is my hand’ –

might well be used an explanation of the words –

’my hand’

however it is not the only possible explanation –

and in any case –

an ‘explanation’ is just a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 413

413. For suppose you were guiding a blind man’s hand, and as you were guiding it along yours you said “this is my hand”; if he then said “are you sure?” or “do you know it is?”, it would take very special circumstances for that to make sense.

the blind man is asking you for an authority for your assertion –

not only is he blind – he’s deluded as well

on certainty 414

414. But on the other hand: how do I know that is my hand? Do I even here know exactly what it means to say it is my hand? – When I say “how do I know?” I do not mean that I have the least doubt of it. What we have here is a foundation for all my action. But it seems to me that it is wrongly expressed by the words “I know”.

‘I know’ –

as the foundation of all my action –

but wrongly expressed by ‘I know’

so the idea is – this foundation –

whatever it is –

is unexpressed

this is mysticism –

not logic

perhaps Wittgenstein recognizes

that any proposal he might put forward –

for a foundation –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain –

and this is just what he doesn’t want –

despite being logically compelled –

to this conclusion –

so he plays the mystical hand

we can only see this as –

pathetic

on certainty 415

415. And in fact, isn’t the use of the word “know” as a pre-eminently philosophical word altogether wrong? If “know” has this interest, why not “being certain”? Apparently because it would be too subjective. But isn’t “know” just as subjective? Isn’t one simply misled by the grammatical peculiarity that “p” follows from “I know p”?

“I believe I know” would not need to express a lesser degree of certainty. – True, but one isn’t trying to express even the greatest subjective certainty, but rather that certain propositions seem to underlie all questions and all thinking.

subjective or not –

‘I know’ – is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant –

any claim to an authority –

other than authorship –

is false and deceptive

in practise –

the only value ‘I know’ has –

is rhetorical

why not ‘being certain’?

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain –

the claim of certainty –

is a denial of propositional logic –

it may have rhetorical effect –

but it is logically corrupt

Wittgenstein is right –

that ‘p’ follows from ‘I know p’ –

is just a language game –

that in itself –

has no epistemological significance

‘I believe I know’ –

indicates uncertainty –

given that any proposition –

is uncertain –

the preface ‘I believe I know’ –

is irrelevant

the ‘greatest subjective certainty’ –

or for that matter –

the ‘greatest objective certainty’ –

is just philosophical rhetoric

a proposition – is a proposal –

a proposal is uncertain

it is just this uncertainty –

that is the ground of  –

all thinking and questioning

any proposition put forward –

as underlying –

all questions and thinking –

will itself be open to question –

open to doubt –

will be uncertain

on certainty 416

416. And have we an example of this in, say, the proposition that I have been living in this room for weeks past, that my memory does not deceive me in this?

–        “certain beyond all reasonable doubt” –

any proposition –

that is any proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

‘beyond reasonable doubt’ –

is just someone’s decision –

to stop questioning –

to stop thinking –

and to call that –

‘reasonable’

on certainty 417

21.3

417. “I know that for the last month I have had a bath everyday.” What am I remembering? Each day and the bath each morning? No. I know that I bathed each day and I do not derive that from some other immediate datum. Similarly I say “I felt a pain in my arm” without this locality coming into my consciousness in any other way (such as by means of an image).

the assertion – ‘for the last month I have had a bath every day’ –

is just that – an assertion –

it is open to question – open to doubt –

open to revision

Wittgenstein prefaces this assertion with ‘I know’ –

in so doing he corrupts the assertion –

‘I know that for the last month I have gad a bath every day’

is the attempt to render the proposition –

beyond question – beyond doubt

what we have here –

is propositional vandalism

‘I felt a pain in my arm’

is an assertion – like any other assertion –

open to question – open to doubt –

open to revision

on certainty 418

418. Is my understanding only blindness to my own lack of understanding? It often seems to me.

to understand –

is to recognize –

and to deal with –

uncertainty

on certainty 419

419. If I say “I have never been in Asia Minor”, where do I get this knowledge from? I have not worked it out, no one told me; my memory tells me. – So I can’t be wrong about it? Is there a truth here that I know? – I cannot depart from this judgment without toppling all other judgments with it.

‘I have never been in Asia Minor’

what you have here is an assertion –

not knowledge –

and the further assertion –

that ‘my memory tells me’

Wittgenstein goes from this to saying –

‘so I can’t be wrong’ –

to say this – is to say – ‘I am certain’

memory is not certain –

his statement is neither –

right or wrong –

it is uncertain –

it is open to question –

open to doubt

he then says –

‘I cannot depart from this judgment without toppling all other judgments with it’

judgment is not about certainty

the ground of judgment is uncertainty –

judgment is decision in the face of uncertainty

and any judgment made –

will be uncertain

on certainty 420

420. Even a proposition like this one, that I am now living in England, has these two sides: it is not a mistake – but on the other hand, what do I know of England? Can’t my judgment go all to pieces?

Would it not be possible that people came into my room and all declared the opposite? – even gave me ‘proofs’ of it, so that I suddenly stood there like a madman alone among people who all were normal, or a normal person alone among madmen? Might I not then suffer doubts about what at present seems at the furthest from remove from doubt?

the ground of any judgment – is uncertainty

and whether a judgment does or does not ‘go all to pieces’ –

will depend on circumstances

in the event of the madman scenario –

if you understand that all judgments are uncertain –

then you will see that you are all in the same boat

regardless of numbers –

and regardless of so called ‘proofs’

in the event of conflict –

what wins the day will be what people assent to

and of course –

you can always go it alone

on certainty 421

421. I am in England. Everything around me tells me so; wherever and however I let my thoughts turn, they confirm this for me at once. – But might I not be shaken if things such as I don’t dream of at present were to happen?

yes –

and what this would point to –

is that despite any illusions you might have had –

of knowledge –

of certainty –

what you actually face –

is uncertainty

on certainty 422

422.  So I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism.

Here I am being thwarted by a kind of Weltanschauung.

a Weltanschauung –

a world view –

is in the end –

only a proposal –

a proposition –

and like any proposition –

any proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

you will only feel ‘thwarted’ –

if you have fallen for

the deception –

the delusion –

of certainty

on certainty 423

423. Then why don’t I simply say with Moore “I know that I am in England”? Saying this is meaningful in particular circumstances, which I can imagine. But when I utter the sentence outside these circumstances, as an example to show that I know truths of this kind with certainty, then it strikes me as fishy. – Ought it to?

to preface any statement with ‘I know’ –

is to claim an authority for that statement

the only authority is authorship –

and it is redundant and irrelevant –

to assert authorship of your statement

any claim to authority – beyond authorship –

in or out – of a particular circumstance –

is false and deceptive

the only value any such claim has –

is rhetorical

on certainty 424

424. I say “I know p” either to assure people that I, too, know the truth p, or simply as an emphasis of |-p. One says, too, “I don’t believe I know it”. And one might also put it like this (for example) “That’s a tree. And that’s not just surmise.”

But what about this: “If I were to tell someone that that was a tree, that wouldn’t be just surmise.”  Isn’t this what Moore was trying to say?

yes – it could well be – but the point is this –

stating that a proposition is not a surmise –

doesn’t make it any less a surmise

I think Moore wanted certainty –

and in the end came to the view –

that all he had to do was assert it –

and he managed to con a number of other idiots –

into sharing his pretentious delusion

on certainty 425

425. It would not be surmise and I might tell it to someone else with complete certainty, as something there is no doubt about. But does that mean that it is unconditionally the truth? May not the thing I recognize with complete certainty as the tree that I have seen here my whole life long – may not this be disclosed as something different? May it not confound me?

And nevertheless it was right, in the circumstances that give this sentence meaning, to say “I know (I do not surmise) that’s the tree”. To say that in strict truth I only believe it, would be wrong. It would be completely misleading to say: “I believe my name is L. W.” And this too is right: I cannot be making a mistake about it. But that does not mean that I am infallible about it.

‘that’s the tree’ –

is all that is required –

‘my name is …’ –

is all that is required

if you preface these assertions with ‘I know’ or ‘I believe’ – etc. –

all you do is introduce irrelevancies –

and create obfuscation

claims to knowledge –

claims to certainty –

are claims of authority

the only logical authority you have –

is authorship –

beyond that any claim to authority –

is rhetorical

any proposition you put forward is a proposal –

and is therefore –

logically speaking –

uncertain

uncertainty is no bar to use –

in fact uncertainty is the ground of use  

as to how your proposal functions –

that is an uncertain matter

you make assessments –

you make decisions –

you make a call

Wittgenstein says –

‘I cannot possibly be making a mistake. But that does not mean that I am infallible about it’

this is just to say that being certain –

is not –

being certain

look either you are –

or you aren’t

the reality is –

that any proposition is uncertain

in an uncertain world –

there are no mistakes

there are different conceptions –

different descriptions –

different proposals –

different decisions

and furthermore –

if you hold with certainty –

then there’s no space for a mistake

my point is –

certain or uncertain –

the notion of the mistake –

has no role to play here –

it is philosophically useless

it is irrelevant –

it’s not in the picture

p.s.

perhaps Wittgenstein was trying to find a way –

of maintaining certainty –

and at the same time recognizing the sceptical position –

and the idea of the mistake –

became his compromise –

his third way

the fact is –

it doesn’t work

and to even try it on –

suggests to me that Wittgenstein –

who is no fool –

and is as clever as a fox –

has simply lost –

his integrity –

or –

which amounts to the same thing –

is just playing a game –

a language game –

of deception

why?

because he can –

and because it is what he thinks –

philosophy –

and life –

amounts to

on certainty 426

21.3.51

426. But how can we show someone that we know truths, not only about sense data but also about things? For after all it can’t be enough for someone to assure us that he knows.

Well, what must our starting point be if we are to show this?

any claim to know is a claim to an authority for an assertion –

the only authority –

is authorship –

the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant

so logically speaking –

there is no basis –

to the claim to know

beyond authorship –

any claim to an authority for a proposition –

is rhetorical

and logically speaking –

deceptive

the claim to know sense data –

is rhetorical

the claim to know ‘about things’ –

is rhetorical

the claim to know –

is rhetorical

the only showing is assertion –

your showing can be logical –

or rhetorical

if logical –

it is non-rhetorical –

and if non-rhetorical –

it comes without the claim to know –

or any other –

assurance –

and is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 427

22.3.

427. We need to show that even if we never use the words “I know…”, his conduct exhibits the thing we are concerned with.

you can interpret his behaviour –

any way you like

there is no bar –

to a deluded interpretation

on certainty 428

428. For suppose a person of normal behaviour assured us that he only believed his name was such-and-such, he believed he recognized the people he regularly lived with, he believed that he had hands and feet when he didn’t actually see them, and so on. Can we shew him it is not so far from the things he does (and says)?

by saying he believes –

rather than –

he knows with certainty –

he recognizes –

the uncertainty –

of what he does –

and the uncertainty –

of what he says

on certainty 429

23.3.51

429.  What reason have I, now, when I cannot see my toes, to assume that I have five toes on each foot?

Is it right to say that my reason is that previous experience has always taught me so? Am I more certain of previous experience than that I have ten toes?

That previous experience may very well be the cause of my present certitude; but is it its ground?

the assumption of five toes on each foot –

is like any assumption –

open to question –

open to doubt

what reason do I have for making the assumption?

who’s to say?

likely you find the assumption appropriate –

for a whole lot of reasons

if you think that previous experience has taught you so –

that may well be your ‘reason’

if you are certain about this assumption –

all that means is that you haven’t thought about it –

you are on this matter operating in ignorance

and if by ‘ground’ here  is meant certainty –

there is no ground

on certainty 430

430. I meet someone from Mars and he asks me “How many toes have human beings got? – I say “Ten. I’ll shew you”, and take my shoes off. Suppose he was surprised that I knew with such certainty, although I hadn’t looked at my toes – ought I to say: “We humans know how many toes we have whether we can see them or not”?

in expressing surprise here the Martian shows he has a better grasp of epistemology than Wittgenstein –

what Wittgenstein ought to say to the Martian is –

‘we humans pretend knowledge – pretend certainty – we do this when we don’t face reality – when we don’t deal with reality – if you want to understand human beings you need to understand pretence and deception’

on certainty 431

26.3.51

431. “I know that this room is on the second floor, that behind the door a short landing leads to the stairs, and so on.” One could imagine cases where I should come out with this, but they would be extremely rare. But on the other hand I shew this knowledge day in, day out by my actions and also in what I say.

Now what does someone gather from these actions and words of mine? Won’t it just be that I am sure of my ground? – From the fact that I have been living here for many weeks and have gone up and down the stairs every day he will gather that I know where my room is situated. – I shall give him the assurance “I know” when he does not already know things which would have compelled the conclusion that I knew.

                                                                                                                                 

‘I show this knowledge’ –

is to say –

this is my interpretation of what I do

and my interpretation –

like any interpretation –

is uncertain

how do I know that it is how others interpret what I do?

I don’t

‘what does someone gather from these actions and words of mine?’

I don’t know

yes – I make certain assumptions here –

but that is all they are – assumptions

and my assumptions are uncertain

I can ask others what they gather from my actions –

and if I get an answer to this question –

I will have to interpret it

can I know that my interpretation is correct?

no

what I can know –

is that my interpretation –

is open to question –

open to doubt

if I give the assurance ‘I know’ –

what I am doing is claiming an authority –

for my assertion

the only authority is authorship –

and that I am the author of my assertion –

does not guarantee the assertion –

beyond authorship –

any claim to an authority –

is rhetorical

does rhetoric show that I am sure of myself?

no –

but it does show –

that I am a fraud

nobody is compelled –

to any conclusion

on certainty 432

432. The utterance “I know…” can only have its meaning in connection with other evidence of my ‘knowing’.

to say ‘I know’ is to say –

‘I have an authority for this proposition’ –

the only authority you have –

is your authorship

and the only evidence you have –

of your authorship –

is your assertion

on certainty 433

433.  So if I say to someone “I know that that’s a tree”, it is as if I told him “that’s a tree; you can absolutely rely on it; there is no doubt about it”. And a philosopher could only use the statement to show that this form of speech is actually used. But if his use of it is not to be merely an observation about English grammar, he must give the circumstances in which it functions.

such a statement will function –

in whatever circumstance –

pretence and deception –

have a chance

on certainty 434

434. Now does experience teach us that in such-and-such circumstance people know this and that? Certainly, experience shews us that normally after so-and–so many days a man can find his way about a house he has been living in. Or even: experience teaches us that after such-and such a period of training a man’s judgment is to be trusted. He must, experience tells us, have learnt for so long in order to be able to make a correct prediction. But  –  –  –

‘experience’ – is open to question –

open to doubt

what experience teaches us –

is uncertainty

any ‘knowledge’ we have –

is uncertain

a man’s judgment is uncertain

to trust someone’s judgment –

is to accept it uncritically

it is to engage in logical deception

‘correct’ – is a rhetorical expression

any prediction –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 435

27.3.

435. One is often bewitched by a word. For example, by the word “know”.

the word ‘know’ –

is the natural home of pretence

take pretence out of ‘know’ –

and what you have is an empty shell

if you are ‘bewitched’ by pretence –

you are a fool

on certainty 436

436. Is God bound by our knowledge? Are a lot of our statements incapable of falsehood? For that is what we want to say.

our knowledge is uncertain –

therefore –

nothing is bound by it

the truth or falsity of a proposition –

is a matter of assent or dissent

any statement –

any proposition –

can be assented to –

or dissented from

and any act of assent or dissent –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 437

437. I am inclined to say: “That cannot be false.” That is interesting; but what consequences has it?

truth and falsity –

are a matter of assent and dissent

any proposition –

can be assented to –

or dissented from

to say  a proposition –

cannot be false –

is stupid –

such a statement –

is ignorant in the extreme –

and characteristic of –

a bigot

on certainty 438

438. It would not be enough to assure someone that I know what is going on in a certain place – without giving him grounds that satisfy him that I am in a position to know.

‘I know’ –

is a claim to an authority for an assertion –

the only authority is authorship

the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant

if the claim of authority –

is other than the claim of authorship –

it is logically false

such claims may have rhetorical effect –

however it is an effect –

based on deception

what you have with a statement of grounds –

is really no more than restatements –

of the original rhetorical claim –

more of the same

if you satisfy someone that you are in a position to know –

you’ve deceived them

on certainty 439

439. Even the statement “I know that behind this door is a landing and the stairway down to the ground floor” only sounds so convincing because everyone takes it for granted that I know it.

yes –

people have been seduced –

into this knowledge game –

this game of rhetoric

on certainty 440

440. There is something universal here; not just something personal.

the claim of knowledge –

is rhetorical –

and the further claim of universality –

is just an amping up of the rhetoric

rhetoric is essentially weak –

and shallow –

and those who deal in it –

are forever supplementing their claims –

with more of the same –

hoping that they stave off –

the inevitable conclusion –

that they are frauds –

peddling deception

on certainty 441

441. In a court of law the assurance “I know…” on the part of a witness could convince no one. It must be shown that he was in a position to know.

Even the assurance “I know that that’s a hand”, said while someone looked at his own hand, could not be credible unless we knew the circumstances in which it was said. And if we do know them, it seems to be an assurance that the person speaking is normal in this respect.

circumstance is uncertain –

our knowledge of circumstance is uncertain

we make assumptions –

assumptions open to question –

open to doubt

and if they fit –

or appear to fit with the assumptions of others –

we assume agreement

as to ‘normal’ –

this is to underwrite apparent agreement –

with a sanction –

and that’s just rhetoric –

which in the end –

is nothing more than –

 hot air

on certainty 442

442. For may it not happen that I imagine myself to know something?

yes – that’s exactly what happens

on certainty 443

443. Suppose that in a certain language there were no word corresponding to our “know”. – The people simply make assertions. (“That’s a tree”, etc.) Naturally it can occur for them to make mistakes. And so they attach a sign to the sentence which indicates how probable they take a mistake to be – or should I say, how probable a mistake is in this case? This latter can also be indicated by mentioning certain circumstances. For example “Then A said to B ‘...’. I was standing quite close to them and my hearing is good”, or “A was at such-and-such a place yesterday. I saw him from a long way off. My eyes are not very good”, or “There is a tree over there: I can see it clearly and I have seen it innumerable times before”.

good start to drop ‘know’ –

and just operate with basic assertions –

unburdened with rhetoric

if you understand that what you deal with –

in propositional reality –

is uncertainty –

you will see there are no mistakes

what you face is uncertainties –

uncertain propositions –

proposals –

open to  question –

open to doubt

on certainty 444

444. "The train leaves at two o'clock. Check it once more to make certain" or "The train leaves at two o'clock. I have just looked it up in a new time-table." One may also add "I am reliable in such matters". The usefulness of such additions is obvious.

‘check it once more to be certain’

‘checking it’ once more –

does not result in certainty –

all checking does is repeat the original action

you can repeat the action again and again –

you never leave uncertainty                                                                                                                               

‘I have just looked it up in a new timetable’ –                                                                                                                             

or ‘I am reliable in such matters’ –

these are rhetorical statements –

they may be customary –

but they guarantee nothing

are they are useful?

they will only be useful –

if rhetoric –

is regarded as useful

on certainty 445

445. But if I say “I have two hands”, what can I add to indicate reliability? At the most that the circumstances are the ordinary ones.

all that you can add –

to indicate reliability –

will be rhetoric

‘circumstance’ –

ordinary or not –

is uncertain

on certainty 446

446. But why am I so certain that this is my hand? Doesn’t the whole language-game rest on this kind of certainty?

Or: isn’t this ‘certainty’ (already) presupposed in the language-game? Namely by virtue of the fact that one is not playing the game, or is playing it wrong, if one does not recognize objects with certainty.

propositions are proposals –

proposal are open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

the language-game is the game of propositions –

the language-game rests on uncertainty

the recognition of an object –

is an exercise in uncertainty

the object recognized –

independent of description –

is unknown

it is only in terms of description –

that the object is recognized

any description is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

what is presupposed –

in the language-game of description –

is uncertainty

Wittgenstein’s language-game of certainty –

is the game of logical deception

on certainty 447

447. Compare with this 12 x 12 = 144. Here too we don’t say “perhaps”. For, in so far as this proposition rests on our not miscounting or miscalculating and on our senses not deceiving us as we calculate, both propositions, the arithmetical one and the physical one, are on the same level.

I want to say: The physical game is just as certain as the arithmetical. But this can be misunderstood. My remark is a logical and not a psychological one.

12 x 12 = 144 – is a word-game –

a game of sign substitution

12 x 12 = 144 is an instruction –

if you follow the instruction –

you play the game

if you don’t follow the instruction –

for whatever reason –

you don’t play the game –

that is to say you don’t calculate

there is no miscalculation –

you either calculate –

or you don’t

the terms of such a proposition –

as 12 x 12 = 144 –

are open to question –

open to doubt –

as indeed –

the history of pure mathematics –

testifies

as to ‘physical propositions’ –

any operating assumptions that we work with –

i.e. our senses do not deceive us –

are uncertain

they can be and at times are –

questioned

doubt shadows –

practise

on certainty 448

448. I want to say: If one doesn’t marvel at the fact that the propositions of arithmetic (e.g. the multiplication tables) are ‘absolutely certain’, then why should one be astonished that the proposition “This is my hand” is so equally?

whether someone is astonished or not –

has nothing to do with the issue of the logical status of propositions –

so Wittgenstein’s statement here –

is really just an example of his rhetoric –

his attempt to con you into adopting his view on certainty –

is a pretty poor effort really

any proposition – arithmetical or empirical –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

with arithmetical propositions –

what you have is instruction –

instruction for a game of sign substitution

if you play the game –

you play it as instructed –

however you can play the game –

and at the same time understand –

that every term and every concept –

involved in the game –

is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 449

449. Something must be taught us as a foundation.

and if it’s not –

what’s the loss?

the loss –

is the loss of deception –

and pretence

on certainty 450

450. I want to say: our learning has the form “that is a violet”, “that is a table”. Admittedly, the child might hear the word “violet” for the first time in the sentence “perhaps that is a violet”, but then he could ask “What is a violet?’ Now this of course might be answered by showing him a picture. But how would it be if one said “that is a …” only when showing him a picture, but otherwise said nothing but “perhaps that is a…” – What practical consequences is that supposed to have?

A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt.

we operate with propositions –

what a child needs to be shown –

is that any proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt

that even though we use propositions –

and use them effectively –

they are uncertain

a question that questioned everything –

is still a question

on certainty 451

451. My objection against Moore, that the meaning of the isolated sentence “That is a tree” is undetermined, since it is not determined what the “that” is that is said to be a tree – doesn’t work, for one can make the meaning more definite by saying, for example: “That object over there that looks like a tree is not an artificial imitation of a real tree but a real one.”

                                                                                                                                  

that – independent of any determination –

is unknown

and any ‘determination’ of that –

will be open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 452

452. It would not be reasonable to doubt if that was a real tree or only…

My finding it beyond doubt is not what counts. If a doubt would be unreasonable, that cannot be seen from what I hold. There would therefore have to be a rule that declares doubt to be unreasonable. But there isn’t such a rule, either.

the proposition – any proposition – is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘finding beyond doubt’ –

is to find against propositional logic –

it is to find for prejudice – for ignorance –

for stupidity

any so called ‘rule’ – like any proposition –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

and any rule that declared doubt to be ‘unreasonable’ –

or for that matter ‘reasonable’ –

at best is a piece of rhetoric –

and like all rhetoric – whether effective or not –

hot air

on certainty 453

453. I do indeed say: “Here no reasonable man would doubt.” – Could we imagine learned judges being asked whether a doubt was reasonable or unreasonable?

‘here no reasonable man would doubt’ –

is just rhetoric

yes – I can indeed imagine ‘learned’ judges being asked –

what was reasonable or unreasonable

and their judgment would be –

a rhetorical judgment

on certainty 454

454. There are cases where doubt is unreasonable, but others where it seems logically impossible. And it seems to be no clear boundary between them.

Wittgenstein doesn’t say what these cases are –

and the reason is of course –

that if he did give examples –

they would be subject  to question –

to doubt

and his carefully worded charade –

would just collapse

‘no clear boundary between them’ –

the point being –

any distinction – genuine or not –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 455

29.3

455. Every language-game is based on words ‘and objects’ being recognized again. We learn with the same inexorability that this is a chair as that 2 x 2 = 4.

recognition is an exercise in uncertainty –

in any act of recognition –

you are faced with question of how to describe

you may have a description that you think will be useful –

but there is no certainty here –

always you have to decide which description – if any –

of any number of possible descriptions –

best fits the circumstances –

will be most useful –

and in a final sense you don’t know with any certainty –

what will and will not work –

but you take a punt –

you proceed in uncertainty

‘this is a chair’ –

is one possible description of a state of affairs –

a state of affairs that without description –

is unknown

if it’s a useful description –

it is likely that you will consider using it again

2 x 2 = 4 –

is a language-game of sign substitution –

if you play the game –

you play it according to its terms

the ground – the terms – the operations of this game –

like the bases of any other game –

are open to question – open to doubt –

just check the history of arithmetic –

the history of mathematics

if you learn how to play this game –

this game of sign substitution –

you can play it any number of times –

what we are talking about here –

is repetition –

not inexorability

on certainty 456

456. If, therefore, I doubt or am uncertain about this being my hand (in whatever sense), why not in that case about the meaning of these words as well?

yes

on certainty 457

457. Do I want to say, then, that certainty resides in the nature of the language-game?

no –

language is a response to the unknown –

and any response is –

uncertain

on certainty 458

458. One doubts on specific grounds. The question is this: how is doubt introduced into the language-game?

it is not that doubt is introduced into the language –

any use of language is uncertain –

the language-game is the game of doubt

on certainty 459

459. If the shopkeeper wanted to investigate each of his apples without any reason, for the sake of being certain about everything, why doesn’t he have to investigate the investigation? And one can talk of the belief here (I mean belief as in ‘religious belief’, not surmise)? All psychological terms merely distract us from the thing that really matters.

there is no reason why he couldn’t investigate the investigation –

but perhaps there were other things he wanted to do that were more important to him

like selling the apples

all terms – psychological or not –

are open to question –

open to doubt

‘the thing that really matters’ –

is always –

a question

on certainty 460

460. I go to the doctor, shew him my hand and say “This is a hand, not…; I’ve injured it etc., etc.” Am I only giving him a piece of superfluous information? For example, mightn’t one say: supposing the words “This is a hand” were a piece of information – how could you bank on him understanding this information? Indeed, it is open to doubt ‘whether that is a hand’, why isn’t it open to doubt whether I am a human being who is informing the human being of this? – But on the other hand one can imagine cases – even if they are very rare ones – where the declaration is not superfluous, or is only superfluous but not absurd.

you cannot ‘bank on’ on him understanding –

fair enough to assume that he will –

but here we are talking about assumption –

and assumption is uncertain

it is open to doubt whether this is a hand –

and whether I am a human being informing another human being –

any of these matters can be the subject of doubt –

whether they will be or not –

is a matter of circumstance –

and here we are dealing fair and square –

with uncertainty

on certainty 461

461. Suppose that I were the doctor and a patient came to me, showed me his hand and said: “This thing that looks like a hand isn’t just a superb imitation – it really is a hand” – and went on to talk about his injury – should I really take this as a piece of information, even though a superfluous one? Shouldn’t I be more likely to consider it nonsense, which admittedly did have the form of a piece of information? For, I should say, if this information really were meaningful, how can he be certain of what he says? The background is lacking for it to be information.

                                                                                                                                   

‘how can he be certain of what he says?’

he can’t be certain –

for the ground of all propositional use –

is uncertainty

‘The background is lacking for it to be information’

the doctor will need to provide a background to the statement

i.e. perhaps the patient is mentally ill?

if the doctor can’t provide a background –

he will have to say –

‘I don’t know what you are talking about’

on certainty 462

30.3.

462. Why doesn’t Moore produce as one of the things he knows, for example, that in such-and such a part of England there is a village called so-and-so? In other words: why doesn’t he mention a fact that is known to him and not to every one of us?

Moore’s trick is to connect with common epistemological prejudice and ignorance –

and re-brand it as reason and  knowledge

on certainty 463

31.3

463. This is certainly true, that the information “That is a tree”, when no one could doubt it, might be a kind of joke and as such have meaning. A joke of this kind was in fact made once by Renan.

any assertion –

is open to interpretation –

open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 464

3.4.51

464. My difficulty can also be shewn like this: I am sitting talking to a friend. Suddenly I say “I knew all along that you were so-and-so.” Is that really a superfluous, though true, remark?

I feel as if these words were like “Good morning” said to someone in the middle of a conversation.

whether the remark is superfluous or not –

really depends on the understandings of those in the conversation –

and the matter is never fully determined

i.e. what immediately strikes one as superfluous –

might on review be seen in a different light

on certainty 465

465. How would it be if we had the words “They know nowadays that there are over…species of insects” instead of “I know that that’s a tree”? If someone were to suddenly utter the first sentence out of all context one might think: he has been thinking of something else in the interim and is now saying out loud some sentence in his train of thought. Or again: he is in trance and is speaking without understanding what he is saying.

firstly –

any claim to knowledge –

is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

authorship is logically irrelevant

the claim to knowledge –

is logically irrelevant

nevertheless –

such claims are made

any such claim to an authority –

other than authorship –

is logically false and deceptive –

such claims may have rhetorical value –

that is to say –

their point is persuasion –

if so it is persuasion –

based on deception

secondly –

context is uncertain –

and whether a particular usage fits a context –

will be uncertain

in the event of a usage appearing not to fit a context –

other contexts are looked for

however any interpretation is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 466

466. Thus it seems to me I have known something the whole time, and yet there is no meaning in saying so, in uttering this truth.

the claim of knowledge is rhetorical –

rhetoric is not without meaning –

but if you are not trying to convince anyone of anything –

then there is no point to –

propagating the deception

on certainty 467

467. I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again “I know that that’s a tree”, pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: “This fellow isn’t insane. We are only doing philosophy.”

say whatever you like –

and whether you are doing philosophy or not –

the claim of knowledge –

is either irrelevant or deceptive

the claim of knowledge –

is a claim of authority –

the only authority is authorship –

the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant –

beyond authorship –

any claim to an authority –

is rhetorical

rhetoric is the art of persuasion –

and its basis is –

a false claim to authority

the ground of rhetoric –

is deception

on certainty 468

4.4

468. Someone says irreverently “that’s a tree”. He might say this sentence because he remembers hearing it in a similar situation; or he was suddenly struck by the tree’s beauty and the sentence was an exclamation; or he was pronouncing the sentence to himself as a grammatical example; etc., etc. And now I ask him “How did you mean that?’ and he replies ”It was a piece of information directed at you”. Shouldn’t I be at liberty to assume he doesn’t know what he is saying, if he is insane enough to want to give me this information?

you can assume –

whatever you like –

bear in mind though –

your assumption –

is uncertain –

is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 469

469. In the middle of a conversation, someone says to me out of the blue “I wish you luck.” I am astonished; but later I realize that these words connect up with his thoughts about me. And now they do not strike me as meaningless any more.                                                                                                                                

meaning is uncertain

on certainty 470

470. Why is there no doubt that I am called L.W? It does not seem at all like something that one could establish at once beyond doubt. One would not think that it is one of the indubitable truths.

5.4.

[Here there is still a gap in my thinking. And I doubt whether it will ever be filled now.]

how could you know –

that there is no doubt that you are called  L.W.?

there may well be doubt –

and you –

not aware of it

there is nothing –

‘that one could establish at once beyond doubt’ –

and no such thing –

as an indubitable truth –

any proposition –

any proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt

the gap in Wittgenstein’s thinking –

is the unknown –

and it’s a big gap

the unknown is the ground of all our thinking –

and it is ‘filled’ –

with our proposals –

our propositions –

it is ‘filled’ –

with uncertainty

                                                                                                                               

on certainty 471

471. It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not to try to go back further.

you begin with whatever proposition is put to you –

whatever proposition is before you

on certainty 472

472. When a child learns a language it learns at the same time what is to be investigated and what not. When it learns that there is a cupboard in the room, it isn’t taught to doubt whether what it sees later on is still a cupboard or only a kind of stage set.

any language use is open to question –

open to doubt

a child doesn’t need to be taught to doubt

to doubt – to question – is natural

if the child is taught not to doubt –

the child is being –

indoctrinated

on certainty 473

473. Just as in writing we learn a particular basic form of letters and then vary it later, so we learn first the stability of things as the norm, which is then subject to alterations.

all learning – genuine learning –

is a response to uncertainty –

the learning of a form of letters –

or the learning of ‘the stability of things’ –

whether altered latter or not –

is a response to uncertainty –

and anything that we do learn –

is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 474

474. This game proves its worth. That may be the cause of it being played, but it is not the ground.

the so called ‘ground’ of any game –

is its so called justification –

and that is just the spouting of rhetoric

this game or that game – or whatever game –

will be played if it is useful

and any aspect of any game –

will be open to question – open to doubt –

will be uncertain

on certainty 475

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination.

outside of any characterization –

man – language – or anything else for that matter –

is an unknown

and any characterization we put forward –

any proposal –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain –

by all means have a go –

have something to say –

but don’t regard anything you run with –

as inviolate

on certainty 476

6.4.

476. Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc. etc. – they learn to fetch the books, sit in armchairs, etc. etc

Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise. “Is there such a thing as a unicorn?” and so on. But such a question is possible only because as a rule no corresponding question presents itself. For how does one know how to set about satisfying oneself of the existence of unicorns? How did one learn the method of determining whether something exists or not?

yes children act – and they learn to act in terms of descriptions given them

‘is there such a thing as a unicorn?’ –

                                                                                                                                  

is a question of the application of a description –

i.e. – do I use the term ‘unicorn’ – in the same way as I would use the term ‘book’ or ‘armchair’?

one does not set about satisfying oneself of the existence of unicorns – one learns – where the term ‘unicorns’ has function and where it does not –

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

‘how does one learn the method of determining whether something exists or not?’

the question is – ‘does this description have function – and if so in what context?’

to exist is to be described – to be made known

before description – all we have is ‘that’ which is not described – that which has not been made known

‘that’ is the unknown –

and any account of ‘that’ – any description of ‘that’ –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 477

477. “So one must know that the objects whose names one teaches a child by ostensive definition exist.” – Why must one know they do? Isn’t it enough that experience doesn’t later show the opposite?

For why should the language game rest on some kind of knowledge?

‘so one must know that the objects one teaches a child by ostensive definition exist’

what you teach by ostensive definition – is description –

if you were to ask – well what is it finally that is being described?

the answer is – the unknown

‘isn’t it enough that experience doesn’t later show the opposite?’

what experience shows – is uncertainty

‘for why should the language game rest on some kind of knowledge?’

it doesn’t

the language-game rests on the unknown –

and the language-games we play –

are uncertain

on certainty 478

7.4.

478. Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a mouse exists?

a child operates with a description –

a description of ‘that’ –

which undescribed – is unknown

as for belief –

what we can say is that –

if the description functions –

i.e. the description ‘milk’ –

it will be used –

belief here is really the expectation of function –

and expectation is uncertain

as to knowledge –

if by knowledge we mean – certainty –

a description may be presented to the child as certain –

but this is to deceive the child

and in reality a good part of the business of learning –

is the unlearning of this deception

to know is to not be deceived –

to throw off the deception and pretension of certainty –

and to recognize that our descriptions –

are uncertain

does a cat know that a mouse exists?

does a cat know?

does a cat describe –

battle with pretension and its absence?

no – just the mouse

                                                                                        

on certainty 479

479. Are we to say that the knowledge that there are physical objects comes very early or very late?

two issues –

does the use of the description ‘physical object’ –

come early or late

and does the use of the claim to knowledge

come early or late –

these are empirical questions

on certainty 480

8.4

480. A child is learning to use the word “tree”. One stands with it in front of a tree and says “Lovely tree!” Clearly no doubt as to the tree’s existence comes into the language-game. But can the child be said to know: ‘that a tree exists’? Admittedly it’s true that ‘knowing something’ doesn’t involve thinking about it –  but mustn’t anyone who knows something be capable of doubt? And doubting means thinking.

there is no doubt expressed in – ‘lovely tree’ –

but the description is open to question –

open to doubt

‘but can the child be said to know that a tree exists?’

what the child knows is description –

what exists for the child is description

and any description is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

what the child knows is uncertain –

what exists for the child is uncertain

to know is to question –

to know is to doubt

and to doubt –

is to think

on certainty 481

481. When one hears Moore say “I know that that’s a tree “, one suddenly understands those who think that that has by no means been settled.

The matter strikes one all at once as being unclear and blurred. It is as if Moore had put it in the wrong light.

It is as if I were to see a painting (say a painted stage-set) and recognize what it represents from a long way off at once and without the slightest doubt. But now I step nearer: and then I see a lot of patches of different colours, which are all highly ambiguous and do not provide any certainty whatever.

the reason Moore’s claim of ‘I know’ is by no means settled –

is that any proposition – with or without the rhetoric of ‘I know’ –

is a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

on certainty 482

482. It’s as if  “I know” did not tolerate a metaphysical emphasis.

I know has an authoritative emphasis –

for which there is no metaphysical basis

and from a logical point of view –

it doesn’t figure at all

it’s only claim to fame –

is  rhetorical

on certainty 483

483. The correct use of the expression “I know”. Someone with bad sight asks me “do you believe that the thing we can see there is a tree?” I reply “I know it is; I can see it clearly and am familiar with it”. – A: “Is N.N at home?” – I: “I believe he is.” – A: ‘Was he at home yesterday?” – I: “Yesterday he was – I know he was; I spoke to him.” – A: “Do you know or only believe that this part of the house is built on later than the rest?” – I: “I know it is; I got it from so and so.”

‘I can see it clearly and am familiar with it’ –

‘yesterday he was – I spoke to him’ –

‘I got it from so and so’ –

are straight out propositions –  proposals – open to question – open to doubt

the preface ‘I know’ – is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

it is unnecessary and irrelevant to claim authorship of your assertion –

logically speaking ‘I know’ is unnecessary and irrelevant

beyond authorship –

any claim to an authority is rhetorical

‘I believe he is’ –

the use of ‘believe’ here is logically correct –

if it indicates uncertainty –

however given that any proposition is open to question –

open to doubt – is uncertain –

it is unnecessary and irrelevant –

in so far as ‘believe’ is rhetorical –

it has no logical value –

and is basically hot air

on certainty 484

484. In these cases, then, one says “I know” and mentions how one knows, or at least one can do so.

the claim to know is a claim to authority

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority is pretence

so any account of how you know –

is an account of the steps involved –

in the development of –

your pretence

on certainty 485

485. We can also imagine a case where someone goes through a list of propositions and as he does so asking “Do I know that or do I only believe it?” He wants to check the certainty of each individual proposition. It might be a question of making a statement as a witness before a court.

the certainty of each proposition?

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

any ‘checking’ of a proposition –

will raise questions –

will reveal – uncertainty

any statement – before a court –

or not –

is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 486

9.4

486. “Do you know or do you only believe that your name is L.W? Is that a meaningful question?

Do you know or do you only believe that what you are writing down are German words? Do you only believe that ‘believe’ has this meaning? What meaning?

‘do you know or do you only believe that your name is L.W? Is that a meaningful question?

yes – it questions the epistemological status of a proposition

‘do you know or do you only believe that what you are writing down are German words?’

‘German words’ – is a description of usage –

it is not the only possible description –

i.e. linguists may have other descriptions –

there is no definite description of usage

‘do you only believe that ‘believe’ has this meaning?’

‘believe’ – indicates uncertainty –

and uncertainty itself –

is open to question – open to doubt

‘what meaning?’ –

whatever the answer here –

it will be open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 487

487. What is the proof that I know something? Most certainly not my saying that I know it.

if by proof is meant –

that which makes a proposition certain –

there is no proof –

for a proposition – is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

if by proof is meant and argument

for the proposition –

that cannot be contest –

there is no such argument

the claim to know is a claim of authority –

for the proposition –

the only authority is authorship –

authorship does not guarantee a proposition

‘I know’ = ‘I am the author of’ –

it is irrelevant and redundant to assert –

that you are the author of your assertion

‘I know’ – is logically irrelevant

any claim to authority apart from authorship –

is rhetorical

the point of which is persuasion –

‘I know’ may have persuasive value –

it has no logical value –

and if it has persuasive value –

it is persuasion –

based on deception –

the deception of the false claim –

to a false authority

‘I know’ is empty and vacuous rhetoric

saying ‘I know’ –

is really all it does amount to

on certainty 488

488. And so when writers enumerate all the things they know, that proves nothing whatsoever.

So the possibility of knowledge about physical objects cannot be proved by the protestations of those who believe that they have such knowledge.

people make assertions –

if they claim to know they claim an authority –

the only authority they actually have –

is the authority of authorship

beyond that any claim to authority is pretence

if you drop this pretence –

what you have – all you have –

is assertion

if you claim there are physical objects –

                                                                                                                                    

that is all there is to it –

the assertion –

open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 489

489. For what reply does one make to someone who says “I believe it merely strikes you as if you knew it”?

if you want to convince them –

that you do know –

you can attempt to persuade them –

with whatever arguments you have

in short – all you can do is –

ramp up the rhetoric

on certainty 490

490. When I ask “Do I know or do I only believe that I am called…?’ it is no use to looking within myself.

But I could say: not only do I never have the slightest doubt that I am called that, but there is no judgement that I could be certain of if I started doubting that.

you might well assume that you are called  …

but how would you know?

that is how would you know what everyone has does or will call you?

and you can call yourself whatever you like – whenever you like

if you are saying there is no judgment that you could be certain of –

if you started doubting that you are called …

all you are saying is that if you were to question this –

you can be certain of nothing

and that I think is a fair point –

if you question – how can you be sure?

and if you don’t question –

or you are not open to question –

it’s not that you are certain –

it is rather that you are stupid

on certainty 491

10.4

491. “Do I know or do I only believe that I am called L.W?” – Of course if the question were “Am I certain or do I only surmise…?” then my answer could be relied on.

even if you answer –

that you surmise –

i.e. that you are not certain –

that answer – that proposal –

that proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

as with any answer –

to any question –

as with any proposal –

any proposition –

you put forward

on certainty 492

492. “Do I know or do I only believe…?” might also be expressed like this: What if it seemed to turn out that what until now has seemed immune to doubt was a false assumption? Would I react as I do when a belief has proved to be false? or would it seem to knock from under my feet the ground on which I stand in making any judgments at all? – But of course I do not intend this as a prophesy.

Would I simply say “I should never have thought it!” – or I (have to) refuse to revise my judgment – because such a ‘revision” would amount to annihilation of all yardsticks?

any assumption – any belief – is open to question –

open to doubt –

what seems to be the case –

is all that is the case –

which is to say – what is the case –

is uncertain

nothing is proved – one way or another

what is true – is what you give your assent to

what is false – is what you dissent from –

your assent or dissent –

are open to question – open doubt –

                                                                                                                                    

are uncertain

the ground of all judgment –

is uncertainty

the reason for judgment –

is uncertainty

           

if you refuse to face the reality of uncertainty

then you are in a logical la la land –

and making a stand

for ignorance

on certainty 493

493. So this is it: I must recognize certain authorities in order to make judgments at all?

yes – the argument for authority

the only logical authority – is authorship –

and authorship – guarantees nothing

beyond authorship any claim to authority –

is purely rhetorical

the reason for judgment –

is just that there is no authority

we judge in the face of uncertainty –

and our judgments –

are uncertain

on certainty 494

494. “I cannot doubt this proposition without giving up all judgment.”

But what sort of proposition is that? (It is reminiscent of what Frege said about the law of identity.) It is certainly no empirical proposition. It does not belong to psychology. It has rather the character of a rule.

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt

what sort of proposition is –

‘I cannot doubt this proposition without giving up all judgment’?

it’s an argument for certainty –

and as such –

an argument against propositional logic –

an attempt to corrupt propositional logic –

at best –

a piece of worthless rhetoric

on certainty 495

495. One might simply say “O rubbish!” to someone who wanted to make objections to the propositions that are beyond doubt. That is, not to reply to him but admonish him.

Wittgenstein is being honest here –

he has no argument against doubt –

all he has is authoritarian rhetoric

on certainty 496

496. This is a similar case to that of showing that it has no meaning to say that a game has always been played wrong.

what we are dealing with here –

is not right and wrong –

but uncertainty

as to how a game is played –

i.e. whether it has been played according to its rules –

or not

questions can always be raised

on certainty 497

497. If someone wanted to arouse doubts in me and spoke like this: here your memory is deceiving you, there you’ve been taken in, there again you have not been thorough enough in satisfying yourself, etc., and if I did not allow myself to be shaken but kept to my certainty – then my doing so cannot be wrong, even if only because this is just what defines a game.

someone arousing doubts –

and someone else sticking to their certainty –

is just the rhetorical game

the logic of the situation is –

any proposal – any proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 498

11.4

498. The queer thing is that even though I find it quite correct for someone to say “Rubbish!” and so brush aside the attempt to confuse him with doubts at bedrock, – nevertheless I hold it to be incorrect if he seeks to defend himself (using, e.g., the words “I know”).

  

saying ‘rubbish’ – to brush aside doubts at bedrock –

is just ignorant rhetoric

any proposition – ‘bedrock’ or not –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

‘incorrect  to use the words ‘I know’ to defend against doubt? 

the point is – if we are talking logic –

there is no ‘correct’ use of the words ‘I know’ –                                                                                                                                 

‘I know’ is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

authorship does not guarantee a proposition –

it is logically irrelevant –

‘I know’ is logically irrelevant

if you claim an authority beyond authorship –

your claim is rhetorical –

‘I know’ – as a rhetorical claim–

may have persuasive effect –

but if so –

it is an effect based on –

logical deception

on certainty 499

499. I might also put it like this: the ‘law of induction’ can no more be grounded than certain particular propositions concerning the material of experience.

any proposition –

any proposal –

be it the ‘law of induction’ -

or a particular statement –

is ‘grounded in’ –

uncertainty

on certainty 500

500. But it would also strike me as nonsense to say “I know that the law of induction is true”.

Imagine such a statement in a court of law! It would be more correct to say “I believe in the law of…” where ‘believe’ has nothing to do with surmising.

to say you know anything –

is nonsense –

but you can say –

‘the law of induction is true’ –

for this is just to give your assent to it –

for whatever reason

to say you ‘believe’ or that you ‘surmise’ –

is to recognise –

that the proposition in question –

and any response you have to it –

i.e. ‘true’ or ‘false’ –

is uncertain

these terms ‘believe’ and ‘surmise’ –

amount to the same thing –

and they really only have function –

in a context –

where you are responding to –

or battling –

claims of certainty

where uncertainty is understood –

they are irrelevant

on certainty 501

501. Am I getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it.

logic is a description –

it is a practice of language

on certainty 502

502. Could one say “I know the position of my hands with my eyes closed”, if the position I gave always or mostly contradicted the evidence of other people?

yes – you could make the claim –

but it would be an empty  rhetorical claim –

as with any other claim to know

as to the position of your hands with your eyes closed –

an uncertain matter –

and in fact as uncertain as –

any statement about the position of your hands –

with your eyes open

on certainty 503

503. I look at an object and say “That is a tree”, or “I know that that’s a tree”. –Now if I go nearer and it turns out that it isn’t, I may say “It wasn’t a tree after all” or alternatively I say “It was a tree but now it isn’t any longer”. But if all the others contradicted me, and said it never had been a tree, and if all the other evidences spoke against me – what good would it be to stick to my “I know”?

the ‘I know’ – is a claim to an authority for a proposition –

the only authority is authorship

therefore – ‘I know’ = ‘I am the author of …’

authorship does not guarantee a proposition –

and if you are the author of your proposition –

it is irrelevant and unnecessary to assert it

if you claim an authority – other than authorship –

your claim is false –

if it has rhetorical – persuasive effect –

it is an effect based on deception

so the real question is  – what good is ‘I know’ –

in any circumstance – in any usage?

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

whether or not  anyone agrees with it –

and prefacing it with ‘I know’ –

doesn’t alter this logical reality –

the reality of uncertainty

all it does is introduce an irrelevancy –

or a deception

on certainty 504

504. Whether I know something depends on whether the evidence backs me up or contradicts me. For to say one knows one has a pain means nothing.

evidence is open to question –

open to doubt

evidence is uncertain

an apparent confirmation of a proposition –

or an apparent contradiction –

is likewise open to question –

open to doubt

in the face of this uncertainty –

we make decisions – and we proceed –

our decisions and our procedure –

are uncertain

to say one knows one has a pain –

is to claim an authority for the proposition –

‘I have a pain’

the only authority you have is authorship –

it is unnecessary and irrelevant –

to assert the authorship of your proposition

and furthermore –

authorship does not guarantee a proposition

if your claim of authority is other than authorship –

it is logically false –

perhaps asserting ‘I know’ has rhetorical effect –

i.e. you persuade someone of an authority –

you don’t have –

an authority that doesn’t exist

if so –

all you have achieved is a deception

regardless of what proposition it is attached to –

‘I know’ –

 is logically worthless

on certainty 505

505. It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something.

‘nature’ is just one of the many names we have for the unknown

knowledge is our response to the unknown

we make knowledge – we put up proposals – propositions –

to negotiate the unknown

any proposal we put forward is uncertain –

and any description is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 506

506. “If my memory deceives me here it can deceive me anywhere.”

If I don’t know that, how do I know if my words mean what I believe they mean?

memory is uncertain

there is no deception in uncertainty

any belief I have –

regarding the meaning of my words –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

my knowledge is uncertain

                                                                                                                             

on certainty 507

507. “If this deceives me, what does ‘deceive’ mean anymore?

authority is deception

you are deceived when you accept a claim of authority –

and you deceive when you make a claim of authority

on certainty 508

508. What can I rely on?

nothing

on certainty 509

509.  I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say “can trust something”)

trust is what?

presumably –

the idea that there is some authority –

behind what is said or written

the only authority is authorship –

authorship does not guarantee a proposition

and is logically irrelevant

any other claim to authority –

is logically false –

and is therefore a deception

if I trust you –

if I think that what you say has an authority –

other than your authorship –

then I am deceiving myself

if you want me to trust you –

on the basis of an authority –

other than authorship –

then you are deceiving me

the ground of any language use –

or any language-game –

is uncertainty

Wittgenstein as he points out –

didn’t say ‘can trust’ –

his idea then is that we play –

a crooked game

and on that – by and large –

I think –

he’s right

on certainty 510

510. If I say “Of course I know that that’s a towel” I am making an utterance. I have no thought of verification. For me it is an immediate utterance.

I don’t think of past or future. (And of course it is the same for Moore, too)

It is just like directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts.

the basic utterance here is –

‘that’s a towel’ –

‘of course I know that’ –

is to load up the utterance with rhetoric

Wittgenstein says –

‘I have no thought of verification’ –

wouldn’t that just be because –

‘of course I know’ –

supposedly settles the matter

the point being –

that in claiming to know –

you are claiming that there is no issue of verification

and if you know –

if the matter is settled and certain –

again – there will be no question –

of past or future –

and furthermore – given a claim of certainty –

the immediacy – or otherwise – of an utterance –

is of no logical significance

when you say ‘I know’ –

you are claiming an authority for your proposition –

the only authority you have is authorship –

and asserting the authorship of your proposition –

is unnecessary and irrelevant –

and authorship does not guarantee a proposition

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority –

any claim to know –

is logically false and is deceptive

yes – it may have rhetorical effect

you may fool yourself –

and you may fool someone else –

into thinking you speak with authority –

into thinking that you ‘know’ –

if so – you are a fool –

fooling a fool

‘directly taking hold of something’ –

I presume by this Wittgenstein means –

acting without question – without doubt –

acting without thought

if such an act is to have any epistemological status –

it is an act of unknowing

on certainty 511

511. And yet this direct taking-hold corresponds to a sureness, not to a knowing.

But don’t I take hold of a thing’s name like that, too?

this is an empirical question really –

if you take hold of a thing’s name like that –

without question –

without doubt –

then – there is no question of knowing –

it is an act of un-knowing

it may well be of course though –

that you take hold of a thing’s name –

with a question –

and with a doubt

and if that is the case –

then indeed –

there is a question of knowledge

the logical point is this –

any name – any description –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 512

12.4

512. Isn’t the question this: “What if you had to change your opinion even on these most fundamental things?” And to that the answer seems to be: “You don’t have to change it. That is just what their being ‘fundamental’ is.”

you don’t have to change your opinion –

nevertheless –

any opinion you have –

is open to question –

open to doubt

to regard your opinion as beyond question –

beyond doubt –

is to take a stand for ignorance and stupidity

what is ‘fundamental’ –

is the unknown –

and any response to the unknown –

is uncertain –

opinion is uncertain

on certainty 513

513. What if something really unheard-of happened? – If I, say, saw houses gradually turning into steam without any obvious cause, if the cattle in the fields stood on their heads and laughed and spoke comprehensible words: if trees gradually changed into men and men into trees. Now was I right when I said before all these things happened “I know that that’s a house” etc., or simply “that’s a house” etc.?

‘I know’ is a claim to an authority for an assertion –

the only authority is authorship

therefore –

‘I know’ = ‘I am the author of …’

claiming you are the author of your assertion –

is redundant and irrelevant

any claim to authority – beyond authorship –

is false

in practise such claims have rhetorical value –

however –

any persuasive effect they have –

is grounded in deception

if ‘that’s a house’ – worked for you –

prior to the strange occurrences –

then you were right to use it –

if – in the face of the unexpected –

‘that’s a house’ – doesn’t work for you –

then you will look for another description

any description – any proposal –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 514

514. This statement appeared to me fundamental; if it is false, what are true or false any more?!

if by ‘fundamental’ is meant –

that which is beyond question –

beyond doubt –

there is no fundamental

any statement is open to question –

open to doubt –

the ground of all propositional action –

is uncertainty

‘true’ is what you assent to –

for whatever reason

‘false’ is what you dissent from –

for whatever reason

and your reasons for assent or dissent –

are open to question –

open to doubt –

your assent or dissent –

is uncertain

on certainty 515

515. If my name is not L. W., how can I rely on what is meant by “true” and “false”?

‘true’ –

is what you give your assent to –

for whatever reason

‘false’ –

is what you dissent from –

for whatever reason

there is nothing to rely on –

I expect that I will continue –

to be able to decide –

what I will proceed with –

and what I will not proceed with –

but there is no certainty in this

and the expectation –

natural as it might be –

is in fact groundless

on certainty 516

516. If something happened (such as someone telling me something) calculated to make me doubtful of my own name, there would certainly also be something that made the grounds of these doubts themselves seem doubtful, and I could therefore decide to retain my old belief.

yes –

you could decide to retain your old belief –

and that decision –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 517

517. But might it not be possible for something to happen that threw me entirely off the rails? Evidence that made the most certain thing unacceptable to me? Or at any rate made me throw over my most fundamental judgments? (Whether rightly or wrongly is beside the point.)

yes – this is always possible –

but only if your life ‘runs on rails’ –

and you hold to ‘certain’ things –

and regard your judgments as ‘fundamental’

if you don’t live in such a conceptual straight-jacket –

                                                                                                                           

and don’t follow blindly rules made by others –

if you aware of the uncertainties of existence –

and that the value of any judgment –

is determined by the circumstances

in which it is made –

you will not be thrown ‘entirely’ –

by anything that happens

on certainty 518

518. Could I imagine observing this in another person?

yes – you could imagine this

on certainty 519

519. Admittedly if you are obeying the order “Bring me a book”, you may have to check whether the thing you see over there really is a book, but then you do at least know what people mean by the term “book”; and if you don’t you can look it up, – but then you must know what some other word means. And the fact that a word means such-and-such, is used in such-and-such a way, is in turn an empirical fact, like the fact that what you see over there is a book.

Therefore, in order for you to be able to carry out an order there must be some empirical fact about which you are not in doubt. But doubt itself rests only on what is beyond doubt.

But since a language-game is something that consists in the re-current procedures of the game in time, it seems impossible to say in any individual case that such-and-such must be beyond doubt if there is to be a language-game – though it is right enough to say that as a rule some empirical judgment or other must be beyond doubt.

any empirical fact –

is open to question –

open to doubt

any knowledge you have –

is uncertain

any order you carry out –

any action you perform –

is open to question –

open to doubt

the ground of doubt –

is uncertainty –

any so called ‘rule’ –

like any proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 520

13.4.

520. Moore has every right to say he knows there’s a tree there in front of him. Naturally he may be wrong (For it is not the same as the utterance “I believe there is a tree there.”) But whether he is right or wrong in this case is of no philosophical importance. If Moore is attacking those who say that one cannot really know a thing, he can’t do it by assuring them that he knows this and that. For one need not believe him. If his opponents had asserted that one could not believe this and that, then he could have replied: “I believe it.”

the claim to know is a claim to authority –

the only authority is authorship –

and the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant –

‘I know’ –

is logically irrelevant

beyond authorship any claim to an authority –

is rhetorical –

its point is persuasion –

and it is persuasion –

based on deception

a claim to a false authority

‘If Moore is attacking those who say that one cannot really know a thing, he can’t do it by assuring them that he knows this and that.’

what else can he do?

when his claim to authority is questioned –

all he can do is drop off altogether –

or in one form or another –

reassert it

as to ‘I believe’ –

in a context where claims to know –

are flying thick and fast –

you might preface your statements with ‘I believe’ –

in order to inject a bit of sanity –

a bit of uncertainty –

back into the debate –

but if you are dealing with people –

who recognize uncertainty –

appreciate openness –

and play a straight hand –

‘I believe’ – will be as unnecessary –

and as irrelevant as –

‘I know’

on certainty 521

14.4

521. Moore’s mistake lies in this – countering the assertion that one cannot know that, by saying “I do know it”.

the rhetoric of ‘I know it’ –

is all that Moore has

all he can do is assert or reassert his claim –

and hope that in some way –

he persuades others

it is not that we cannot know –

it is rather that our knowledge –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 522

522. We say: if a child has mastered language – and hence its application – it must know the meaning of words. It must, for example, be able to attach the name of its colour to a white, black, red or blue object without the occurrence of any doubt.

there is no ‘mastering ‘ a language – there is just its use – effective or not

‘to know the meaning of words’ – is to be able use words according to an accepted practise

what counts as accepted practise – while it might be stable in certain contexts –

is never fixed – it is always at base – uncertain

you can attach a name – with the occurrence of doubt –

the world doesn’t end

and if you don’t doubt –

this doesn’t mean that  the use is beyond doubt –

only that you have not questioned what you are doing

children in my experience – if they are given a go –

are the best questioners –

the best doubters

on certainty 523

523. And indeed no one misses doubt here; no one is surprised that we do not merely surmise the meaning of our words.

whether anyone misses doubt here or not –

is not the issue

‘knowing the meaning of a word’ –

is always a question of use

there may be convention here –

but there is no certainty

and therefore any ‘knowledge’ here –

is surmise

on certainty 524

15.4

524. It is essential for our language-games (‘ordering and obeying’ for example) that no doubt appears at certain points, or is it enough if there is the feeling of being sure, admittedly with a slight breath of doubt?

That is, it is enough if I do not, as I do now, call something ‘black’, ‘green’, ‘red’, straight off, without any doubt at all interposing itself – but do I instead say “I am sure that that is red”, as one may say “I am sure that he will come today” (in other words with the ‘feeling of being sure’)?

The accompanying feeling is of course a matter of indifference to us, and equally we have no need to bother about the words “I am sure that” either. – What is important is whether they go with a difference in the practice of the language.

One might ask whether a person who spoke like this would always say “I am sure” on occasions where (for example) there is sureness in the reports we make (in an experiment, for example, we look through a tube and report the colour we see through it). If he does, our immediate inclination will be to check what he says. But if he proves to be perfectly reliable, one will say that his way of talking is merely a bit perverse, and does not affect the issue. One might for example suppose that he has read sceptical philosophers, become convinced that one can know nothing, and that is why he has adopted this way of speaking. Once we are used to it, it does not infect practice.

‘a slight breath of doubt’ –

there goes the neighbourhood

saying ‘I am sure’  –

is rhetoric –

the ‘feeling of being sure ‘ –

is logically irrelevant

any ‘report’ is open to question –

open to doubt

and saying someone is ‘reliable’ –

is just pretence

any observation –

as with any practice –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain –

and it is this uncertainty –

that is the source –

of the vitality –

and the creativity –

at the heart of any genuine –

language-game

on certainty 525

525. What, then, does the case look like where someone really has a different relationship to the names of colours, for example, from us? Where, that is, there persists a slight doubt or a possibility of doubt in their use.

what does this look like?

it looks like a state of affairs –

where presumption and prejudice –

are defeated by difference

and where doubt makes obvious –

that the ground of our language use –

is uncertainty

on certainty 526

16.4

526. If someone were to look at an English pillar-box and say “I am sure that it’s red”, we should have to suppose that he was colour-blind, or believe he had no mastery of English and knew the correct name for the colour in some other language.

If neither was the case we should not quite understand him.

the example here –

makes the point that –

‘I am sure that …’

is not only irrelevant to –

but it can confound –

and derail –

plain and effective –

language use

the general point –

you can take from this –

is that logically speaking –

rhetoric –

is a waste of time –

and space

on certainty 527

527. An Englishman who calls this colour “red” is not ‘sure it is called “red” in English’.

A child who mastered the use of the word is not ‘sure that in his language this colour is called…’. Nor can one say of him that when he is learning to speak he learns that the colour is called that in English; nor yet: he knows this when he has learnt the use of the word.

as to the Englishman –

usage is uncertain –

and description of usage is uncertain

as for the child –

being able to describe usage –

or recognize customary description of usage

requires a level of linguistic sophistication –

that is not essential to basic usage

and in any case –

‘knowing’ language – use and description –

is to deal in –

uncertainty

on certainty 528

528. And in spite of this: if someone asked me what the colour was called in German and I tell him, and now he asks me “are you sure?” – then I shall reply “I know it is; German is my mother tongue”. 

what the colour is called – in any language –

is a question of usage –

circumstance and context

and that is logically speaking  –

uncertain

and this is generally understood and assumed

if some asks you what the colour is called in German

give your answer –

but drop the albatross of certain knowledge –

and don’t bother with the rhetoric –

‘German is my mother tongue’

and if they then ask  you –

are you sure?

do them a philosophical favour –

and say –

no

on certainty 529

529. And one child, for example, will say, of another or of himself, that he already knows what such-and such is called.

children learn from adults –

they learn language use –

and they learn logical deception

on certainty 530

530. I may tell someone “this colour is called ‘red’ in English” (when for example I am teaching him English). In this case I should not say “I know that this colour…” – I would perhaps say that if I had just now learned it, or by contrast with another colour whose English name I am not familiar with.

if you are teaching English – all you need to say is –

‘this colour is called ‘red’ in English –

and you should add the qualification –

‘it really always depends on circumstance and context –

but you will get the hang of this –

as you get more familiar with using the language’

if you have just learnt it –

and you think telling someone this is relevant –

what you say is –‘I have just learnt it’

as to contrasting with another colour –

whose English name you are not familiar with –

if you want to do this –

what you say is –

‘I am familiar with what this colour is called in English –

but not with what that colour is called’

logically speaking – ‘I know’ –

is a dead weight in any language-game –

it’s only value is rhetorical –

that is to say it is of use –

if your game is –

pretence and deception

on certainty 531

531. But now isn’t it correct to describe my present state as follows: I know what this colour is called in English? And if that is correct, why then should I not describe my state with the corresponding words “I know etc.”?

‘I know’ –

adds nothing to the assertion

it might give the impression that you have an authority –

above and beyond authorship –

but that is just pretence

and logically irrelevant

the fact is you are just another language user –

you are the author of your statements –

of your usage –

that’s it

on certainty 532

532. So when Moore sat in front of tree and said “I know that that is a tree”, he was simply stating the truth about his state at the time.

[I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and having to look for it again: now her spectacles now her keys.]

if he was claiming to know – and being genuine – he was deluded –

if not deluded – and claiming to know – he was involved in deception

[doing philosophy is not mislaying what you have found and looking for it –

it is not knowing what you will find when you look]

on certainty 533

533. Well, if it was correct to describe this state out of context, then it was just as correct to utter the words “that’s a tree” out of context.

if you describe a state – you give it context –

and whatever context you give it –

will be open to question – open to doubt

whatever statement is made –

there can always be a question of context –

and any context proposed –

will be open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 534

534. But is it wrong to say: “A child that has mastered a language-game must know certain things”?

If instead of that one said “must be able to do certain things”, that would be a pleonasm, yet this is just what I want to counter the first sentence with. –But: “a child acquires knowledge of natural history”. That presupposes that it can ask what such and such a plant is called.

no one ‘masters’ a language-game –

any language-game is a work in progress

what anyone ‘knows’ – is uncertain –

is a work in progress

and there is no certainty about whether someone can do certain things –

whether they can or not is something to be demonstrated –

and any demonstration is open to question –

open to doubt

yes – so called knowledge presupposes questioning –

presupposes doubt

and the result of any questioning –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 535

535. The child knows what something is called if he can reply correctly to the question “what is that called?”

yes –

knowledge is a response to –

the unknown –

and any response –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 536

536. Naturally, the child who is just learning to speak has not yet got the concept is called at all.

you can describe a language use –

in ‘conceptual’ terms

having ‘the concept is called ’ –

is a description of a language use

so the question here is –

does the child use this description?

most unlikely

the real issue for the child who is just learning to speak –

is learning language practice –

and regardless of what is put to the child –

what the child is taught by others

the learning of language practise –

is learning to deal –

in uncertainty

on certainty 537

537. Can one say of one who hasn’t this concept that he knows what such-and such is called?

‘having a concept’ –

is using a description of language use

any description –

is open to question –open to doubt

knowing –

is not the use of a particular description –

knowing – is recognizing –

and being able to deal with –

the uncertainty –

of language use

on certainty 538

538. The child, I should like to say, learns to react in such-and-such a way, and in so reacting it doesn’t so far know anything. Knowing only begins at a latter level.

to react without questioning –

is to react without knowing

on certainty 539

539. Does it go for knowing as it does for collecting?

no

knowing –

is not about finding pieces of knowledge –

putting them together – and building up –

a collection –

this not what knowing is about

knowing –

is recognizing that any proposition put to you –

or any proposition you put forward –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 540

540. A dog might learn to run to N at the call “N”, and to “M” at the call “M” – but would it mean that he knows what these people are called?

learning without questioning –

is not knowing

on certainty 541

541. “He only knows what this person is called – not yet what that person is called”. That is something one cannot, strictly speaking, say of someone who simply has not yet got the concept of people’s having names.

‘the concept of people’s having names’ –

is a description you might give –

of the action of naming

a description you might offer upon observing –

someone performing the action of naming

it is not the only possible description –

for example a behaviourist would describe the action –

in terms of stimulus / response and reinforcement

just what description people use –

if indeed they do use a description –

when they take this action or observe it –

is an empirical question

furthermore there is the logical point –

that any description applied to any action –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 542

542. “I can’t describe this flower if I don’t know that this colour is called ‘red’.”

first up –

not every functional and useful description of ‘this flower’ –

will refer to its colour

secondly –

in my language community – yes the colour is called ‘red’ –

in other language communities – or in different contexts within a language community –

it may have – and will have –

different names

the only knowledge here –

is the knowledge of usage –

of practise –

and this – as is obvious –

is an uncertain matter

on certainty 543

543. A child can learn the names of people long before he can say in any form whatever: “I know this one’s name; I don’t know that one yet.”

yes – ‘I know – is a rhetorical claim –

it is to claim an authority for the assertion –

in this case – a name

the ‘I know’ is irrelevant –

all that is required is –

‘this one’s name is …’

and as for the ‘I don’t know that one yet’ –

it too is rhetorical –

it amounts to –

‘I can’t say with authority what that one’s name is’

drop the rhetoric and what you have here is –

‘I can’t say what that one’s name is’

logically speaking he only authority is authorship –

‘I know’ = ‘I am the author of’ –

and stating that you are the author of your assertion –

is irrelevant an unnecessary

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority –

the claim of knowledge –

is rhetorical

does a child learn the names of people –

long before it learns rhetoric?

it’s an empirical question

on certainty 544

544. Of course I may truthfully say “I know what this colour is called in English”, at the same time as I point (for example) to the colour of fresh blood. But - - -

what you can say is –

‘this colour is called  … in English’

and doing so –

is just an exercise in uncertainty –

for whatever you might say here –

is open to question –

open to doubt

as to the claim to knowledge –

any such claim is an assertion of an authority

the only actual authority –

is authorship –

and it is unnecessary and irrelevant –

to assert that you assert

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority –

is false

it may have rhetorical value –

but it has no logical value

on certainty 545

17.4

545.  “A child knows which colour is meant by the word “blue”. What he knows here is not at all simple.

the child learns a use of the word ‘blue’ –

just following someone’s instruction on use –

is simple –

being able to question a usage –

and to deal with the uncertainty of usage –

is what is not simple

on certainty 546

546. I should say “I know what this colour is called” if e.g. what is in question is shades of colour whose name not every-body knows.

all you need to say here is –

‘this colour is called …’

and your statement here –

will be open to question –

open to doubt –

will be uncertain –

prefacing your statement with –

‘I know’ –

is to claim an authority for it

the only authority –

is authorship –

it is irrelevant and redundant –

to say you are the author –

of your statement

if your claim to know –

is a claim to an authority

other than authorship –

your claim is logically false –

it may have rhetorical effect –

but if so –

it will be an effect –

based on deception

on certainty 547

547. On cannot yet say to a child who is just beginning to speak and use the words “red” and “blue”: “Come on, you know what this colour is called!”

yes – for a child to be able to deal with –

‘come on, you know what this colour is called!’ –

it must already have been inducted into –

the deception that is knowledge

on certainty 548

548. A child must learn the use of colour words before it can ask for the name of a colour.

learning the use of colour words –

and learning naming –

is to learn to deal in uncertainty

on certainty 549

549. It would be wrong to say that I can only say “I know that there is a chair there” when there is a chair there. Of course it isn’t true unless there is, but I have a right to say this if I am sure there is chair there, even if I am wrong.

[Pretensions are a mortgage which burdens a philosopher’s capacity to think.]

so you can make claims to knowledge – even when you are wrong –

you have a ‘right’ to be sure – even if you are wrong –

and here is a perfect example of where pretension has burdened a philosopher’s capacity to think

on certainty 550

18.4

550. If someone believes something, we needn’t always be able to answer the question ‘why he believes it’; but if he knows something, then the question “how does he know?” must be capable of being answered.

the claim of knowledge –

is a claim to an authority –

the only legitimate claim of authority –

is the claim of authorship –

and it is unnecessary and irrelevant –

to claim authorship of your statement

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority is false –

the point of such claims though –

is rhetorical

the question –

‘how does he know? –

comes to be the question –

why does he claim an authority –

he doesn’t have?

on certainty 551

551. And if one does answer this question, one must do so according to generally accepted axioms. This is how something of this sort may be known.

so – if you answer the question –

‘how does he know?’ –

you answer it according to –

‘generally accepted axioms’?

‘generally accepted axioms’ –

amounts to nothing more than –

the prevailing rhetoric

so here we have rhetoric –

accounting for rhetoric –

for the claim to know  –

is nothing but rhetorical rubbish –

so why not account for it –

with more rhetorical rubbish?

on certainty 552

552. Do I know that I am now sitting in a chair? – Don’t I know it?! In the present circumstances no one is going to say that I know this; but no more will he say, for example, that I am conscious. Nor will one normally say this of the passers-by in the street.

But now, even if one doesn’t say it, does that make it untrue??

‘no one is going to say I know this’ –

the idea is that in this case  – it is obvious – that the claim to know – is irrelevant

the circumstance may make this obvious – but circumstance or not – the claim to know – is a claim to an authority – the only authority is authorship – and to claim you are the author of your statement – will be irrelevant and unnecessary – whatever the circumstance

and if you are claiming an authority other than authorship – your claim will be logically false – and if it has any value – its value will be rhetorical

whether saying that I am conscious – or that others are conscious – is relevant –

will depend on circumstance

‘now, even if one doesn’t say it, does that make it untrue?’ –

‘true’ is what you assent to – ‘false’ what you dissent from

if there is no proposal – no proposition  – there is nothing to affirm –

nothing to deny

on certainty 553

553. It is queer: if I say without any special occasion, “I know” – for example, “I know that I am now sitting in a chair”, this statement seems to me to be unjustified and presumptuous. But if I make the same statement where there is some need for it, then although I am not a jot more certain of its truth, it seems to me to be perfectly justified and everyday.

some need for it?

what need would that be I wonder?

would it be a need to pretend –

you have an authority you don’t have –

in order to deceive someone –

perhaps even yourself?

that seems to be the idea –

for you are ‘not a jot more certain of its truth’ –

and yet you are prepared to claim –

‘justification’

and it seems –

prepared to regard –

pretence and deception –

as ‘everyday’ –

and presumably –

OK

on certainty 554

554. In its language-game it is not presumptuous. There it has no higher position than, simply the human language game. For there it has its restricted application.

But as soon as I say this sentence outside its context, it appears in a false light. For then it is as if I wanted to insist that there are things that I know.  God himself can’t say anything to me about them.

yes – in its language-game  it is not presumptuous –

reason being – such a language-game –

the language-game of ‘I know’ –

is itself presumptuous

outside of context?

‘I know’ – is a claim to an authority for a proposition

the only authority is authorship –

authorship does not guarantee a proposition –

the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant –

in or out of context

beyond authorship –

any claim to an authority is rhetorical –

and its point is persuasion

it is a false claim to authority –

its ground is deception –

in or out of context

‘God’ – is the ultimate –

rhetorical devise

on certainty 555

19.4

555. We can know that water boils when it is put over a fire. How do we know? Experience has taught us. I say “I know that I had breakfast this morning”; experience hasn’t taught me that. One also says “I know that he is in pain”. The language-game is different every time, we are sure every time, and people will agree with us that we are in a position to know every time. And that is why the propositions of physics are found in text-books for everyone.

If someone says he knows something, it must be something that, by general consent, he is in a position to know.

‘water boils when it is put over fire’

‘I had breakfast this morning’

‘he is in pain’

straight out assertions

prefacing these assertions with ‘I know’ –

does what?

burdens them with an irrelevance and rhetoric

the claim of knowledge is a claim of authority –

the only authority you have is your authorship –

it is unnecessary and irrelevant to assert –

that you are the author of your assertions

if you claim an authority other than authorship –

you are engaging in pretence and deception

forget the rhetoric –

and simply make your assertions –

say what you have to say – clearly and simply –

without any rhetorical baggage

your assertions will have their day –

in the marketplace of assent and dissent –

the logical reality is –

that any proposition you put forward –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

Wittgenstein asks – ‘how do we know?’

and his answer is – ‘experience has taught us’

what experience teaches us

is uncertainty

when Wittgenstein says ‘we are sure every time’

he shows himself to be either a fraud –

or a fool

the reason that the propositions of physics are found in texts books –

is not because they are certain –

but rather because the text book is a convenient  media –

for introducing students to physics –

and that means to propositions –

that are open to question –

open to doubt –

that are uncertain

behind any consent – general or otherwise –

is uncertainty –

and the ground of uncertainty –

is the unknown

on certainty 556

556. One doesn’t say: he is in a position to believe that.

But one does say: “It is reasonable to assume that in this situation” (or “to believe that”).

the position he is in –

is the ‘position’ of –

uncertainty

‘it is reasonable to assume …’ –

what is reasonable –

is just rhetoric

any assumption –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 557

557. A court-martial may well have to decide whether it was reasonable in such and such a situation to have assumed this or that with confidence (even though wrongly).

in logical terms –

there is no right or wrong here –

any assumption –

any decision –

any degree of confidence –

is open to question –

open to doubt

is uncertain

logically speaking

the only authority –

is authorship –

and authorship –

guarantees nothing

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority –

is rhetorical

the ‘authority’ of a court –

is no different –

except in that –

its rhetoric –

is backed by the state –

and the state’s rhetoric –

by the gun

on certainty 558

558. We say we know that water boils and does not freeze under such-and-such circumstances. Is it conceivable that we are wrong? Wouldn’t a mistake topple all judgment with it? More: what could stand if that were to fall? Might someone discover something that made us say “it was a mistake”?

What may happen in the future, however water may behave in the future, – we know that up to now it has behaved thus in innumerable instances.

This fact is fused into the foundations of our language-game.

                                                                                                                               

there are no mistakes –

only uncertainties

there is nothing to topple –

but pretence

what may happen in the future is unknown

and we don’t know –

that up to now water has behaved thus –

presumably the ‘basis’ of any such assertion –

is observation reports –

‘innumerable’ as these might be –

they do not add up to a certainty –

they are open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 559

559. You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable).

It is there – like our life.

and like life –

open to interpretation – to description –

that is to say – uncertain

and in the absence of interpretation – of description –

unknown

on certainty 560

560. And the concept of knowing is coupled with that of the language-game.

knowing is dealing in uncertainty

the language-game is the game of uncertainty

on certainty 561

561. “I know” and “You can rely on it”. But one cannot always substitute the latter for the former.

‘I know’ –

is a claim to an authority –

the only authority –

is authorship –

beyond that –

any claim to authority –

is rhetorical

‘you can rely on it’ –

is a claim to an authority –

and like ‘I know’

or any other such claim –

it’s only value –

is rhetorical

so given that both assertions –

are rhetorical –

they amount to the same thing –

hot air

on certainty 562

562. At any rate it is important to imagine a language in which our concept of ‘knowledge’ does not exist.

if Wittgenstein means –

a language without certainty –

he won’t have to imagine anything  –

it’s what we have

on certainty 563

563. One says, “I know that he is in pain” although one can produce no convincing grounds for this. – Is this the same as “I am sure that he…”? – No. “I am sure” tells you my subjective certainty. “I know” means that I who know it, and the person who doesn’t are separated by a difference in understanding. (Perhaps based on a difference in degree of experience.)

If I say “I know” in mathematics, then the justification for this is a proof.

If in these two cases instead of  “I know”, one says “you can rely on it” then the substantiation is of a different kind in each case.

And substantiation comes to an end

‘although one can produce no convincing grounds for this –‘

yes – the claim to know – if it means certainty – is empty and deceptive

‘subjective’ – or ‘objective’ – if the claim is certainty –

it is false and pretentious

the difference that separates you and the person who doesn’t claim to know –

is pretence – you’re pretentious – he isn’t

a ‘proof’ in mathematics – is a language game –

best understood as – poetry

‘you can rely on it’ –

whether a reference to a statement about pain –

or a statement in mathematics –

is just rhetoric

and rhetoric is only ‘substantiated’ – if you can call it that –

by rhetoric

‘And the substantiation comes to an end’? –

I wonder –

is there an end to bullshit?

on certainty 564

564. A language-game: bringing building stones, reporting the number of available stones. The number is sometimes estimated, sometimes established by counting. Then the question arises “Do you believe there are as many stones as that?”, and the answer “I know there are – I’ve just counted them”. But here the “I know” could be dropped. If however, there are several ways of finding something out for sure, like counting, weighing, measuring the stack, then the statement “I know” can take the place of mentioning how I know.

the question –

do you believe there are as may stones as that?’ –

is technically rhetorical

the logical question is –

‘how many stones are there?’

the answer –

‘yes – I’ve just counted them’ –

is rhetorical

the logical answer is –

yes – or no

prefacing an answer here with ‘I know’ –

is to claim an authority for the assertion

the only authority is authorship –

and claiming authorship of your assertion –

is logically irrelevant

any other claim to an authority –

is false

the only ‘value’ such claims have –

is rhetorical

‘I’ve weighed them’ – ‘I’ve measured the stack’ –

are rhetorical statements –

designed to reinforce –

‘yes’

on certainty 565

565. But here there isn’t yet any question of any ‘knowledge’ that this is called a “slab”, this “a  pillar”, etc.

yes – and there will be no question of ‘knowledge’ –

unless someone wants to claim an authority for their assertion –

‘slab’ – ‘a pillar’ – etc.

if you assert – you have the authority of authorship –

but authorship does not guarantee your assertion –

and any other claim to an authority –

is rhetorical

on certainty 566

566. Nor does a child who learns my language-game (No 2)* learn to say “I know that this is called a ‘slab’”.

Now of course there is a language-game in which the child uses that sentence. This presupposes that the child is already capable of using the name as soon as he is given it. (As if someone were to tell me “this colour is called…”.) – Thus, if the child has learnt a language-game with building stones, one can say something like “ and this stone is called’…’, and in this way the original language-game has been expanded.

‘and this stone is called …’ –

is an expansion or perhaps more correctly – an explanation –

of the original language-game

I think Wittgenstein wants to suggest that ‘I know’ is a further expansion?

naming – like any propositional action –

is essentially – uncertain

‘I know’ – if it is a claim of certainty –

does not expand the original language-game –

it corrupts it

on certainty 567

567. And now, is my knowledge that I am called L.W. of the same kind as knowledge that water boils at 100 degrees C? Of course, this question is wrongly put.

my knowledge that I am called …

is an assertion

that water boils at 100 degrees C

is an assertion –

and if it is understood that these assertions –

indeed any assertion –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

the question is not –

wrongly put

on certainty 568

568. If one of my names were used only very rarely, then it might happen that I did not know it. It goes without saying that that I know my name, only because, like everyone else I use it over and over again.

a name like any other  language use –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

usage – and repetitive usage –

does not equal –

certainty

any ‘knowledge’ I have here –

is uncertain

on certainty 569

569. An inner experience cannot show me that I know something.

Hence, if in spite of that I say, “I know my name is …”, and yet it is obviously not an empirical proposition – – –

if by ‘know’ here –

you mean – certainty

no experience is relevant –

to a claim of certainty –

experience is uncertain

if you drop the ‘I know’ –

what you have is the basic uncorrupted assertion –

‘my name is ..’ –

if that proposition – that proposal –

is made public –

and by asserting it –

you make it public –

it is testable –

and therefore empirical –

which is to say –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 570

570. “I know this is my name; among us any grown-up knows what his name is.”

the idea here is –

that my claim to knowledge has authority –

because I am a grown-up –

this is rubbish –

the only authority you have –

is the authority of authorship –

and it is unnecessary and irrelevant –

to assert that you are the author –

of your assertions

to claim an authority –

other than authorship –

is false and pretentious –

to say ‘I know’ –

may have rhetorical effect –

but it is essentially –

an act of deception

on certainty 571

571. “My name is ... – you can rely on that. If it turns out to be wrong you need never believe me in the future.”

‘my name is …’ –

is all that is required –

saying  – ‘you can rely on that’ –

‘if it turns out to be wrong …’ –

etc. etc. –

is just to load it up with –

rhetorical rubbish –

the fact is –

regardless –

of any protestation to the contrary –

the assertion –

like any assertion –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

if others assent to it –

all to the good –

if they don’t –

bad luck

on certainty 572

572. Don’t I seem to know that I can’t be wrong about such a thing as my own name?

This comes out in the word: ‘If that is wrong, then I am crazy.” Very well, but those are words; but what influence does it have on the application of language?

there is no right or wrong here –

language use is uncertain

‘if that is wrong, then I am crazy’ –

is rhetoric –

rhetoric to support a claim to authority in language use

there is no authority –

but authorship –

and authorship guarantees nothing

all you have –

if you want to persist with the delusion –

of authority –

the deception of authority –

is rhetoric

what influence does it have –

on the application of language?

it makes the application of language –

fraudulent

on certainty 573

573. Is it through the impossibility of anything’s convincing me of the contrary?

to be convinced one way or the other on any matter –

is to be either deluded or deceived

on certainty 574

574. The question is, what kind of proposition is “I know I can’t be mistaken about that”, or again “I can’t be mistaken about that”?

This “I know” seems to prescind from all grounds: I simply know it. But if there can be any question at all of being mistaken here, then it must be possible to test whether I know it.

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

‘I know I can’t be mistaken about that’ –

and ‘I can’t be mistaken about that’ –

as claims of certainty –

deny propositional logic

if you want to call them propositions at all –

they are corrupt propositions –

I prefer to call them statements of prejudice

the ground of a proposition –

is whatever argument is put to support it

any such argument is open to question –

open to doubt

if you are certain – there is no question –

there is no doubt

and so any statement of grounds –

is irrelevant to a claim of certainty

if grounds are put forward –

to support a claim of certainty –

then what we are dealing with –

is rhetoric

if you claim your knowledge is certain

then there can be no mistake

if on the other hand –

you recognize that knowledge is uncertain –

what you face is uncertainties –

not mistakes

the mistake has no place in this debate –

it has no logical significance –

its only value is rhetorical

as for testing –

if you claim certainty – there is nothing to test

on the other hand –

if your proposition is open to question –

open to doubt –

then testing – is the exploration –

of its uncertainty

on certainty 575

575. Thus the purpose of the phrase “I know” might be to indicate where I can be relied on; but where that’s what it’s doing the usefulness of this sign must emerge from experience.

‘where you can be relied on’ –

is rhetoric

what emerges from experience –

is uncertainty

on certainty 576

576. One might say “How do I know that I am not mistaken about my name?” – and if the reply was “Because I have used it so often”, one might go on to ask “How do I know that I am not mistaken about that?” And here the “How do I know” cannot any longer have significance.

‘how do I know I am not mistaken about my name?’

is wrongheaded –

firstly the claim of knowledge –

is a claim of authority –

unless you are talking about authorship –

there is no authority

and authorship is neither here nor there –

it guarantees nothing

so there is no knowledge here –

mistaken or otherwise

the ‘I know’ can be dropped altogether –

or if it is used –

recognized for what it is –

cheap rhetoric

if you ditch the rhetoric –

what you are left with –

is a (non-rhetorical) proposition –

a basic proposition

a straightforward proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

as for ‘mistakes’ –

there are no mistakes –

what we deal with is uncertainties

use – does not equal – certainty –

effective use – does not equal – certainty

repetition – does not equal – certainty –

habit – does not equal – certainty

if you get into the business of –

‘how I know’ –

you are just ramping up the rhetoric –

which is to say –

you are trying to persuade someone –

perhaps even yourself –

of an authority you don’t have

to do so is to be deluded –

or deceptive

and furthermore –

it is a sign –

of a dead-set bore

on certainty 577

577. “My knowledge of my name is absolutely definite.”

I would refuse to entertain any argument that tried to show the opposite!

And what does “I would refuse” mean? Is it the expression of an intention?

yes – an intention – to be ignorant –

to stay ignorant –

even so –

you can’t know with certainty –

what you would do –

the ground of all intention  –

is uncertainty

on certainty 578

578. But mightn’t a higher authority assure me that I don’t know the truth? So that I had to say “Teach me!” But then my eyes would have to be opened.

the only authority –

is authorship

beyond that –

any claim to ‘authority’ –

is false –

I pity the poor bastard –

who bows before

the deception –

of ‘higher authority’ –

and says –

‘teach me’

if your ‘eyes are open’ –

you think –

for yourself

on certainty 579

579. It is part of the language-game with people’s names that everyone knows his name with the greatest certainty.

what you have with people’s names –

is use and habit

use and habit –

does not equal certainty

any language use is contingent –

open to question –

open to doubt

uncertain

on certainty 580

20.4

580. It might surely happen that whenever I said “I know” it turned out to be wrong. (Shewing up)

the claim to know –

is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

to claim authorship of your proposition –

is logically irrelevant

beyond authorship any claim to authority –

is rhetorical –

so let’s drop ‘I know’ –

and just deal with basic assertion –

so what if a basic assertion ‘turned out wrong’?

there is no right or wrong here –

what we operate with –

is proposals –

open to question –

open to doubt –

yes you can fall for this rhetoric –

of right and wrong –

and cop being ‘shown up’

but the logical reality is –

your proposition – any proposition –

is neither right or wrong –

but uncertain

the real philosophical task –

is to show up certainty –

to show up the pretence  and deception –

of right and wrong

on certainty 581

581. But perhaps I might nevertheless be able to help myself, so that I kept on declaring “I know…” But ask yourself: how did the child learn the expression?

the child learnt from adults –

that there is persuasive value –

in claiming an authority –

in claiming to know

the child was taught –

deception

on certainty 582

582. “I know that” may mean I am quite familiar with it – or again it is certainly so.

if ‘I am quite familiar with it’ –

then I experience it

experience –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

any ‘knowledge here –

is uncertain

to suggest –

as Wittgenstein does here –

that ‘I know that’ –

can mean either –

I am uncertain or I am certain –

is to give up the ghost –

on knowledge

Wittgenstein for a minute –

may have thought –

that by saying –

knowledge can mean ‘anything’ –

he is covering all bases

in fact –

he has stripped the notion –

of any significance

and shown –

he has nothing to say –

on the question of –

knowledge

on certainty 583

583. “I know that the name of this in…is ‘…’ – How do you know? – “I have learnt…”

Could I substitute “In…the name of this is ‘..’” for “I know etc.” in this example?

yes –

nothing would be lost logically speaking –

and there would be a gain –

                                                                                                                                   

the deception of ‘I know’ –

would have been avoided

this has to be a step in the right direction –

for clear thinking and plain speaking

on certainty 584

584. Would it be possible to make use of the verb “know” only in the question “How do you know?” following a simple assertion? – Instead of “I already know that” one says ‘I am familiar with that”; and this follows only upon being told the fact. But* what does one say instead of “I know what that is’?

*The last sentence is a latter addition. (Eds.)

following a simple assertion –

the logical response –

is affirmation or denial

if you wish to question the assertion made –

you can always ask – ‘do you think so?’ –

or ‘why do you think that?’

and yes –

you can listen to the other’s ‘argument’ –

their rhetoric –

and you can put your own argument –

your own rhetoric –

but at the end of this – as at the beginning –

what you have is an assertion –

that you either affirm or deny –

it’s as basic as that

you may want the matter –

to be more complex than this –

but it’s not –

and yes –

all involved can pretend –

with their rhetoric –

that it is more complex –

but it’s not –

rhetoric – persuasion –

at best is irrelevant –

at worst – it corrupts –

all rhetoric runs on –

the argument from authority –

the only authority –

is authorship –

                                                                                                                                  

and the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant

any other claim to an authority –

is false and deceptive

if people stuck to simple propositions –

and simple – yea or nay – responses –

their dealings with each other –

would be straightforward –

elegant –

and honest

and it is worth realizing here –

that at no point –

does the question of ‘knowledge’ arise –

it’s a rhetorical issue –

it’s not in the logical picture

‘I am familiar with that’ –

is OK –

it’s an affirmation –

and ‘familiarity’ –

indicates uncertainty –

rather than certainty

nevertheless I prefer –

‘yes’

instead of ‘I know what that is’ –

one says –

‘that is’

on certainty 585

585. But doesn’t ‘I know that that’s a tree” say something different from “that’s a tree”?

yes – ‘I know that that’s a tree’ – saddles a perfectly straightforward assertion –

with pretence and deception

on certainty 586

586. Instead of ‘I know what that is” one might say “I can say what that is”. And if one adopted this form of expression what would then become of “I know that that is…”?

you don’t need to say – that you can say –

if you’ve got something to say – say it

‘I can say what that is ’ – is like ‘I know that that is …’

unnecessary and irrelevant –

and pretentious

‘that is …’ –

will do the trick

and what will become of ‘I know that that is …’ –

with a bit of luck –

logic will prevail –

and it will be dropped from usage

alternatively –

if still used –

it will be seen for what it is –

rhetoric

on certainty 587

587. Back to the question whether “I know that that’s a…” says anything different from “that is a …” In the first sentence a person is mentioned, in the second, not. But that does not shew that they have different meanings. At all events one often replaces the first form by the second, and then often gives the latter a special intonation. For one speaks differently when one makes an uncontradicted assertion from when one maintains an assertion free of contradiction.

‘I know that that’s a …’ –

is a statement loaded with rhetoric –

that is to say –

the ‘I know that’ –

is claim to an authority –

that doesn’t exist –

and the purpose of the claim –

is persuasion

‘that is a …’ –

is the statement –

without the rhetoric –

that is to say –

without the deception

if the issue is persuasion –

then rhetoric has a place –

go your hardest –

but if you want to simply state your case –

as best you can –

and leave it at that –

then pretence –

will only get in the way –

and corrupt –

your assertion

on certainty 588

588. But don’t I use the words “I know that…” to say that I am in a certain state, whereas the mere assertion  “that is a…” does not say this? And yet one often does reply to such an assertion by asking “how do you know?” – “But surely, only because the fact that I assert this gives to understand that I think I know it”. – This point could be made in the following way: In a zoo there might be a sign “this is a zebra”; but never “I know that this a zebra””.

“I know” has meaning only when it is uttered by a person. But, given that, it is a matter of indifference whether what is uttered is “I know…” or “That is…”.                                                                                                                                

‘a matter of indifference’?

from a logical point of view ‘I know’ is irrelevant

however the value of ‘I know’ is not logical –

but rhetorical –

and that is not a matter of indifference –

for ‘I know’ is used to pretend authority –

and hence to deceive

on certainty 589

589. For how does a man recognize his own state of knowing something?

he will recognise his own state of knowing something –

when he recognizes self-deception

on certainty 590

590. At most one might speak of recognizing a state, where what is said is “I know what that is”. Here one can satisfy oneself that one really is in possession of this knowledge.

this saying to yourself that you are ‘recognizing a state’  -

is really just you persuading yourself that you have knowledge

what you are doing is engaging in rhetoric

on certainty 591

591. “I know what kind of tree that is. – It is a chestnut.”

“I know what kind of tree that is. – I know it’s a chestnut.”

The first statement sounds more general than the second. One will only say “I know” a second time if one wants especially to emphasize certainty; perhaps to anticipate being contradicted. The first “I know” means roughly: I can say.

But in the second case one might begin with the observation “That’s a…”, and then, when this is contradicted, counter by saying: “I know what sort of tree it is”, and by this means lay emphasis on being sure.

yes – I say the ‘I know’ the second time –

to emphasize –

and what that says is that ‘I know’ –

is rhetorical –

and yes – the first ‘I know’ –

means ‘roughly I can say’ –

or as I have put it – repeatedly –

(some might say ad nauseam)

‘I am the author of … ’

‘I know’ is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

the claim of authorship –

is logically irrelevant and unnecessary

any other claim to an authority –

is rhetorical –

persuasive – perhaps –

but logically false –

and deceptive

on certainty 592

592. “I can tell you what kind of a … that is, and there is no doubt about it.”

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

yes – you can say –

‘there is no doubt about it’ –

and what you doing –

is engaging in rhetoric

and in so doing –

I would say –

revealing yourself –

as a fraud –

or a fool

on certainty 593

593. Even when one can replace “I know” by “It is …” still one cannot replace the negation of the one with the negation of the other.

With “I don’t know …” a new element enters our language-games.

in the ‘I know’ language-game –

‘I don’t know …’ – is what?

are you still playing the game –

accepting the ‘I know’ game –

but effectively saying –

I don’t have this knowledge?

possibly

if so – no new element –

enters the ‘I know’ language-game –

the terms of the game are accepted –

you just give a negative response

on the other hand –

with ‘I don’t know …’ –

you might just be rejecting –

the ‘I know’ language-game –

altogether

on certainty 594

21.4

594. My name is “L.W.” And if someone were to dispute it, I should straightaway make connections with innumerable things which make it certain.

making connections does not make it certain

making connections is putting up proposals –

and proposals are uncertain

on certainty 595

595. But I can imagine someone making all these connections, and none of them corresponding with reality. Why shouldn’t I be in a similar case?”

If I imagine such a person I also imagine a reality, a world that surrounds him; and I imagine him as thinking (and speaking) in contradiction to this world.

what is real is what is proposed –

and whether a proposition functions or not –

whether it gains assent or not –

is uncertain

on certainty 596

596. If someone tells me his name is N.N. it is meaningful for me to ask him “Can you be mistaken?” That is an allowable question in the language-game. And the answer to it, yes or no, makes sense. – Now of course this answer is not infallible either, i.e., there might be a time when it proved to be wrong, but that does not deprive the question “Can you be…” and the answer “No” of their meaning.

an allowable question in the language-game?

any question is allowable –

because what we face in an ultimate sense is the unknown –

and what we deal with in propositional practise –

is uncertainty

so it’s not a question of what is allowed –

or what is not allowed –

where is the so called ‘authority’ –

that determines –

what’s allowed and what’s not?

there is no such authority –

and what goes for ‘authority’ here –

is pretence and stupidity

                                                                                                                                    

the real question is –

does it make any sense to speak of a ‘mistake’ here?

and the answer is – no

the ‘mistake’ has no place in this matter –

if you are certain – there can be no mistake –

and in and uncertain world –

there are no mistakes –

there is just different conceptions –

different proposals –

different evaluations –

all of which are uncertain

there will not be a time –

‘when it is proved to be wrong’ –

any so called proof –

is open to question –

open to doubt

there is no right or wrong –

in an uncertain reality

we make the assessment –

to proceed with a proposition –

or not –

and any such assessment –

is open to question

yes or no –

is a meaningful answer –

to any question

but any answer –

it is open to question

on certainty 597

597. The reply to the question “Can you be mistaken?” gives the argument a definite weight. The answer may also be “I don’t think so.”

the answers ‘yes’ or ‘no’ –

or ‘I don’t think so’ –

will only give the argument ‘weight’ –

definite or not  –

if the question –  ‘can you be mistaken?” –

makes sense in the first place

now the fact is –

if you claim certainty –

there is no place for the mistake –

your world is certain –

if on the other hand –

you see propositional reality as uncertain –

then there will be no mistakes –

rather different conceptions –

different proposals–

different assessments –

uncertainties

mistakes – don’t enter into this matter –

the ‘mistake’-

is not in the picture

NB

Wittgenstein trades on the fact –

that ‘mistake’ – is a common notion –

interesting – that at no point –

does he even attempt –

an analysis of ‘mistake’

the reason is –

it doesn’t stand up –

to philosophical analysis –

it is not a notion –

with a any philosophical significance

I find it hard to believe –

that Wittgenstein didn’t see this –

and so I can’t but conclude –

that his argument in On Certainty –

is a fraud

on certainty 598

598. But couldn’t one reply to the question “Can you …” by saying: “I will describe the case to you and then you can judge for yourself whether I am mistaken”?

For example, if it were a question of someone’s own name, the fact might be that he had never used this name, but remembered he had read it on some document, – but on the other hand the answer might be: “I’ve had this name my whole life long, I’ve been called it by everyone.” If that is not equivalent to the answer “I can’t be mistaken” then the latter has no meaning whatever. And yet obviously it points to a very important distinction.

‘judge for yourself’ –

the basis – the reason for – judgment –

is uncertainty

and in an uncertain reality –

there are no mistakes –

what we have is – uncertainties

so – any judgment –

will be a response to –

uncertainty –

and any judgment will be –

uncertain

repetitive use – does not entail –

certainty

a use of language – is uncertain –

open to question –

open to doubt –

the first time it is used –

or the five hundredth time

and it is irrelevant –

who the user is

‘I can’t be mistaken’ –

has no logical meaning –

it’s only value –

is rhetorical

on certainty 599

599. For example one could describe the certainty of the proposition that water boils at circa 100 degrees C. That isn’t e.g. a proposition I have once heard (like this or that, which I could mention). I made the experiment myself at school. The proposition is a very elementary one in our texts-books, which are to be trusted in matters like this because … – Now one can offer counter-examples to all this, which show that human beings have held this and that to be certain which later, according to our opinion, proved false. But the argument is worthless* To say: in the end we can only adduce such grounds as we hold to be grounds, is to say nothing at all.

I believe at the bottom of this is a misunderstanding of the nature of our language-games.

*Marginal Note. May it not also happen that we believe we recognize a mistake of earlier times and latter come to the conclusion that the first opinion was the right one?

etc.

that a proposition has been tested – does not make it certain

that it is elementary and in texts-books – does not make it certain

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt

yes you can trust –

but if you do so –

you engage in logical deception

‘To say: in the end we can only adduce such grounds as we hold to be grounds, is to say nothing at all.

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain –

groundless

talk of grounds –

is rhetoric

‘at the bottom of this is a misunderstanding of the nature of our language-games’

the language-game – is the game of uncertainty

and there are no mistakes  –

what we deal with in an uncertain world –

is uncertainties

any opinion we have –

regardless of when it is held –

is uncertain

on certainty 600

600. What kind of grounds do I have for trusting text-books of experimental physics?

I have no grounds for not trusting them. And I trust them. I know how such books are produced – or rather I believe I know. I have some evidence, but it does not go very far and is of a scattered kind. I have heard, seen and read various things.  

if by trust – you mean –

not questioning – not doubting

then to trust –

is to take a stand for ignorance

the text books of experimental physics –

contain propositions –

open to question –

open to doubt

‘I have heard, seen and read various things’ –

experience is uncertain

on certainty 601

22.4.

601. There is always the danger of wanting to find an expression’s meaning by contemplating the expression itself, and the frame of mind in which one uses it, instead of always thinking of the practice. This is why one repeats the expression to oneself so often, because it is as if one must see what one is looking for in the expression and in the feeling it gives one.

an expression’s meaning –

is its use –

but what this amounts to –

is always open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 602

23.4.

602. Should I say “I believe in physics”, or “I know that physics is true”?

what you say is – ‘I do physics’ –

or – ‘I use the propositions of physics’

on certainty 603

603. I am taught that under such circumstances this happens. It has been discovered by making the experiment a few times. Not that that would prove anything to us, if it weren’t that this experience was surrounded by others which combine with it to form a system. Thus, people did not make experiments just about falling bodies but also about air resistance and all sorts of other things.

But in the end I rely on these experiences, or on the reports of them, I feel no scruples about ordering my own activities in accordance with them. – But hasn’t this trust also proved itself? So far as I can judge – yes.

experience is uncertain –

open to question –

open to doubt –

a ‘system’ – in the end –

is no more than a proposal –

a proposition –

open to question –

open to doubt

uncertain

in the face of uncertainty –

to trust is to engage in –

logical deception

proof – is just a language-game –

a game of rhetoric

the ground of judgment –

is uncertainty

on certainty 604

604. In a court of law the statement of a physicist that water boils at about 100 degrees C. would be accepted unconditionally as truth.

If I mistrusted this statement what could I do to undermine it? Set up experiments myself? What would they prove?

whether or not the statement is accepted as unconditionally true in a court of law –

is not relevant here –

any proposition – regardless of whether it has the backing of so called ‘authorities’ –

is a proposal –

that is to say – open to question – open to doubt –

to ‘mistrust’ it – is to question the proposition –

to doubt it –

that is to say – to understand it

any experiment you perform –

will be open to question –

open to doubt –

if by ‘proof’ you mean –

reaching a conclusion that is certain –

there is no proof

on certainty 605

605. But what if a physicist’s statement were superstition and it were just as absurd to go by it in receiving a verdict as to rely on an ordeal of fire?

whether the physicist’s statement –

is regarded as superstition – or science –

relying on it –

in the sense of regarding it as certain –

is what is absurd

on certainty 606

606. That to my mind someone else has been wrong is no ground for assuming that I am wrong now. – But isn’t it a ground for assuming that I might be wrong? It is no ground for any unsureness in my judgment, or my actions.

right and wrong are not in the picture –

our propositions are uncertain

our decisions regarding propositions –

are uncertain –

you can assent to a proposition –

or you can dissent from it

your judgments –

and your actions –

are open to question –

open to doubt –

are uncertain

on certainty 607

607. A judge might even say “That’s the truth – so far as a human being can know it”. But what would this rider achieve? (“beyond all reasonable doubt”).

our knowledge –

is uncertain

a proposition is true –

if assented to

assent – as with dissent –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

the notion of ‘reasonable doubt’ –

is really just the attempt –

to put the kibosh –

on doubt

on certainty 608

608. Is it wrong for me to be guided in my actions by the propositions of physics? Am I to say I have no good ground for doing so? Isn’t precisely this what we call a ‘good ground’?

there is no right or wrong here –

if you find the propositions of physics useful –

you will be guided by them –

if you don’t find them useful

you won’t be guided by them

and whatever proposition you use –

or are guided by –

that proposition – that proposal –

is open to question –

is open to doubt –

is uncertain

as for ‘ground’ –

the ground of any proposition –

any propositional action –

is uncertainty

on certainty 609

609. Supposing we met people who did not regard that as a telling reason. Now, how do we imagine this? Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle. (And for that we consider them primitive.) Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it? – If we call this “wrong” aren’t we using our language-game as a base from which to combat theirs?

any proposition –

be it a proposition of physics –

or the proposition of an oracle –

or whatever –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

and any decision you take –

as to what you’ll be guided by –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

the battle of ‘right and ‘wrong’ –

is not the logical battle –

it’s the rhetorical battle  -

the battle of delusion –

and deception

and in these rhetorical battles –

language games –

are the weapons –

of combat

on certainty 610

610. And are we right or wrong to combat it? Of course there are all sorts of slogans which will be used to support our proceedings.

logically speaking –

there is no right or wrong  –

any proposition – any proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

what we are talking about here –

is rhetoric –

and the battle of rhetoric –

and if you are going to play this game –

I say –

go your hardest

on certainty 611

611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled, then each man declares the other a fool and a heretic.

yes – this does happen –

but if you realize that your principle –

is just as uncertain as the next man’s –

then you will have no reason –

to rubbish him

on certainty 612

612. I said I would ‘combat’ the other man – but wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.)

it is not that at the end of reasons –

comes persuasion –

the giving of reasons –

is persuasion –

is rhetoric

on certainty 613

613. If I now say “I know that the water in the kettle on the gas flame will not freeze but boil”, I seem to be as justified in this “I know” as I am in any. ‘If I know anything I know this’. – Or do I know with greater certainty that the person opposite me is my old friend so-and-so? And how does this compare with the proposition that I am seeing with two eyes and shall see them if I look in the glass? – I don’t know confidently what I am to answer here. – But still there is a difference between the cases. If the water over the gas freezes, of course I shall be as astonished as can be, but I shall assume some factor I don’t know of, and perhaps leave the matter to physicists to judge. But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N., whom I have known for years? Here a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos.

‘If I know anything I know this’ –

is just straight out rhetoric

the idea of ‘greater certainty’ –

puts pay to the whole notion of certainty

if certainty itself is a matter of degree –

then it is uncertain

‘I don’t know confidently what I am to answer here’ –

‘some factor I don’t know of’ –

at the heart of any so called claim to knowledge –

is what is not known –

and for this reason –

the claim to complete or certain knowledge –

is false and pretentious

‘If the water over the gas freezes, of course I shall be as astonished as can be’

astonished or not –

the proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

‘But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N., whom I have known for years?’

who’s to say?

but if a doubt should arise –

the world does not fall apart –

all that has been damaged –

is your delusion of certainty –

and that’s a good thing –

it might put you back –

in the real world

on certainty 614

614. That is to say: if I were contradicted on all sides and told that this person’s name was not what I had always known it was (and here I use “know” here intentionally), then in that case the foundation of all judging would be taken away from me.

your assertion –

and the assertions that contradict your assertion –

are proposals –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

the foundation of all judging –

is uncertainty –

and all judgments made –

are open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 615

615. Now does that mean: “I can only make judgments at all because things behave thus and thus (as it were, behave kindly)”?

that things behave thus and thus –

is a judgment –

not the ground of judgment –

and like any judgment –

it is open to question –

open to doubt

the ground of judgment –

is uncertainty

on certainty 616

616. Why, would it be unthinkable that I should stay in the saddle however the facts bucked?

it’s not unthinkable –

however to maintain a certainty –

in the face of an uncertain reality –

is delusional

on certainty 617

617. Certain events would put me into a position in which, I could not go on with the old language-game any further. In which I was torn away from the sureness of the game.

Indeed, doesn’t it seem obvious that the possibility of a language-game is conditioned by certain facts?

any language-game – is a response to uncertainty –

and as such is – uncertain –

sureness is pretence

a fact is an accepted interpretation of a state of affairs –

any interpretation is open to question –

open to doubt

that the possibility of a language-game –

is conditioned by facts –

is to say that –

the possibility of a language-game –

is conditioned by –

uncertainty

on certainty 618

618. In that game it would seem as if the language-game must ‘show’ the facts that make it possible. (But that’s not how it is.)

Then can one say that only a certain regularity in occurrences makes induction possible? The ‘possible’ would of course have to be ‘logically possible’.

the language game is the showing –

the language-game is the game of proposals –

‘facts’ are accepted  proposals –

proposals – accepted or not –

are uncertain

‘a certain regularity in occurrence’ –

is a description of how things are –

any description –is open to question –

open to doubt

if the basis of induction –

is the description –

‘a certain regularity in occurrence’

then the basis of induction –

is uncertainty

on certainty 619

619. Am I to say; even if an irregularity in natural events did suddenly occur, that wouldn’t have to throw me out of the saddle. I might make inferences then just as before, but whether one would call that “induction” is another question.

you’re always in the saddle –

and the ride is uncertain

any description of what you do –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 620

620. In particular circumstances one says “you can rely on this”; and this assurance may be justified or unjustified in every day language, and it may also count as justified even when what was foretold does not occur. A language-game exists in which this assurance is employed.

yes – it is the language-game of rhetoric

on certainty 621

22.4.

621. If anatomy were under discussion I should say: “I know that twelve pairs of nerves lead from the brain.” I have never seen these nerves, and even a specialist will only have observed them in a few specimens. – This is just how the word “know” is correctly used here

so ‘know’ is a claim to authority for a proposition –

when you have no authority for that proposition –

this is how the word ‘know’ is correctly used?

basically what we are talking about here is rhetoric –

and yes – all ‘know’ amounts to – is rhetoric

on certainty 622

622. But now is it also correct to use “I know” in the contexts which Moore mentioned, at least in particular circumstances. (Indeed, I do not know what “I know I am a human being” means. But even that might be given a sense.)

For each one of these sentences I can imagine circumstances that turn it into a move in one of our language-games, and by that it loses everything that is philosophically astonishing.

‘I know’ is a claim to authority –

in any context – in any circumstance

the only authority is authorship –

and it is unnecessary and irrelevant –

to assert the authorship of your assertion –

and furthermore –

the authorship of a proposition –

does not guarantee that proposition

as for ‘I know I am a human being’ –

‘I am a human being’ – is all that is required –

if indeed that is ever required

if you claim an authority beyond authorship –

your game is deception –

‘I know’ has no philosophical significance –

it is either an irrelevancy or a deception –

if it’s a move in a language-game –

it’s the language-game –

of rhetoric

on certainty 623

623. What is odd is that in such a case I always feel like saying (although it is wrong): “I know that – so far as I can know such a thing.” That is incorrect, but something right is hidden behind it.

                                                                                                                                    

‘I know that – in so far as I can know such a thing’ –

really just points to the uncertainty in any claim to knowledge

it is the unknown – that is hidden behind it

on certainty 624

624. “Can you be mistaken about this colour’s being called ‘green’ in English?” My answer to this can only be “No”. If I were to say “Yes, for there is always the possibility of a delusion”, that would mean nothing at all.

For is that rider something unknown to the other? And how is it known to me?

first up there are no mistakes –

if you are certain – you cannot be mistaken –

and if you recognize – that the proposition – is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

then you understand – that what you deal with –

is uncertainties

the mistake – is not in the picture –

it’s a common notion –

that once analysed is shown to have no significance

can you be uncertain that the colour is called ‘green’ in English?

yes – of course

from the point of view of propositional logic –

all a delusion  amounts to –

is a different – let us say ‘unusual’ – description

‘is that rider something unknown to the other? And how is it known to me?’

either you have come across it or you haven’t –

and even if you haven’t –

if you’re a competent language user –

you will get the idea of different description –

shouldn’t be too much of a strain

on certainty 625

625. But does that mean that it is unthinkable that the word “green” should have been produced  by a slip of the tongue or a momentary confusion? Don’t we know of such cases? – One can also say to someone “Mightn’t you have perhaps made a slip?” That amounts to “Think about it again”.

But these rules of caution only make sense if they come to an end somewhere.

A doubt without an end is not even a doubt.

as to ‘slip of the tongue’ –

any word – any use of language is open to question –

whether it is described as ‘a slip of the tongue’ –

or ‘intentional’

if you say – ‘think again’ –

then what you are pointing out is that language use –

is uncertain

Wittgenstein says –

‘a doubt without an end is not a doubt’ –

the fact is –

a question can always be asked

on certainty 626

626. Nor does it mean anything to say: “The English name of this colour is certainly ‘green’, – unless, of course, I am making a slip of the tongue or am confused in some way.”

a slip of the tongue is an unintentional or thoughtless use of a term –

perhaps it comes about as a result of bad language habits one hasn’t quite managed to delete from one’s language practise

in any case –

once you realize you have made a slip of the tongue –

you recognise it as –

irrelevant

if the claim of certainty is a confusion –

then the claim of certainty is self-defeating –

and useless

propositions are proposals –

open to question –

open to doubt

propositional reality is the reality of uncertainty –

the claim of certainty defies and denies –

propositional reality –

it is illogical and delusional

in practise its only value – is rhetorical

and it should be seen for what it is –

a logical fraud

on certainty 627

627. Wouldn’t one have to insert this clause into all language-games? (Which shows its senselessness)

what it shows –

is that the claim of certainty –

is an irrelevant distraction –

in any language-game

on certainty 628

628. When we say “Certain propositions must be excluded from doubt”, it sounds as if I ought to put these propositions – for example, that I am called L.W. – into a logic book. For if it belongs to the description of a language-game, it belongs to logic. But that I am called L.W. does not belongs to any such description. The language-game that operates with people’s names can certainly exist even if I am mistaken about my name. – but it does presuppose that it is nonsensical to say that the majority of people are mistaken about their names.

                                                                                                                                    

it is not that people can be or can’t be mistaken –

about their names –

or anything else for that matter –                                                                                                                             

the ground of all language use –

of all language-games –

is uncertainty

and if you understand this –

you see that the notion of the ‘mistake’ –

has no place in language use –

it’s irrelevant

you don’t have mistakes –

what you have is assessments of use –

                                                                                                                                   

and these assessment

are uncertain

and the point should also be made –

that logic –

is just another language-game –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 629

629. On the other hand, however, it is right to say of myself “I cannot be mistaken about my name”, and wrong if I say “perhaps I am mistaken”. But that doesn’t mean it is meaningless for others to doubt what I declare to be certain.

‘I cannot be mistaken’ –

is to say – I am certain

a proposition is a proposal

and regardless of who puts it forward –

a proposition is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

to claim certainty for a proposition –

i.e. your name –

is to corrupt the proposition

the claim of certainty –

is illogical

on certainty 630

630. It is simply the normal case, to be incapable of a mistake about the designation of certain things in one’s mother tongue.

any designation in any tongue –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

as for ‘mistake’ –

if you regard your proposition as certain –

there can be no mistake

on the other hand –

if you recognize that your proposition –

is uncertain –

what you are dealing with –

is uncertainties –

not mistakes

yes the term ‘mistake’ –

is commonly used –

however –

as soon as it is subjected to analysis –

it disappears

on certainty 631

631. “I can’t be making a mistake about it” simply characterizes one kind of assertion.

yes –

an ignorant assertion

on certainty 632

632. Certain and uncertain memory. If certain memory were not in general more reliable than uncertain memory, i.e., if it were not confirmed by further verification more often than uncertain memory was, then the expression of certainty and uncertainty would not have its present function in language.

all memory is uncertain –

which is to say any memory can be questioned –

can be doubted

and any so called ‘verification’ –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

the expression of certainty in our language –

is the expression of pretence and delusion

uncertainty – is the ground of all language use

all language use – addresses and expresses –

uncertainty

on certainty 633

633. “I can’t be making a mistake” – but what if I did make a mistake then, after all? For isn’t that possible? But does that make the expression “I can’t be etc.” nonsense? Or would it be better to say instead “I can hardly be mistaken”? No; for that means something else.

‘I can’t be making a mistake’ –

is to say ‘I am certain’ –

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

the claim of certainty –

undermines any proposition –

it is illogical

‘I can hardly be mistaken –

amounts to –

begrudgingly recognizing uncertainty

if you understand –

that any proposition –

any proposal –

is uncertain –

it is unnecessary and redundant –

to state the fact

on certainty 634

634. “I can’t be making a mistake; and if the worst comes to the worst I shall make my proposition into a norm.”

that is to make –

ignorance and stupidity –

into a norm –

not a big stretch either –

for as far as I can see –

ignorance and stupidity –

already is –

the norm

on certainty 635

635. “I can’t be making a mistake; I was with him today.”

‘I was with him today’ –

like any other assertion –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

‘I can’t be mistaken’ –

is to say – ‘I am certain’

such a claim –

is logically bankrupt –

and delusional

on certainty 636

636. “I can’t be making a mistake; but if after all something should appear to speak against my proposition I shall stick to it, despite appearance.”

ignorance and stupidity –

is always an option

on certainty 637

637. “I can’t etc.” shows my assertion its place in the game. But it relates essentially to me, not to the game in general.

If I am wrong in my assertion that doesn’t detract from the usefulness of the game.

the game is the game of uncertainty

‘I can’t be making a mistake’ – actually takes you out of the game –

and the ‘game’ is only useful – to those who play it

on certainty 638

25.4

638. “I can’t be making a mistake” is an ordinary sentence, which serves to give me the certainty value of a statement. And only in its everyday use is it justified.

‘I can’t be making a mistake’ –

is rhetoric–

it’s point is to deceive and persuade

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain –

claiming certainty for a proposition –

corrupts the proposition

such a practise doesn’t give a value –

what it does is destroy any logical value –

an ‘everyday’ proposition –

as with any other proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt

and trying to ‘justify’ rhetoric

is just more rhetoric –

rhetoric –

on –

rhetoric

on certainty 639

639. But what the devil use is it if – as everyone admits – I may be wrong about it, and therefore about the proposition it was supposed to support too?

it is not that you might be wrong about –

‘I can’t be making a mistake’ –

there are no mistakes –

and so the statement –

‘I can’t be making a mistake’ –

is logically speaking –

out of place altogether

and it’s not a question of being right or wrong –

there is no right or wrong here –

propositional reality is uncertain

what we face and what we deal with –

is uncertainties

the propositions put to us –

and the propositions we put forward –

are open to question –

open to doubt –

are uncertain

on certainty 640

640. Or shall I say the sentence excludes a certain kind of failure?

‘I can’t be making a mistake’ –

what it excludes –

is uncertainty –

and as such is a denial –

of propositional reality

such a sentence –

is logically worthless

on certainty 641

641. “He told me about it today – I can’t be making a mistake about that.” – But what if it does turn out to be wrong?! – Mustn’t one make a distinction between the ways in which something ‘turns out wrong’? – How can it be shewn that my statement was wrong? Here evidence is facing evidence, and it must be decided which is to give way.

there is no ‘wrong’ here –

and for that matter – there is no ‘right’ –

and so no distinction between –

‘the ways in which something ‘turns out wrong’’

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain –

not right or wrong

yes you may think a proposition will function as you expect –

or you may decide it doesn’t

whatever you think – whatever you decide –

is open to question –

open to doubt

where ‘evidence is facing evidence’ –

what you in fact have –

is uncertainty facing uncertainty –

and where ‘it must be decided which is to give way’ –

whatever is decided –

will be open to question – open to doubt –

will be uncertain

on certainty 642

642.But suppose someone produced the scruple: what if I suddenly as it were woke up and said “Just think I’ve been imagining I was called L.W!”------well who says that I don’t wake up once again and call this an extraordinary fancy, and so on?

yes –

if that happens – it happens –

logically though –

                                                                                                                                   

all that counts is assertion  –

affirmation and denial

as to the why and wherefore –

of any assertion –

all you can do is –

speculate    

on certainty 643

643. Admittedly one can imagine a case – and cases do exist – where after the ‘awakening’, one never has any more doubt which was imagination and which was reality. But such a case, or its possibility, doesn’t discredit the proposition “I can’t be wrong”.

the fact that you might not doubt –

does not mean that there can be no doubt

furthermore –

there is no right or wrong –

what we face is uncertainty

any description –

any proposal – any proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt

the statement  –

‘I can’t be wrong’ –

is a claim of certainty –

it denies propositional reality –

it is a statement of –

and an argument for –

ignorance

on certainty 644

644. For otherwise wouldn’t all assertion be discredited in this way?

this is not about –

discrediting an assertion –

or alternatively – 

crediting it

it is about recognizing –

that any assertion –

is open to question –

is open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 645

645. I can’t be making a mistake, – but some day, rightly or wrongly, I may think that I was not competent to judge.

it is not a question –

of being mistaken –

or not –

there is no right or wrong here –

what we deal with is –

uncertainty

as to ‘competence’ –

any judgment of competence –

at any time –

will be open to question –

open to doubt –

will be uncertain

on certainty 646

646. Admittedly, if that always or often happened it would completely alter the character of the language-game.

no – dealing with uncertainties –

i.e. the question of competence –

does not alter –

the character of the language-game

the language-game –

is the game of uncertainty

on certainty 647

647. There is a difference between a mistake for which, as it were, a place is prepared in the game, and a complete irregularity that happens as an exception.

there are no mistakes –

the game is the game of uncertainty –

the idea of the mistake –

along with that of certainty –

of certain knowledge –

is what has corrupted epistemology –

and rendered the language-game –

nothing more than –

a rhetorical ploy

‘a complete irregularity that happens as an exception’

these notions of ‘regularity’ – ‘irregularity’ – ‘exception’ –

are really just operating assumptions –

which may have some methodological value –

but only if it is understood –

that nothing is set in concrete –

that any concept we use –

is open to question – open doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 648

648. I may convince someone else that ‘I can’t be making a mistake’.

I say to someone “So-and-so was with me this morning and told me such-and-such”. If this is astonishing he may ask me: “You can’t be mistaken about it?” That may mean: “Did that really happen this morning?” or, on the other hand: “Are you sure you understood him properly?” It’s easy to see what details I should add to show that I was not wrong about the time, and similarly to show that I hadn’t misunderstood the story. But all that cannot show that I haven’t dreamed the whole thing, or imagined it to myself in a dreamy way. Nor can it show that I haven’t perhaps made some slip of the tongue throughout. (That sort of thing does happen.)

as for ‘I can’t be making a mistake’

any statement you make –

is open to question –

is open to doubt –

is uncertain

you may convince someone –

‘I can’t be making a mistake’

but here we are talking about –

a rhetorical not a logical use of language

whether what you say –

is dreamed – imagined –

or described as ‘a slip of the tongue’ –

it is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 649

649. (I once said to someone – in English – that the shape of a certain branch was typical of an elm, which my companion denied. Then we came past some ashes, and I said “There, you see, here are the branches I was speaking about”. To which he replied “But that’s an ash” – and I said “I always meant ash when I said elm”)

the argument here seems to be –

that it doesn’t matter what you say –

you can underline it –

with a claim to certainty –

which of course –

makes the claim of certainty –

superfluous and irrelevant

on certainty 650

650. This surely means: the possibility of a mistake can be eliminated in certain (numerous) cases. – And one does eliminate mistakes in calculation in this way. For when a calculation has been checked over and over again one cannot say “Its rightness is still only very probable – for an error may always still have slipped in”. For suppose it did seem for once as if an error had been discovered – why shouldn’t we suspect an error here?

checking a calculation –

is repeating the calculation

repetition does not equal certainty

a calculation is a direction –

for a language game of sign substitution

if you follow the direction –

you play the game – you calculate

if you don’t play the game as directed –

it’s not that you make a mistake –

or make an error –

you just don’t calculate

logically speaking –

there can always be a question –

as to whether –

you have followed the direction or not

nevertheless you proceed –

and proceed in uncertainty –

and as the history of mathematical theory shows –

the terms of a calculation proposition –

are open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 651

651. I cannot be making a mistake about 12 x 12 = 144. And now one cannot contrast mathematical certainty with the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions. For the mathematical proposition has been obtained by a series of actions that are in no way different from the actions of the rest of our lives, and are in the same degree liable to forgetfulness, oversight and illusion.

12 x 12 = 144 –

substituting one set of terms for another – does not amount to certainty

what we have here is a practise – a convention – a game –

not a certainty

and yes –

‘the mathematical proposition has been obtained by a series of actions that are in no way different from the actions of the rest of our lives, and are in the same degree liable to forgetfulness, oversight and illusion.’ –

and this is to say –

the ground of any proposal – of any proposition –

is uncertainty

on certainty 652

652. Now can I prophesy that men will never throw over the present arithmetical propositions, never say at last they know how the matter stands? Yet would that justify a doubt on our part?

a prophesy – of certainty –

is just crude rhetoric

doubt doesn’t require – justification –

doubt is the logical response –

to claims of justification

on certainty 653

653. If the proposition 12 x 12 = 144 is exempt from doubt, then so too must non-mathematical propositions be.

12 x 12 = 144 –

is not exempt from doubt –

every feature of the proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt

the history of the proposition –

of the mathematics behind it –

is a history of doubt

12 x 12 = 144 –

is a  sign game –

a game of substitution –

yes – you can play the game –

without questioning it –

however that does not mean –

the game is without question –

without doubt

on certainty 654

26.4.51

654. But against this there are plenty of objections. – In the first place there is the fact that “12 x 12 etc.” is a mathematical proposition, and from this one may infer that only mathematical propositions are in this situation. And if this inference is not justified, then there ought to be a proposition that is just as certain, and deals with the process of this calculation, but isn’t itself mathematical. I am thinking of such a proposition as: “The multiplication ‘12 x 12’, when carried out by people who know how to calculate, will in the great majority of cases give the result ‘144’ ”. Nobody will contest this proposition, and naturally it is not a mathematical one. But has it got the certainty of the mathematical one?

“The multiplication ‘12 x 12’, when carried out by people who know how to calculate, will in the great majority of cases give the result ‘144’

is speculation – plain and simple –

and he asks –

‘But has it got the certainty of the mathematical one?’

it has no certainty

and as for the ‘mathematical one’ –

a mathematical proposition –

may be used without question –

however –

its terms and operations –

are open  to question –

open to doubt –

are uncertain

and the history of mathematical theory –

demonstrates this

on certainty 655

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e. : “Dispute about other things; this is immovable – it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn.”

‘officially, been given the stamp of incontestability’

by who or what?

this is just rhetorical rubbish –

the ground of any dispute –

is uncertainty –

the ground of any proposal –

any proposition – mathematical or not –

is uncertainty –

our proposals are uncertain –

they emerge out of uncertainty –

they express –

uncertainty

on certainty 656

656. And one can not say that of the proposition that I am called L.W. Nor of the proposition that such-and-such people have calculated such-and-such a problem correctly.

nor in fact of act of any mathematical proposition

Wittgenstein confuses ‘incontestability’ –

with how a proposition may be used

a proposition may well be used uncritically –

but this is not to say that it is beyond doubt

that it is beyond question

on certainty 657

657. The propositions of mathematics might be said to be fossilized. – The proposition “I am called …” is not. But it too is regarded as incontrovertible by those who, like myself, have overwhelming evidence for it. And this is not out of thoughtlessness. For, the evidence’s being overwhelming consists precisely in the fact that we do not need to give way before any contrary evidence. And so we have a buttress similar to the one that makes the propositions incontrovertible.

even a fossil is subject to change –

and ‘I am called …’ –

is open to question –

open to doubt

all evidence is uncertain –

and in any case what you need –

can and does change –

it’s hardly a certainty

this ‘buttress’ you have –

against uncertainty –

is rhetoric –

and its basis –

is ignorance

on certainty 658

658. The question “But mightn’t you be in the grip of a delusion now and perhaps later find this out?” – might also be raised as an objection to any proposition of the multiplication tables.

the real point of the argument from delusion –

is just that –

a question can always be raised

on certainty 659

659. “I cannot be making a mistake about the fact that I have just had lunch.,”

For if I say to someone “I have just eaten” he may believe that I am lying or have momentarily lost my wits but he won’t believe that I am making a mistake. Indeed, the assumption that I might be making a mistake has no meaning here.

But that isn’t true. I might for example, have dropped off immediately after the meal without knowing it and have slept for an hour, and now I believe I had just eaten.

But still, I distinguish here between different kinds of mistake.

‘the mistake’ –

has no role at all to play here –

if you are certain – there is no mistake –

and if you are uncertain –

what you are dealing with –

is uncertainties –

not mistakes –

this ‘concept’ – if you can call it that –

of the ‘mistake’ –

just simply – does not work –

in either epistemological setting –

it’s a dud

on certainty 660

660. I might ask: “How could I be making a mistake about my name being L.W?” And I can say: I can’t see how it would be possible.

‘I can’t be mistaken about my name being …’ –

is to say – ‘I am certain my name is …’

to claim certainty here –

is to claim an unimpeachable authority –

for the statement – ‘my name is …’

the only authority is authorship –

and authorship does not guarantee the statement –

which is to say –

the fact that someone makes a statement –

does not make it certain

any statement – any proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt

                                                                                                                              

yes you can pretend otherwise –

but to do so –

is to engage in –

rhetoric –

logical deceit

on certainty 661

661. How might I be mistaken in my assumption that I was never on the moon?

you can’t be mistaken here –

you can be uncertain –

any assumption –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

what is a mistake?

if you claim certainty for your assumption –

there can be no mistake –

if on the other hand –

you recognise that your assumptions are uncertain

what you have is uncertainties –

not mistakes

the mistake has no role in this issue at all

this concept of the ‘mistake’ – if you can call it that –

disappears –

as soon as it is subjected to analysis

what is a mistake?

the mistake is intellectual laziness

on certainty 662

662. If I were to say “I have never been on the moon – but I may be mistaken”, that would be idiotic.

For even the thought that I might have been transported there, by unknown means, in my sleep, would not give me any right to speak of a possible mistake here. I play the game wrong if I do.

if you claim certainty

the concept of the mistake makes no sense –

and what would a mistake be here?

another certainty?

if so –

the claim of certainty – is just empty rhetoric –

that can be applied willy-nilly –

to any statement –

regardless of what is being asserted

the proposition –

‘I have never been on the moon’

like any proposition – any proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

as to what might have been –

again –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 663

663. I have a right to say “I can’t be making a mistake about this” even if I am in error.

I am certain about this even if I am in error –

so the claim of certainty –

has nothing to do with truth –

or with how the world is

and if so –

it has no logical value –

it has no content –

it is nothing more than –

empty rhetoric

on certainty 664

664. It makes a difference: whether one is learning in school what is right and wrong in mathematics, or whether I myself say that I cannot be making a mistake.

what you learn in school –

is not what is right and wrong in mathematics –

though it may be presented to you that way –

what you actually learn is –

the rules of the game –

the game of mathematics

at school it is unlikely –

that you will be made aware –

that the rules of the game –

are uncertain –

and that they have emerged –

from question and doubt

you will simply be shown –

how to play the game

if you are certain –

there are no mistakes

and if you are uncertain –

what you face –

is uncertainties –

not mistakes

the ‘mistake’ is not in the picture

however if you say to yourself –

‘I cannot be making a mistake’ –

which is to say –

‘I am certain’ –

all you do is make a stand for –

ignorance

on certainty 665

665. In the latter case I am adding something special to what is generally laid down.

the latter case is where in mathematics –

‘I myself say that I cannot be making a mistake’

what is ‘generally laid down’ –

                                                                                                                                    

is no more than what is practiced –

and we add something ‘special’ to this?

what is added here is the claim to certainty

Wittgenstein’s ‘something special’ –

is rhetoric

on certainty 666

666. But how is it for example with anatomy (or a large part of it)? Isn’t what it describes, too, exempt from doubt?

anatomy is a description –

what it describes –

in the absence of any description –

is the unknown

any description – or any part of it –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 667

667. Even if I came to country where they believed that people were taken to the moon in their dreams, I couldn’t say to them: “I have never been on the moon. – Of course I may be mistaken”. And to their question “Mayn’t you be mistaken?” I should have to answer: No.

if you are certain –

there can be no mistake –

the point is though –

that the claim of certainty –

is either a delusion –

or a deception

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 668

668. What practical consequence has it if I give a piece of information and add that I can’t be making a mistake about it?

(I might also add instead: “I can no more be wrong about this than about my name’s being L.W.”)

The other person might doubt my statement nonetheless. But if he trusts me he will not only accept my information, he will also draw definite conclusions from my conviction, as to how I shall behave.

what practical consequence if I add –

I can’t be making a mistake –

or I can be no more wrong about this than about my name?

the answer to this question is –

whatever the practical consequence –

of deception might be

Wittgenstein says – ‘if he trusts me’ –

if you trust someone on the basis of their rhetoric –

you’ve been conned –

and what other basis is there for trust –

but rhetoric?

and if he draws definite conclusions –

from Wittgenstein’s ‘conviction’ as to how he will behave –

he is doubly a fool

on certainty 669

669. The sentence “I can’t be making a mistake” is certainly used in practice. But we may question whether it is then to be taken in a perfectly rigorous sense, or is it rather a kind of exaggeration which is used only with a view to persuasion.

yes – it’s only value is rhetorical

on certainty 670

27.4.

670. We might speak of fundamental principles of human enquiry.

any principle of enquiry –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

therefore uncertain

this concept of the ‘fundamental’ –

is a rhetorical rubbish

on certainty 671

671. I fly from here to a part of the world where the people have only indefinite information, or none at all, about the possibility of flying. I tell them I have just flown there from …They ask me if I might be mistaken. – They have obviously a false impression of how the thing happens. (If I were packed up in a box it would be possible for me to be mistaken about the way I travelled.) If I simply tell them that I can’t be mistaken, that won’t perhaps convince them: but it will if I describe the actual procedure to them. Then they will certainly not bring the possibility of a mistake into question. But for all that – even if they trust me – they might believe I had been dreaming or that magic had made me imagine it.

if you are certain –

there can be no mistake –

and if you are uncertain

what you deal with –

is uncertainties

the mistake –

is not in the logical picture –

this game –

‘you are mistaken’ –

‘no I’m not’ –

‘you are’ –

is just a rhetorical battle

any ‘information’ –

is indefinite

that is to say –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

anyone who trusts –

is a victim of –

or engages in –

logical deception

on certainty 672

672. ‘If I don’t trust this evidence why should I trust any evidence?’

exactly –

‘evidence’ – of any kind –

is uncertain

by all means operate with  –

whatever you think –

might be of use to you –

but don’t be conned –

into the false security –

of trust

on certainty 673

673. It is not difficult to distinguish between the case in which I cannot and those in which I can hardly be mistaken? Is it always clear to which a case belongs? I believe not.

I cannot be mistaken = I am certain

‘hardly mistaken? – hardly certain

hardly certain is? – uncertain

if you are ‘certain’ –

you are either deluded –

or in the business of deception –

you play the rhetorical game

alternatively –

if you are uncertain –

you keep an open mind –

recognize the value of doubt –

and operate –

with logical integrity

on certainty 674

674. There are, however, certain types of cases in which I cannot be making a mistake, and Moore has given a few examples of such cases.

I can enumerate certain typical cases, but not give any common characteristic. (N.N. cannot be mistaken about having flown from America to England a few days ago.  Only if he is mad can he take anything else to be possible.)

Wittgenstein’s first statement is just unabashed rhetoric

‘certain typical cases’ – can’t give any common characteristic?

the common characteristic is pretence grounded in ignorance

the question is always – how is reality to be described?

what is clear is that there is no one description  –

the mad are those who think there is

on certainty 675

675. If someone believes that he has flown from America to England in the last few days, then, I believe, he cannot be making a mistake.

And just the same if someone says he is at this moment sitting at a table and writing.

if you think that because someone say says something – it’s therefore certain –

you’re a fool

on certainty 676

676. “But even if such cases can’t be mistaken, isn’t it possible that I am drugged?” If I am and if the drug has taken away my consciousness, then I am not now really talking and thinking. I cannot seriously suppose that I am at this moment dreaming. Someone who, dreaming says “I am dreaming”, even if he speaks audibly in doing so, is no more right than if he said in his dream “it is raining”, while it was in fact raining. Even if his dream was actually connected with the noise of the rain.  

drugged or dreaming –

what you say –

is open to question –

open doubt –

whether you are –

or not                                                                                                                               

on certainty 677*

A proposition is a proposal. A proposal is open to question, open to doubt, is uncertain. A proposition is true if assented to. A proposition is false if dissented from. Assent and dissent are open to question, open to doubt. If you are certain there can be no mistake. In an uncertain reality there are no mistakes; what you face is uncertainties. The notion of the mistake has no role to play in epistemology. The  claim of knowledge is a claim to an authority for a proposition. The only authority is authorship. The authorship of a proposition is logically irrelevant. Any claim to an authority other than authorship is rhetorical.

*There is no 677 in Wittgenstein’s text. Wittgenstein ends with 676.

© greg t. charlton. 2013.

Killer Press Australia.