on certainty 200-399

on certainty 200

200. Really “The proposition is either true or false” only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like.

a proposition is true – if assent to

and false – if dissented from

as to the ‘ground ‘ of assent or dissent –

that is whatever it is said to be –

logically speaking –

the ground is no more than –

a restating of assent or dissent

and if a ‘ground’ is given –

the proposition put –

as with the initial assent or dissent –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 201

201. Suppose someone were to ask: “Is it really right for us to rely on the evidence of our memory (or our sense) as we do?”

isn’t it rather that we understand that memory and sense are unreliable –

and that we work with what we have?

on certainty 202

202. Moore’s certain propositions almost declare that we have a right to rely on evidence.

if Moore’s certain propositions declare –

or almost declare – whatever that means –

that we have a right to rely on certain evidence –

them what we then have from Moore –

is declaration –

and a declaration that we have a right to rely on evidence –

is just pure rhetoric

on certainty 203

203. [Everything* that we regard as evidence indicates that the earth already existed long before my birth. The Contrary hypothesis has nothing to confirm it at all.

If everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it, is it objectively certain? One can call it that. But does it necessarily agree with the world of facts? At the very least it shows us what “agreement” means. We find it difficult to imagine it to be false, but also difficult to make use of it.]

* Passage crossed out in MS.

What does this agreement consist in, if not in the fact that what is evidence in these language games speaks for our proposition? (Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus)

‘what we regard as evidence’

presumably ‘we’ –

are those who hold with Wittgenstein’s world view –

someone should have pointed out to him –

that there are other world views

and furthermore –

that even his world view –

is open to question – open to doubt –

and as a matter of logic –

is uncertain

a different point of view on these matters –

or what he calls ‘the contrary hypothesis’ –

may well have nothing to confirm it –

from his point of view

all that tells us is that Wittgenstein can’t see past his nose –

that he can’t entertain different world views –

or understand the different criteria that come with such views

the next thing to say is that –

if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it –

it’s not an hypothesis – it’s a prejudice

‘agreement with the facts’ –

is the agreement of propositions

and just what ‘agreement’ amounts to –

is always in question

what is true and what is false –

is what you assent to – and what you dissent from –

if you find it difficult to imagine –

dissenting from a proposition –

you lack imagination

‘what is evidence in these language games speaks for our propositions?’ –

‘evidence’ – whatever the language game –

is a window to uncertainty

the reason that it is difficult to make use of prejudice –

is that if you hold to a prejudice –

you exclude possibility

‘propositions’ – ‘hypotheses’ –

that are not open to question –

are useless

on certainty 204

204. Giving grounds, however, justifying evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.

giving grounds – justifying evidence –

comes to an end –

when you stop doing it

these language games –

are games of rhetoric –

if action shows us anything –

it shows us the irrelevance

of these language games –

it shows us –

the irrelevance –

of rhetoric

on certainty 205

205. If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false.

a proposition is true – if it is assented to –

false – if dissented from

the ground or basis of assent or dissent –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 206

206. If someone asked us “but is that true?” we might say “yes” to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say “I can’t give you any grounds, but if you learn more you will think the same”.

If this didn’t come about, that would mean that he couldn’t for example learn history.

a proposition is true – if you assent to it

and the ‘ground’ of assent –

is uncertain

which is to say – I can elaborate my assent –

in whatever way I choose –

but in the end –

regardless of what account I give –

my assent – is open to question –

open to doubt

this idea that we should all think the same –

think as Wittgenstein does –

is deluded – egoist – authoritarian – rubbish

history – for example –

is just the making of interpretation –

different interpretations –

what you deal with in history –

is uncertainty – fascinating –

uncertainty

on certainty 207

207. “Strange coincidence that every man whose skull has been opened had a brain!”

‘brain’ is a description –

without the description – ‘brain’ –

or any other – description –

what you find when you open a  man’s skull –

is the unknown

that a description is commonly used –

is a testament to its utility –

it is not a testament to its certainty

you may well find that at a different place and time –

another description –

is popular

on certainty 208

208. I have a telephone conversation with New York. My friend tells me that his young trees have buds of such and such a kind. I am convinced that his tree is…And I am also convinced that the earth exists.

why?

why not just take what your friend says –

without all the baggage?

what you are convinced of –

is what you don’t question –

and in any case –

it is irrelevant  to the proposition –

put to you

like any baggage you carry –

it too –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 209

209.  The existence of the earth is rather part of the whole picture which forms the starting point of belief for me.

the starting point –

is not some imagined ‘whole picture’ –

the starting point –                                                                                                                                  

is whatever proposition is put to you –

or whatever proposition –

you propose –

this is what you need to deal with –

the reality of the immediate proposition –

delusions –

such as the ‘whole picture’ –

are really just rhetorical devises –

for avoiding uncertainty –

for avoiding –

reality

on certainty 210

210. Does my telephone call to New York strengthen my conviction that the earth exists?

Much seems to be fixed, and it is removed from the traffic. It is so to speak shunted into an unused siding.

if your conviction can be strengthened–

even perhaps needs to be strengthened –

then presumably it is basically – uncertain –

and what sort of a conviction is it –

if it is uncertain?

on the other hand – if your conviction is solid –

telephoning New York –

will have no effect on it at all

the ‘conviction’ – the certainty –

does get shunted into a logical siding

the reason being –

it has no logical value –

however it does have a use –

and that use is –

rhetorical

on certainty 211

211. Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts. (Every human being has parents.)

‘the scaffolding of our thoughts’ –

is what?

the rhetoric that we manufacture –

to pretend –

a solid background –

to our propositions –

our proposals

regardless of how we dress it up

‘our way of looking at things’ –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 212

212.  In certain circumstances, for example we regard a calculation as sufficiently checked. What gives us the right to do so? Experience? May that have deceived us? Somewhere we must be finished with justification, and then there remains the proposition that this is how we calculate.

we may in certain circumstances regard a calculation as sufficiently checked

however any such decision is open to question –

open to doubt

it is not that we have a right to regard a calculation as sufficiently checked –

it is rather that we proceed in uncertainty – in order to proceed

experience is uncertain

and it is not that we may have been deceived –

it is that we recognize that our propositions – our decisions –

are open to question – open to doubt –

are uncertain

justification is not a logical process –

it is a rhetorical process

we finish with ‘justification’ – in an operational sense –

when we stop doing it –

we finish with it methodologically –

when we see that it is pretence

yes – then there remains the proposition –

‘that this is how we calculate’ –

and we proceed –

open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 213

213. Our ‘empirical propositions’ do not form a homogeneous mass.

a proposition is open to question – open to doubt –

that is the logic of it

a term like ‘empirical’ applied to a set or group of propositions –

will be some kind a description of their use

all very well

however this description –

like the propositions themselves –

will be open to question –

open to doubt –

will be uncertain

as to ‘homogeneous mass’ –

again a description – of use

if such a description suits your purpose –

I can’t see what the problem is –

however bear in mind –

in propositional reality –

everything is up for grabs –

                                                                                                                                  that’s the vitality of it –

that is life as is –

without the drag –

of rhetoric

on certainty 214

214. What prevents me from supposing that this table either vanishes or alters its shape and colour when no one is observing it, and then when someone looks at it again changes back to its old condition? – “But who is going to suppose such a thing!” –one would feel like saying.

nothing prevents you from supposing such –

but who is going to suppose such?

a philosopher perhaps?

on certainty 215

215. Here we see that the idea of ‘agreement with reality’ does not have any clear application.

reality without description –

is unknown

when you put up a proposition –

when you propose –

you defy reality –

defy the unknown

it is not that ‘agreement with reality’ –

‘does not have any clear application’ –

it has no application

what we have –

if we have agreement –

is propositions agreeing with –

propositions

and even that is  –

open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 216

216. The proposition “It is written”.

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 217

217. If someone supposed that all our all our calculations were uncertain and that we could rely on none of them (justifying himself by saying that mistakes are always possible) perhaps we would say he is crazy. But can we say he is in error? Does he not just react differently? We rely on calculations, he doesn’t; we are sure, he isn’t.

if all our calculations are uncertain –

there will be no mistakes –

what you have is uncertainties

and it is not that he is in error –

or not in error –

his claim is – uncertain –

a proposition is a proposal –

that is to say –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

the reaction – that is ‘being sure’ –

has no basis in logic –

its ground –

is rhetoric

on certainty 218

218. Can I believe for one moment that I have ever been in the stratosphere? No. So I do know the contrary like Moore?                                                                                                                                  

you can put the proposition that you have never been in the stratosphere –

and that proposition – as with any proposition –

 is open to question –

open to doubt

to preface this assertion with ‘I know’ –

is to claim an authority for the assertion

the only authority you have is authorship –

it is irrelevant  and unnecessary –

to claim authorship of your assertion –

therefore –

logically speaking –

‘I know’ –

is irrelevant and unnecessary

it’s only value is –

rhetorical

on certainty 219

219.  There cannot be any doubt about it for me as a reasonable person. – That’s it. –

so the idea is –

give yourself the cover –

of a ‘reasonable person’ –

and then claim –

that ‘there cannot be any doubt about it’ –

‘it’ being whatever it is you say –

you are certain about

really – this is just rubbish –

rhetorical rubbish

on certainty 220

220. The reasonable man does not have certain doubts.

a pronouncement from on high?

authority assumed

on certainty 221

221. Can I doubt at will?

yes

on certainty 222

222. I cannot possibly doubt that I was never in the stratosphere. Does that make me know it? Does it make it true?

any proposition that you entertain –

or that is put to you –

can be questioned –

can be the subject of doubt

the only genuine ‘knowledge’ –

is uncertain knowledge –

if what you ‘know’ –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

then yes – you know it

the claim of certain knowledge –

is either a delusion –

or a deception

what is true –

is what you give your assent to –

for whatever reason

and whatever reason you have –

is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 223

223. For mightn’t I be crazy and not doubting what I absolutely ought to doubt?

doubt is the natural response to a proposition –

the proposition is a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt

it is only pretence and deception –

that stops you –

doubting

on certainty 224

224. “I know that it never happened, for if it had happened I could not possibly have forgotten it.”

But supposing it did happen, then it just would have been the case that you had forgotten it. And how do you know that you could not possibly have forgotten it? Isn’t that just from earlier experience?

memory is uncertain

on certainty 225

225. What I hold fast to is not one proposition but a nest of propositions.

whether it’s one proposition –

or a nest –

‘holding fast’ –

amounts to –

not questioning –

not doubting

it amounts to –

being ignorant

on certainty 226

226. Can I give the supposition that I have ever been on the moon any serious consideration at all?

any proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

therefore –

open to –

serious consideration

on certainty 227

227. “Is that something that one can forget?”

memory is uncertain

on certainty 228

228. “In such circumstances, people do not say ‘Perhaps we’ve all forgotten’, and the like, but rather they assume that…”

whatever they assume –

it is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 229

229. Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings.

meaning – is uncertain

accounting for it –

is uncertain

on certainty 230

230. We are asking ourselves: what do we do with a statement “I know…” For it is not a question of mental processes and mental states.

And that is how one must decide whether something is knowledge or not.

the only authority is authorship –

claiming authorship of your proposition –

is irrelevant

if  ‘I know’ is a claim of authority –

‘I know’ = ‘I am the author of ..’

‘I know’ is irrelevant

the only other function of ‘I know’ –

is rhetorical

any statement can function as knowledge –

if it is held open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 231

231. If someone doubted whether the earth had existed a hundred years ago, I should not understand, for this reason: I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what would not.

the point is –

to see that your view –

as with other views –

is grounded in –

uncertainty

if this is appreciated –

you will be open –

to different understandings –

and different accounts –

of evidence

on certainty 232

232.  “We could doubt every one of these facts, but we could not doubt them all.”

Wouldn’t it more correct to say: “we do not doubt them all”.

Our not doubting them all is simply our manner of judging, and therefore of acting.

every ‘fact’ is uncertain – we can doubt them all –

no drama there

we deal with what is before us –

and what we put or what is put to us –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

not doubting is not judging

if you act without questioning – without doubting –

without thinking –

you act in ignorance

on certainty 233

233. If a child asked whether the world was already there before my birth, I should answer him that the earth did not begin with my birth, but that it existed long, long before. And I should have the feeling of saying something funny. Rather as if the child had asked me if such and such a mountain were higher than a tall house that it had seen. In answering the question I should have to be imparting a picture of the world to the person who asked it.

If I do answer the question with certainty, what gives me this certainty?

I would say to the child that I don’t know

I would say other people believe that the earth existed before I was born –

and I am happy to accept what they say

I would mention that there are various theories about the age of the earth and about its origins –

but that no one can say for sure what the situation is –

I would tell the child there are scientific theories and religious views on this matter

I would also tell the child that it is to its advantage to understand these various accounts of the earth –

and the various pictures of the world that people have proposed

and that it should make up its own mind on these matters –

but to keep an open mind –

that is be ready to look at the matter afresh

if you answer the child with certainty –

you perpetrate either a delusion –

or a deception

on certainty 234

234. I believe that I have forebears, that every human being has them. I believe that there are various cities, and, quite generally, in the main facts of geography and history. I believe that the earth is a body on whose surface we move and that it no more suddenly disappears or the like than any other solid body: this table, this house, this tree etc. If I wanted to doubt the existence of the earth long before my birth, I should have to doubt all sorts of things that stand fast for me.

Wittgenstein has all these beliefs –

and they all function for him

to doubt is to question –

it does not follow –

that if he were to question these beliefs –

to doubt them –

they would cease to function for him

in fact recognizing  –

the intrinsic uncertainty of his belief system –

may just give him –

a deeper understanding of his reality

on certainty 235

235. And that something stands fast for me is not grounded in my stupidity or credulity.

yes it is

on certainty 236

236. If someone said “The earth has not long been …” what would he be impugning? Do I know?

Would it have to be what is called a scientific belief? Might it not be a mystical one? Is there any absolute necessity for him to be contradicting historical facts? or even geographical ones?

do I know what he would be impugning? – no

would it have to be a scientific belief? – no

might it not be a mystical one? – yes

is he necessarily –

contradicting historical and geographical facts? –

no

on certainty 237

237. If I say “an hour ago this table didn’t exist”, I probably mean it was only made latter on.

If I say “this mountain didn’t exist then”, I presumably mean that it was only formed later on – perhaps by a volcano.

If  I say “this mountain didn’t exist half an hour ago”, that is such a strange statement that it is not clear what I mean. Whether for example I mean something untrue but scientific. Perhaps you think that the statement that the mountain didn’t exist then is quite clear, however one conceives the context. But suppose someone said “This mountain didn’t exist a minute ago, but an exactly similar one did instead”. Only the accustomed context allows what is meant to come through clearly.

the meaning of any proposition – any proposal –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 238

238.  I might therefore interrogate someone who said that the earth did not exist before his birth, in order to find out which of my convictions he was at odds with. And then it might be that he was contradicting my fundamental attitudes, and if that were how it was, I should have to put up with it.

Similarly if he said he had at some time been on the moon.

what you have here –

is different views

if you want to load up with rhetoric –

and talk of ‘conviction’

and what is ‘fundamental’ –

why not?

but don’t take your rhetoric too seriously –

recognize it for it is

it is just your means of persuasion –

and whether your persuasion works or not –

is logically irrelevant

whatever view you have –

regardless of whether it is widely accepted or not –

is logically speaking no more than –

a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

recognizing this – understanding this –

is to find genuine intellectual freedom –

and with that to gain –

a deep understanding and appreciation –

of human reality

on certainty 239

239.  I believe that every human being has two parents; but Catholics only believe that Jesus had a human mother. And other people might believe that there are human beings with no parents, and give no credence at all to the contrary evidence. Catholics believe as well that in certain circumstances a wafer completely changes its nature, and at the same time that all evidence proves the contrary. And so if Moore said “I know that this is wine and not blood”, Catholics would contradict him.

in so far as Moore and the Catholics make claims of certainty –

they are both barking up the wrong tree

on certainty 240

240. What is the belief that all human beings have parents based on? On experience. And how can I base this sure belief on my experience? Well, I base it not only on the fact that I have known parents of certain people but on everything that I have learnt about the sexual life of human beings and their anatomy and physiology: also on what I have heard and seen of animals. But then is that really a proof?

experience is uncertain –

and so we have uncertain knowledge –

and no proof

on certainty 241

241. Isn’t this an hypothesis, which, as I believe, is again and again completely confirmed?

what this is – is an hypothesis –

that is uncertain

and is –

again and again –

restated

on certainty 242

242. Mustn’t we say at every turn : “I believe this with certainty”?

no – what you do is –

you just make your statement –

that is all that is required

the rider –

 ’I believe this with certainty’–

is logically irrelevant –

it’s only value is rhetorical

the claim of certainty –

is either delusional –

or deceptive

all belief is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 243

243. One says “I know” when one is ready to give compelling grounds. “I know” relates to a possibility of demonstrating the truth. Whether someone knows something can come to light, assuming that he is convinced of it

But if what he believes is of such a kind that the grounds that he can give are no surer than his assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes.

one says ‘I know’ –

when one claims an authority for one’s proposition

the only authority – is authorship –

and it is irrelevant to state –

that you are the author of your assertion –

beyond that any claim to authority –

is logically speaking – false

the only ‘value’ of any such claim –

is rhetorical

‘I know’ is a rhetorical devise –

the point of which is to persuade

‘compelling grounds’ –

are whatever you regard as persuasive

the giving  of ‘compelling grounds’ –

is an exercise in rhetoric

a proposition is true – if it I assented to

being ‘convinced’ –

is either believing your own rhetoric –

in which case you are deluded

or pretending to believe it –

and in that case –

your game is – deception

and yes – it is the case –

that the so called ‘grounds’ of an assertion –

are no surer than the assertion

any assertion is a proposal – is uncertain –

and a statement of ‘grounds’ –

logically speaking –

is no more than – more assertion –

the point of which is rhetorical –

and logically unnecessary and irrelevant

once you drop the rhetoric –

what you get back to –

is the basic assertion

which others  –

for whatever reason –

can assent to – or –

dissent from

on certainty 244

244. If someone says “I have a body”, he can be asked “Who is speaking here with this mouth?”

if you ask for the ground for an assertion –

what you get is another assertion –

which like the original assertion

is open to question – open to doubt

i.e. assuming the answer here is – ‘I am’

this may well be regarded –

as good enough to go on with –

but logically speaking –

it is not the end of the matter

what does ‘I’ amount to?

there is no certainty here –

just philosophical possibilities –

in other words –

the answer – the assertion –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

the assertion –‘I have a body ‘ –

does not require grounds –

a statement of grounds –

is nothing more than the attempt –

to give the assertion an authority

the only authority is authorship –

and authorship is logically irrelevant –

it guarantees nothing –

any other attempt to justify – is rhetoric –

is logical deception –

which I would suggest –

is the greater part of human discourse –

of human reality

on certainty 245

245.  To whom does one say he knows something? To himself or someone else. If he says it to himself, how is it distinguished from the assertion that he is sure that things are like that? There is no subjective sureness that I know something. The certainty is subjective but not the knowledge. So if I say “I know that I have two hands”, and that is not supposed to express just my subjective certainty, I must be able to satisfy myself that I am right. But I can’t do that, for my having two hands is not less certain before I have looked at them than afterwards. But I could say: “That I have two hands is an irreversible belief.” That would express the fact that I am not ready to let something count as disproof of this proposition.

there is no ‘subjective certainty’ –

to be sure – is to not question – or to stop questioning –

to be sure is to be ignorant

the claim ‘to know’ –

is a claim to an authority for one’s assertion –

the only authority is authorship –

to claim authorship of your assertion –

is unnecessary and irrelevant

to claim an authority other than authorship –

is to claim an authority that doesn’t exist –

if ‘I know’ has any significance –

it’s significance is rhetorical

‘that I have to hands is an irreversible belief’ –

no proposal is – irreversible

‘I have two hands’ – is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt

in common usage – it may function effectively –

however there will be specialist contexts –

i.e. philosophic scientific and artistic –

where its usefulness and appropriateness –

will be called into question –

and where it may well be replaced –

by other proposals –

regarded as more useful –

more appropriate

on certainty 246

246. “Here I have arrived at a foundation of all my beliefs.” This position I will hold!” But isn’t that, precisely, only because I am completely convinced of it? What is ‘being completely convinced’ like?

if I have arrived at the foundation of all my beliefs –

I have just stopped asking questions –

I have stopped thinking

what is ‘being completely convinced’ like?

it’s ‘like’  being stupid

on certainty  247

247. What would it be like to doubt now that I have two hands? Why can’t I imagine it at all? What would I believe if I didn’t believe that? So far I have no system at all within which this doubt might exist.

what would it be like to doubt that I have two hands?

it would be to question the description –

‘I have two hands’

in certain contexts i.e. scientific –artistic – philosophic –

such a description may not be functional

‘why can’t I imagine it at all?’ –

lack of imagination

‘so far I have no system at all within which this doubt might exist’ –

find one

on certainty 248

248. I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions.

And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.

the rock bottom of my conviction –

I would have thought the conviction –

is rock bottom –

if rock bottom is not the conviction –

then the conviction – as such – is uncertain –

and therefore hardly – a conviction

but what is rock bottom supposed to be anyway?

isn’t ‘rock bottom’ –

just the fact that you’ve stopped – thinking?

stopped questioning?

it can’t be that there are no questions left –

so rock bottom is what –

how about – ignorance?

‘foundation walls carried by the whole house’ –

nice poetic image –

and yes it might suit you to describe your beliefs in this way –

and this description will fit well with your beliefs –

because it is as uncertain as any belief you operate with

on certainty 249

249. One gives oneself a false picture of doubt.

only if the picture one has –

is not open to doubt

on certainty  250

250. My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I would produce in evidence for it.

That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it.

so evidence is irrelevant if you are certain –

so the question –

what is your certainty based on?

nothing –

apparently –

so it’s groundless –

and that makes your certainty –

a prejudice –

a claim that you hold –

and hold not to be –

open to question –

open to doubt

another name for this ‘certainty’ –

is ignorance

on certainty 251

251. Doesn’t this mean: I shall proceed according to this belief unconditionally, and not let anything confuse me?

can you proceed unconditionally?

not in the real world –

the world of contingency –

the world of uncertainty

we should not be afraid of confusion –

it’s an indicator of philosophic health –

at the heart of any confusion –

is a question –

is a doubt –

an uncertainty

on certainty 252

252. But it isn’t just that I believe in this way that I have two hands, but that every reasonable person does.

believe whatever it suits you to believe –

and whatever you do believe –

will be open to question – open to doubt –

will be uncertain

appealing to an ‘authority’ –

be that ‘reasonable people’ – or whatever –

is rhetorical –

it has no logical value at all

on certainty 253

253. At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded.

there is no well-founded belief –

all belief is unfounded –

which is to say –

all belief is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 254

254. Any ‘reasonable’ person behaves like this.

the question is –

can you know how people behave?

can you say with certainty?

yes – you can take a punt –

we all do –

but there is no certainty in this

and what do you say –

when a different view is proposed?

as for ‘reasonableness’ –

isn’t that just –

a piece of rhetoric –

designed –

to make it look as if –

your view has some basis to it –

other than –

your assertion of it?

on certainty 255

255.  Doubting has certain characteristic manifestations, but they are only characteristic of it in particular circumstances. If someone said that he doubted the existence of his hands, kept looking at them from all sides, tried to make sure it wasn’t all ‘done with mirrors’, etc. we should not be sure whether to call that doubting. We might describe this way of behaving as like the behaviour of doubt, but his game would not be ours.

yes – just what doubt amounts to –

is open to question

on certainty 256

256. On the other hand a language-game does change with time.

yes –

a language-game –

is uncertain

on certainty 257

257. If someone said to me that he doubted whether he had a body I should take him to be a half-wit. But I shouldn’t know what it would mean to try and convince him that he had one. And if I had said something, and that had removed his doubt, I should not know how or why.

yes – when you get down to it –

you can’t say with certainty –

why anyone doubts what they doubt –

and if they stop doubting –

why they stop doubting

and whatever view you take –

there is always a question –

always a doubt

on certainty 258

258. I do not know how the sentence “I have a body” is to be used.

That doesn’t unconditionally apply to the proposition that I have always been on or near the surface of the earth.

if you don’t have a use for ‘I have a body’ –

don’t use it

all use is conditional –

so you will use –

‘I have always been on or near the surface of the earth’ –

or any other sentence –

when you think the conditions are right

any assessment you make –

as to whether the conditions are right or not –

will be uncertain –

nevertheless you will get on with it –

and you’ll say what you have to say

on certainty 259

259. Someone who doubted whether the earth had existed for one hundred years might have a scientific, or on the other hand a philosophical, doubt.

yes

on certainty 260

260. I would like to reserve the sentence “I know” for the case in which it is used in normal linguistic exchange.

in normal linguistic exchange ‘I know’ is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

claiming authorship of your proposition –

is unnecessary and irrelevant

and furthermore –

authorship guarantees nothing

in normal linguistic usage –

as indeed in any so called specialist usage –

the only value ‘I know’ has –

is rhetorical –

‘I know’ is a persuasive devise

if Wittgenstein wants to exclude ‘I know’ –

from philosophical usage –

there goes traditional epistemology –

and a good thing too

on certainty 261

261. I cannot at present imagine a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the earth during the last 100 years.

a ‘reasonable doubt’ – I take it –

is a sanctioned doubt –

so it’s the old authoritarian game –

repackaged as ‘reasonableness’

any proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

the point here is –

don’t be conned  –

don’t be fooled –

by authoritarian rhetoric –

by the rhetoric –

of ‘reasonableness’

on certainty 262

262. I can imagine a man who had grown up in quite special circumstances and been taught that the earth came into being 50 years ago, and therefore believed this. We might instruct him: the earth has long…etc. – We should be trying to give him our picture of the world.

This would happen through a kind of persuasion.

yes – the business of ‘knowledge’ is persuasion –

is rhetoric

on certainty 263

263.The schoolboy believes his teachers and his schoolbooks.

perhaps he does – perhaps not

if the schoolboy doesn’t question –

the supposed ‘authority’ of his teachers –

of his schoolbooks –

he will grow up to be a fool

on certainty 264

264. I could imagine Moore being captured by a wild tribe, and their expressing the suspicion that he has come from somewhere between the earth and the moon. Moore tells them that he knows etc. but he can’t give them, the grounds for his certainty, because they have fantastic ideas of human ability to fly and know nothing of physics. This would be an occasion for making that statement.

Moore’s claim to know –

is a claim to an authority

the only authority he has –

is authorship

any assertion – logically speaking –

is a proposal –

and as such – open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain –

so the claim of certainty –

has no logical basis

if it has any value

it’s only value –

is rhetorical

Wittgenstein suggests –

that because here –

Moore faces people  –

with an entirely different view –

to his –

that this is an occasion –

for Moore to ratchet up –

the rhetoric –

why not?

on certainty 265

265.  But what does it say, beyond “I have never been to such a place, and have compelling grounds for believing that”?

say what you have to say –

as for ‘compelling grounds’ –

that is just loading up your assertion –

with your rhetoric

on certainty 266

266.  And here one would still have to say what are compelling grounds.

as to saying what are compelling grounds –

you can say whatever you like –

in whatever way you like –

all you are doing is engaging in rhetoric

the point of which is –

to persuade another –

to your point of view

on certainty 267

267. “I don’t merely have the visual impression of a tree: I know that is a tree”.

the basic assertion here is ‘that is a tree’

prefacing this assertion with ‘I know’ –

is to claim an authority for the assertion

the only authority for an assertion is authorship

and if you make the assertion –

then claiming authorship –

is irrelevant and unnecessary –

and furthermore –

authorship guarantees – nothing

if by ‘I know’ you claim an authority –

other than authorship –

your claim is false –

the only ‘value’ such a claim has –

is rhetorical –

and rhetoric is the art –

of deception

on certainty 268

268. “I know that this is a hand” – And what is a hand? – “Well, this, for example.”

‘this’ –

refers to – the unknown

‘this’ –

is a logical place –

for description

on certainty 269

269. Am I more certain that I have never been on the moon than that I have never been in Bulgaria? Why am I so sure? Well I know I have never been in the neighbourhood – for example I have never been in the Balkans.

if you are ‘more certain’ of one thing than another –

then you are not certain of either

on certainty 270

270. “I have compelling grounds for my certitude.” These grounds make the certitude objective.

‘I have compelling grounds for my certitude.’ –

‘These grounds make the certitude objective’

these statements are blatant – unabashed exercises –

in rhetoric

on certainty 271

271.  What is a telling ground for something is not anything I decide.

isn’t this just a pathetic attempt at –

epistemological intimidation?

‘a telling ground’  – an authority –

it’s not anything I decide – or you decide –

but we should bow to it –

because it’s there?

I mean who is going to buy this rubbish?

the world’s moved on

on certainty 272

272. I know = I am familiar with it as a certainty.

whatever the supposed ‘certainty’ is –

it will be open to question – open to doubt –

and therefore –

I know = I am familiar with it –

as an uncertainty

on certainty 273

273. But when does one say of something that it is certain?

For there can be dispute whether something is certain; I mean when something is objectively certain.

There are countless general empirical propositions that cannot count as certain for us.

when do you say of something that it is certain?

when you are trying to con yourself –

or someone else

on certainty 274

274. One such is that if someone’s arm is cut off it will not grow again. Another, if someone’s head is cut off he is dead and will never live again.

Experience can be said to teach us these propositions. However, it does not teach us them in isolation: rather, it teaches us a host of interdependent propositions. If they were isolated I might perhaps doubt them, for I have no experience relating to them.

whether taken in isolation –

or regarded as interdependent –

empirical propositions –

are open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 275

275. If experience is the ground of our certainty, then naturally it is past experience.

And it isn’t for example just my experience, but other people’s, that I get my knowledge from.

Now one might say that it is experience again that leads us to give credence to others. But what experience makes me believe that the anatomy and physiology books don’t contain what is false? Though it is true that this trust is backed up by my own experience.

uncertainty –

is the ground of our experience

knowledge is uncertain –

experience is uncertain

to trust is to engage –

in logical deception

on certainty 276

276. We believe, so to speak, that this great building exists, and then we see, now here, now there, one or another small corner of it.

my belief that this great building exists is uncertain –

and this can be demonstrated by the fact that –

I see – now here – now there – one or another small corner of it

on certainty 277

277.  “I can’t help believing…”

this proposition –

this proposal –

like any –

is open to question –

open to doubt

                                            

on certainty 278

278`.  “I am comfortable that this is how things are.”

yes – you can be comfortable that this how things are –

but still ask questions – still have doubts –

have an open mind

on certainty 279

279. It is quite sure that motor cars don’t grow out of the earth. We feel that if someone could believe the contrary he could believe everything that we say is untrue, and could question everything that we hold to be sure.

But how does this one belief hang together with all the rest? We should like to say that someone who would believe that does not accept our whole system of verification.

This system is something that a human being acquires by means of observation and instruction. I intentionally do not say “learns”.

yes – someone could question everything that we hold to be sure –

and that would be a good thing

and yes – someone with different beliefs to us – will most likely not accept our whole system of verification

observation and instruction?

observation requires interpretation –

is this where the instruction comes in?

much better to think than to obey

on certainty 280

280. After he has seen this and this and heard that and that, he is not in a position to doubt whether…

you are always in a position to question what you see – what you hear –

always in a position to doubt

and that is because your position –

is uncertain

on certainty 281

281. I, L. W., believe, am sure, that my friend hasn’t sawdust in his body or in his head, even though I have no direct evidence of my senses to the contrary.  I am sure, by reason of what has been said to me, of what I have read, and of my experience. To have doubts about it would seem to me madness – of course, this is also in agreement with other people, but I agree with them.

your belief –

with or without so called evidence –

is uncertain –

and any so called evidence –

one way or the other –

is open to question –

open to doubt

what has been said to you –

what you have read –

and your experience –

none of this is certain

to have doubts about any belief –

is just to question that belief

you don’t know –

with any certainty –

that you are in agreement –

with others

there is always a question –

always a doubt –

even about madness

on certainty 282

282.  I cannot say that I have good grounds for the opinion that cats do not grow in trees or that I had a father and a mother.

If someone has doubts about it – how is that supposed to have come about? By his never, from the beginning, having believed that he had parents? But then, is that conceivable, unless he has been taught it?

yes –

you don’t have good grounds for the opinion –

that cats do not grow in trees –

or that you had a mother and a father

and if you have these opinions –

if you run with them –

if you operate with them –

you do so without good grounds

but this is not say anything exceptional –

in fact any opinion you hold –

is groundless

the value of any opinion is its utility –

not its ground

if someone has doubts about the opinion –

that they have parents –

how is that supposed to come about?

who is to say?

who is to say how doubt comes about?

the real point here is –

any proposition – any proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 283

283. For how can a child immediately doubt what it is taught? That could mean only that he was incapable of learning certain language games.

no – what it means is that the child can question –

and this ability to question – this natural ability –

has not been compromised

if by ‘learning’ Wittgenstein means – not questioning –

not doubting –

then Wittgenstein mistakes learning –

for indoctrination

on certainty 284

284. People have killed animals since the earliest of times, used the fur, bones etc. etc. for various purposes; they have counted definitely on finding similar parts in any similar beast.

They have always learnt from experience; and we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not. By this I naturally do not want to say that men should behave like this, but only that they do behave like this.

who’s to know whether ‘they counted definitely’ or not?

might there not have been people who regarded –

‘finding similar parts in any similar beast’ –

a gift from the gods –

something not guaranteed –

or indeed to be expected?

and what is it to say –

‘they have always learnt from experience?

who’s idea of ‘learning’ –

and who’s idea of ‘experience’ –

are we talking about here?

we don’t see –

‘that they believe certain things definitively’ –

we hoist this interpretation onto their actions –

with the idea that it will suit our purposes

the point is this –

any behaviour –

in the absence of interpretation –

is unknown –

yes we interpret behaviour –

to make it known

and any interpretation that we but forward –

is no more than a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 285

285. If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain place, he shows that he believes that what he is looking for is there.

his rooting around –

shows –

that he is uncertain –

as to whether –

what he’s looking for –

is there –

or not

on certainty 286

286. What we believe depends on what we learn. We all believe it is impossible to get to the moon; but there might be people who believe that it is possible and that it sometimes happens. We say: these people do not know a lot that we know. And, let them never be so sure of their belief – they are wrong and we know it.

If we compare our system of knowledge with theirs then theirs is evidently the poorer one by far.

what we believe –

depends on what we learn –

and what we learn –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

no one is in a position to say –

‘we all believe …’

anyone who says such a thing –

is pretending support –

for their own view –

or is just plain ignorant

if you understand –

that all knowledge –

is uncertain –

then you will be tolerant –

of different beliefs –

different systems of knowledge –

different ways –

of seeing the world

on certainty 287

23.9.50

287. The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And no more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions.

the ‘law of induction’ –

is an interpretation –

of what we do –

and like any other interpretation –

any other ‘explanation’ –

it’s open to question –

open to doubt

the real question is –

whether or not it is useful –

if it is –

it will have currency –

if not –

it won’t

justification is just rhetoric –

do we need rhetoric?

it seems so

yes – we do what we do –

and the why of it is really unknown –

however –

it seems that human beings –

need to give some account of their actions –

need the pretence –

of knowledge –

and if that is the case –

so be it

on certainty 288

288. I know, not just that the earth existed long before my birth, but also that it is a large body, that this has been established, that I and the rest of mankind have forebears, that there are books about all this, that such books don’t lie, etc. etc. etc. And I know all this? I believe it. This body of knowledge has been handed on to me and I have no grounds for doubting it, but on the contrary all sorts of confirmation.

And why shouldn’t I say I know all this? Isn’t that what one does say?

But not only I know, or believe, all that, but the others do too. Or rather I believe that they believe it. 

‘this body of knowledge’ –

is a body of assertion –

and any assertion –

is open to question –

open to doubt

if we are to call this ‘knowledge’ –

it is uncertain knowledge

‘all sorts of confirmation’ –

is just all sorts of rhetoric

isn’t this what one does say?

says who?

what you believe –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 289

289. I am firmly convinced that others believe, believe they know, that all that is in fact so.

any belief you have –

is open to question –

open to doubt

to be ‘firmly convinced’ –

is to be pretentious –

or deluded

on certainty 290

290.  I myself wrote in my book that children learn to understand a word in such and such a way. Do I know that, or do I believe it? Why in such a case do I write not “I believe etc.” but simply the indicative sentence?

yes –

just the indicative sentence is all that is required

prefacing any proposition with ‘I know’ or ‘I believe’ –

adds nothing to the proposition –

nothing but rhetoric

which if it is not identified for what it is –

will corrupt the proposition –

and its bearer

on certainty 291

291. We know that the earth is round. We have definitely ascertained that it is round.

We shall stick to this opinion, unless our whole way of seeing things changes. “How do you know that?” – I believe it.

‘we know that the earth is round’ –

means it has been asserted that the earth is round –

and with this assertion comes a claim of authority

the only authority is authorship –

beyond authorship any claim to authority –

is rhetorical

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain –

therefore no proposition – no proposal –

is definite – is definitely ascertained

if by ‘sticking to an opinion’ –

means not questioning – not doubting –

then sticking to an opinion –

is making a stand for ignorance

perhaps your whole way of thinking will change –

perhaps not –

in any case what you deal with immediately –

is the propositions you put forward –

and those put to you –

they are open to question – open to doubt –

even if –

you are not

on certainty 292

292. Further experiments cannot give the lie to our earlier ones, at most they may change our whole way of looking at things.

the experiment is a demonstration of uncertainty –

and who can say where that will lead?                                                                                                                                                                  

on certainty 293

293. Similarly with the sentence “water boils at 100 degrees centigrade.”

‘water boils at 100 degrees centigrade’ –

is a proposal

if tested – it will be questioned –

and if the questioning is successful –

the proposal – functional as it may be –

useful as it may be –

will be shown to be –

uncertain

on certainty 294

294.  This is how we acquire conviction, this is called ‘being rightly convinced’.

if by ‘this’ –Wittgenstein means –

performing experiments –

quite the opposite is the case –

experiment dispels conviction

for what experiment reveals –

is uncertainty

on certainty 295

295. So hasn’t one, in this sense, a proof of the proposition? But that the same thing has happened again is not proof of it; though we do say it gives us the right to assume it.

if you assume proof –

where there is none –

then what you are involved in –

is pretence –

and deception

on certainty 296

296. This is what we call an “empirical foundation” for our assumptions.

if this is what we call an empirical foundation for our assumptions

then what we call the empirical foundation for our assumptions

is pretence and deception

on certainty 297

297. For we learn, not just that such and such experiments had those and those results, but also the conclusion which is drawn. And of course there is nothing wrong in our doing so. For this inferred proposition is an instrument for a definite use.

action is definite –

however the ground or basis –

of any action –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 298

298. ‘We are quite sure of it’ does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education.

I presume that by ‘community’ –

Wittgenstein is imagining –

that there are many others –

who think just like he does

how would Wittgenstein know –

how anyone else thinks?

as for ‘bound together’ –

by what?

Wittgenstein’s pretence?                                /

his rhetoric?

on certainty 299

299. We are satisfied that the earth is round.

‘we are satisfied that the earth is round’ – 1950

‘we are satisfied that the earth is flat’ –  1542

on certainty 300

10.3.51

300. Not all corrections of our views are on the same level.

any ‘correction’ is a response to uncertainty

on certainty 301

301.  Supposing it wasn’t true that the earth had already existed long before I was born – how should we imagine the mistake being discovered?

there would be no mistake discovered –

just the domination of an alternative view

on certainty 302

302.  It’s no good saying “Perhaps we were wrong” when, if no evidence is trustworthy, trust is excluded in the case of the present evidence.

yes – exactly

trust is not in the logical picture

‘trust’ –

only has rhetorical value –

it’s a fraud

on certainty 303

303. If, for example we have always been miscalculating, and twelve times twelve isn’t a hundred and forty-four, why should we trust any other calculation? And of course that is wrongly put.

to calculate – is to play a game –

a game of sign substitution

if you play the game –

you accept the rules of the game –

there is no question of a mistake –

and the idea of trust here –

is just irrelevant rhetoric

you either play the game –

according to it’s rules –

or you don’t play the game –

and if you don’t play the game –

you don’t – calculate –

simple as that

on certainty 304

304. But nor am I making a mistake about twelve times twelve being a hundred and forty-four. I may say later that I was confused just now, but not that I was making a mistake.

calculating – is playing a game of sign substitution –

there is no question of being mistaken or not

if you follow the rules –

you play the game –

if you don’t follow the rules –

you don’t play

on certainty 305

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory

Wittgenstein’s reference to relativity theory here –

is just a piece of populist intellectual – rhetoric

I think the idea is –

just as in relativity theory –

even where we imagine our clocks slowing down relative to certain co-ordinate systems –

we don’t question the rigidity of our clocks –

so too –

with our ‘conceptual tools’ –

i.e. mathematics –  calculations –

regardless of circumstance

we don’t question – their rigidity –

their certainty

this ‘argument’ – misses the point entirely –

the conceptual history of mathematics –

is a history of uncertainty

mathematical propositions – as used –

are game propositions – games of sign substitution

yes – you can question the ground –  the rules – of any game –

but if you play the game –

you play it according to its rules

and if you play it as designed –

there will be no question of a mistake

if you don’t play it as designed –

you don’t play it

if under the circumstances –

you are confused – as to how to play the game –

then you won’t play it

on certainty 306

306. “I don’t know if this is a hand.” But do you know what the word “hand” means? And don’t say “I know what it means now for me”. And isn’t it an empirical fact – that this word is used like this?

it may well be that this word is used like this –

however the word may have other uses –

and there may well be other words that can be or are used here

regardless of how a word is used –

there is always the question of its use –

whether that is acknowledged by those who use the word or not

customary use does not equal certainty –

it equals contingency

and contingency equals –

uncertainty

on certainty 307

307. And here the strange thing is that when I am quite certain of how the words are used, have no doubt about it, I can still give no grounds for my way of going on. If I tried I could give a thousand, but none as certain as the very thing they were supposed to be grounds for.

that words are used in a certain way –

may well be an empirical fact –

in particular circumstances

however any use of words is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

if you are ‘quite certain’ –

how words are used – have no doubt about it –

you are a fool

‘I can still give no grounds for my way of going on’ –

here we can ask –

if you are certain – why do you need grounds?

and what kind of grounds are we talking about?

certain grounds?

certain grounds for certainty?

‘certain grounds’ here – if the idea made any sense –

would be – irrelevant

if certain – is certain – it is without grounds –

it is groundless

and the very question of grounds for certainty –

suggests – your certainty –

is not certain –

which of course is the case

any so called ‘ground’ – for your use of words –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

in practise –

any so called ‘ground’ for your use of words –

is nothing more than –

rhetoric

on certainty 308

308. ‘Knowledge’ and ‘certainty’ belong to different categories. They are not two ‘mental states’ like, say ‘surmising’ and ‘being sure’. (Here I assume it is meaningful for me to say “ I know what (e.g.) the word ‘doubt’ means” and that this sentence indicates that the word “doubt” has a logical role.) What interests us now is not being sure but knowledge. That is, we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one.

knowledge is a proposal – a proposition –

open to question – open to doubt –

to claim certainty is to make a stand for ignorance

if when you say –

‘I know what the word ‘doubt ‘ means’ –

and you are claiming certainty –

then you misuse the word ’know’

to know is to recognize uncertainty –

and to deal in uncertainty

and so the meaning of ‘doubt’ –

as with meaning of any word –

is open to question –

is open to doubt

the logic of language –

is the logic of uncertainty

‘about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is possible at all’ –

judgment is only a possibility – given uncertainty –

if there is no doubt – there will be no judgment

a proposition – empirical or otherwise – is a proposal –

and as such – uncertain

how we characterize a proposition –

i.e. – as ‘empirical’ – as ‘non-empirical’ – or whatever –

is a question of usage –

a matter of circumstance

and any characterization itself –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 309

309. Is it that rule and empirical proposition merge into one another?

a proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt

a rule –

is a proposition –

open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 310

310. A pupil and a teacher. The pupil will not let anything be explained to him, for he continually interrupts with doubts, for instance as to the existence of things, the meaning of words, etc. The teacher says “Stop interrupting me and do as I tell you. So far your doubts don’t make sense at all”.

if the teacher did stop and address the student’s concerns –

he might learn that he is valued for his teaching –

and not his authoritarianism

and the student might learn that he is valued for his intelligence –

and not a capacity to blindly accept authority –

like an idiot

on certainty 311

311. Or imagine that the boy questioned the truth of history (and everything that connects up with it) – and even whether the earth had existed at all a hundred years before.

                                                                                                                                   

I imagine you would have before you an exceptional student

on certainty 312

312. Here it strikes me as if doubt were hollow. But in that case – isn’t belief in history hollow too? No; there is so much that this connects up

doubt opens up possibilities –

belief closes them down

connecting beliefs – is of no value at all –

if the connections – and the beliefs –

are not open to the question –

open to doubt

on certainty 313

313. So is that what makes us believe a proposition? Well – the grammar of “believe” just does hang together with the grammar of the proposition believed.

saying you believe a proposition –

is to give the proposition an authoritative status

the only authority is authorship

and you have the ‘authority’ of authorship –

whether you ‘believe’ or not

saying you believe a proposition –

is to make claim of authority above and beyond authorship

any such claim to an authority –

is rhetorical –

you are trying to persuade –

either your self or someone else –

that your proposition has more authority –

than your authorship

rhetoric is deception –

belief – is deception

and yes the rhetoric of ‘believe’ –

does hang together with the rhetoric –

of the proposition believed

deception –

hangs with –

deception

on certainty 314

314. Imagine that the schoolboy really did ask “and is there a table there even when I turn around, and even when no one is there to see it?” Is the teacher to reassure him – and say – “of course there is!”?

Perhaps the teacher will get a bit impatient, but think that the boy will grow out of asking such questions.

                                                                                                                                 

the answer the teacher should give to the schoolboy’s question is – ‘I don’t know’

on certainty 315

315. That is to say, the teacher will feel that this is not really a legitimate question at all.

And it would be just the same if the pupil cast doubt on the uniformity of nature, that is to say on the justification of inductive arguments. – The teacher would feel that this was only holding them up, that this way the pupil would only get stuck and make no progress. – And he would be right. It would be as if someone were looking for some object in a room; he opens a drawer and doesn’t see it there; then he opens it again, waits, and opens it once more to see if perhaps it isn’t there now, and keeps on like that. He has not learned to look for things. And in the same way this pupil has not learned to ask questions. He has not learned the game that we are trying to teach him.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

isn’t it rather that someone opens the drawer and sees what’s there –

but doesn’t see what’s there when the drawer is closed?

such a person does know how to look for things –

but he does not confuse vision with imagination

and it is not that the pupil has not learned the game that has been put to him –

the student is questioning the game

perhaps at the back of his mind is the question –

why should I play this game?

on certainty 316

316. And isn’t it the same as if the pupil were to hold up his history lesson with doubts as to whether the earth really…?

perhaps the teacher could say –

‘fair question –

but for the arguments sake –

let’s assume that the earth really …’ –

and see where we can go with that –

we will address your question –

and any other question of that type –

at another time’

on certainty 317

317. This doubt isn’t one of the doubts in our game. (But not as if we chose this game!)

says who?

who says what the game is –

and what the doubts are?

and as for not choosing it –

if you can think about –

you can make a choice

you can choose how to play it–

and you can choose –

whether to play it

on certainty 318

12.3.51

318.  ‘The question doesn’t arise at all.’ Its answer would characterize a method. But there is no sharp boundary between methodological propositions and propositions within a method.

the question arises – if the question is asked

any proposition addresses the question of how to proceed

on certainty 319

319. But wouldn’t one have to say then, that there is no sharp boundary between propositions of logic and empirical propositions? The lack of sharpness is that boundary between rule and empirical propositions.

how a proposition is described –

depends on the use it is put to

if the task is to decide what can be done –

the proposition is logical

if it is what to do –

the propositions is empirical –

if the task is to stop thinking –

and proceed regardless –

then the propositions is a rule

on certainty 320

320. Here one must, I believe, remember that the concept ‘proposition’ itself is not a sharp one.

the concept proposition –

is like any other proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 321

321. Isn’t what I’m saying: any empirical proposition can be transformed into a postulate – and then becomes a norm of description. But I am suspicious even of this. The sentence is too general. One almost wants to say “any empirical proposition can, theoretically, be transformed…”, but what does “theoretically” mean here? It sounds all too reminiscent of the Tractatus.

a proposition has no immanent value –

how it is characterized –

will depend on how it is used –

and here there will be no definite description –

there will only be a working description –

and any working description –

will be open to question –

open to doubt –

will be uncertain

on certainty 322

322. What if the pupil refused to believe that the mountain has been there beyond human memory?

We should say that he had no grounds for this suspicion.

first up –

we should say to the student –

to keep an open mind –

and further –

adopt the same principle ourselves

any view is open to question –

open to doubt –

the claim of grounds is rhetorical –

logically speaking –

any belief – any suspicion –

is groundless

on certainty 323

323. So rational suspicion must have grounds?

We might also say: “the reasonable man believes this”.

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

if ‘rational suspicion’ is to mean anything –

it means recognizing the nature of the proposition

the ‘ground for a proposition’ –

is nothing more than the argument for it –

argument is rhetoric

‘a reasonable man believes this’ –

is rhetoric

on certainty 324

324. Thus we should not call anyone reasonable who believed something in despite of scientific evidence.

                                                                                                                                    

if I believe something in spite of scientific evidence –

then presumably I come at the matter –

with a non-scientific point of view

who is to say what perspective is to be used?

there is no authority to appeal to here –

there is only assertion –

someone’s assertion –

and perhaps their pretence

don’t be fooled by rhetoric of any kind –

keep an open mind –

and be open to different understandings –

different kinds of knowing –

and understand that any view you take –

on any matter –

for whatever reason –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 325

325. When we say that we know that such and such…, we mean that any reasonable person in our position would also know it, that it would be a piece of unreason to doubt it. Thus Moore too wants to say not merely that he knows that he etc. etc., but also that anyone endowed with reason in his position would know it just the same.

forget all the rhetoric about reasonable and unreasonable –

and whether the gang’s on side or not –

any claim to knowledge – is open to question –

open to doubt

knowledge is uncertain

to suggest otherwise is to be involved in pretence –

and deception

on certainty 326

326. But who says what it is reasonable to believe in this situation?

anyone who wants to pretend an authority –

the ‘authority’ of reason

anyone who’s game is –

rhetoric

on certainty 327

327. So it might be said: “The reasonable man believes: that the earth has been there since long before his birth, that his life has been spent on the surface of the earth, or near it, that he has never, for example, been on the moon, that he has a nervous system an various innards like all other people, etc., etc.”

if you drop the rhetoric –

‘the reasonable man believes …’

what you have here –

is a series of propositions –

proposals

these propositions –

may well be generally agreed to –

nevertheless –

they are open to question –

and open to doubt –

and as such –

uncertain

on certainty 328

328. “I know it as I know that my name is L.W.”

‘I know’ –

is a claim to an authority – for an assertion

the only actual ‘authority’ –

is authorship –

and it is irrelevant to claim authorship –

of your assertion

‘I know’ – is irrelevant

if by ‘I know’ –

you claim an authority –

other than authorship –

your claim is false

if it has rhetorical effect –

that effect is based on –

deception

as for ‘I know that my name is ..’ –

all that is needed is –

‘my name is …’

it is  irrelevant –

to preface ‘my name is …’ –

with ‘I know’ –

and really – why bother?

and if you are claiming –

an authority –

other than authorship –

for your assertion –

why?

on certainty 329

329. ‘If he calls that in doubt – whatever “doubt” means here – he will never learn this game.

without doubt –

there is no learning

so a game –

that is not open to doubt –

is a ‘game’ –

that has no value

on certainty 330

330. So here the sentence “I know…” expresses the readiness to believe certain things.

if ‘I know’ expresses a ‘readiness’ –

it is pre-propositional –

what gets expressed –

is in the proposition

and in that case  -

‘I know’ is propositionally –

irrelevant

on certainty 331

13.5.

331. If we ever do act with certainty on the strength of belief, should we wonder that there is much we cannot doubt?

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      

the ‘strength of belief’ is what?

presumably a strong belief –

is one that is not questioned

and if so then strength –

amounts to ignorance

if you act with certainty –

you act without thinking

and if you act without thinking –

no big surprise –

you don’t doubt

                                                   

on certainty 332

332. Imagine that someone were to say, without wanting to philosophize, “I don’t know if I have ever been on the moon; I don’t remember ever being there”. (Why would this person be so radically different from us?)

In the first place – how would he know that he was on the moon? How does he imagine it? Compare: “I do not know if I was ever in the village of X.” But neither could I say that if X were in Turkey, for I know that I was never in Turkey.

we have two propositions here –

‘I have never been on the moon…’

and ‘I have never been to the village of X’

any proposition – any proposal –

is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

if you preface a proposition with a claim to certainty –

which presumably is the point here –

of the ‘I know’ or the ‘I don’t know’ –

you corrupt or attempt to corrupt the proposition

claiming certainty for your proposition –

may well have rhetorical value –

it has no logical value

on certainty 333

333. I ask someone have you ever been in China?” he replies “I don’t know”. Here one would surely say “You don’t know? Have you any reason to believe that you might have been there at some time? Were you for example ever near the Chinese border? Or were your parents there at the time when you were going to be born?” – Normally Europeans do know whether they have been in China or not.

all Wittgenstein can really say here –

is that his ‘someone’ – didn’t answer his question –

the question as put

the answer to Wittgenstein’s question –

‘have you been to China?’ –

will be either –

‘yes I have been in China’ – or – ‘no – I haven’t’

note – in these answers –

the question of knowledge does not arise –

and the reason is that it is not relevant

on the other hand –

if the question was to fit the answer – ‘I don’t know’

it would have to be –

‘do you know if you have ever been in China?’

this question renders the real question –

(‘have you been to china?’) –

irrelevant –

if you answer the ‘do you know’ question –

you’ll be talking about the nature of knowledge –

not where you’ve been –

and yes your answer here could well be –

‘I don’t know’ –

but that’s got nothing to do with China –

and you might just be annoyed –

that ‘someone’ –

has sidetracked you down a blind alley –

on the pretence of asking you –

where you’ve been?

on certainty 334

334. That is to say: only in such-and-such circumstances does a reasonable person doubt that.

says who?

who decides what circumstance?

and what is reasonable?

if you fall for this –

this authoritarian argument –

you’ve been conned –

you’re a fool

on certainty 335

335. The procedure in a court of law rests on the fact that circumstances give statements a certain probability. The statement that, for example, someone came into the world without parents wouldn’t be taken into consideration there.

in the Scopes trial in Tennessee in 1925 – William Jennings Bryan before Judge Raulston argued the creationist case –

part of which was that Adam and Eve did not have parents –

the court took this into consideration

Wittgenstein’s idea of jurisprudence –

is based not it seems on the practice of law –

but his own philosophical prejudices

on certainty 336

336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And visa versa.

But is there no objective character here?

Very intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others hold it proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former.

yes the rhetoric alters

all we have is opinion –

and any opinion –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

the claim of objectivity –

is a claim of authority

the only authority –

is authorship

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority –

is rhetorical

on certainty 337

337. One cannot make experiments if there are not some things that one does not doubt. But that does not mean that one takes certain presuppositions on trust. When I write a letter and post it, I take it for granted that it will arrive – I expect this.

If I make an experiment I do not doubt the existence of the apparatus before my eyes. I have plenty of doubts, but not that. If I do a calculation I believe, without any doubts, that the figures on the paper aren’t switching of their own accord, and I also trust my memory the whole time, and trust it without reservation. The certainty here is the same as my never having been on the moon.

we operate with – and in – uncertainty –

uncertainty does not stop us acting –

you may expect –

that when you do a calculation –

the figures on the page –

won’t switch of their own accord –

the ground of this expectation –

and indeed – any expectation –

is uncertainty

memory is uncertain –

to trust in the face of uncertainty –

is to engage in logical deception

any proposition – any proposal –

i.e. ‘I have never been on the moon’ –

is open to question –

is open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 338

338. But imagine people who were never quite certain of these things, but said that they were very probably so, and that it did not pay to doubt them. Such a person, then, would say in my situation: “It is extremely unlikely that I have ever been on the moon”, etc., etc. How would the life of these people differ from ours? For there are people who say that it is merely extremely probable that water over a fire will boil and not freeze, and that therefore strictly speaking what we consider impossible is only improbable. What difference does this make in their lives? Isn’t it rather that they talk rather more about things than the rest of us?

those who recognize uncertainty –

the difference is not that they talk more –

it is that they understand more

and what difference does it make to their lives?

well who is to say?

my bet would be that they live without delusion –

and that they live without  prejudice –

and that they are open to the possibilities –

of this life

on certainty 339

339.  Imagine someone who is supposed to fetch a friend from the railway station and doesn’t simply look the train up in the time-table and go to the station at the right time, but says: “I have no belief that the train will really arrive, but I will go to the station all the same.” He does everything that the normal person does, but accompanies it with doubts or self-annoyance, etc.

‘I have no belief that the train will really arrive, but I’ll go to the station all the same’

by the sounds of it – not only does this person have no belief –

he has no expectation

his going ‘to the station all the same’ –

makes no sense –

or he is playing some perverse game

Wittgenstein says –

‘he does everything that a normal person does, but accompanies it with doubts or self-annoyance”

where’s the doubt?

he says – ‘I have no belief ….’

if he said ‘I am unsure of my belief that  …’ –

fair enough to assume doubt –

but he doesn’t say this or anything like it –

his statement –

‘I have no belief …’ –

is a statement – without doubt

and as for self-annoyance –

I see no sign of it from his statement

however –

if what Wittgenstein is trying to say by way of this example is –

that someone can act with doubt –

and their action doesn’t appear to be any different –

to someone acting under the delusion of certainty –

then yes – that can be right –

but to say that is epistemologically uninteresting –

if not entirely irrelevant

the logical and epistemological issue

is the status of propositions –

the status of proposals –

what people say and how they regard –

what they say –

and here you will find – difference

for there is a real difference between –

a claim of certainty –

and a claim of uncertainty

it’s the difference between a deluded perspective –

and one that faces up to propositional reality –

fair and square

on certainty 340

340. We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical proposition, how the letters A and B are pronounced, what the colour of human blood is called, that other beings have blood and call it “blood”.                                                                                                                                  

if a proposition’s use is stable –

this is only a measure of its utility –

not its certainty                                                                                   

a mathematical proposition –

is a description of an operation –

a practice –

as with any description –

it is open to question –

open to doubt –

the history of mathematical theory –

is evidence of this –

if any evidence is needed

how the letters A and B are pronounced –

is not a matter of certainty –

it is a matter of circumstance –

of practise – of usage –

the same is true –

with the colour of blood –

I don’t know with certainty –

that other beings have blood –

or know with certainty –

that they call it ‘blood’

on certainty 341

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

our questions and our doubts –

do not depend on certainty

the ground of any question –

of any doubt –

is uncertainty

on certainty 342

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.

any scientific proposition –

any scientific investigation –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 343

343. But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

we operate with assumption

and any assumption is uncertain

the point being –

we operate effectively –

in uncertainty

on certainty 344

344. My life consists in my being content to accept many things.

that may be the so  –

but even if that is the case –

the fact is –

you can be content –

and be critical –

and have an open mind

in any case –

the logical point is –

there is nothing in this life –

that is not –

open to question –

that is not –

open to doubt

on certainty 345

345. If I ask someone “what colour do you see at the moment?”, in order that is, to learn what colour there is there at the moment, I cannot at the same time question whether the person I ask understands English, whether he wants to take me in, whether my own memory is not leaving me in the lurch as to the names of colours, and so on.

yes – you can only ask one question at a time

on certainty 346

346. When I am trying to mate someone in chess, I cannot have doubts about the pieces perhaps changing places of themselves and my memory simultaneously playing tricks on me so that I don’t notice.

you can have these doubts –

and still play the game –

the doubts are legitimate

the question is –

would they be useful to you –

in playing the game?

I can’t see it myself –

but I can’t speak for others

I can’t say  –

what is and is not useful –

to another

on certainty 347

15.3.51

347. “I know that that’s a tree.” Why does it strike me as if I did not understand the sentence? though it is after all an extremely simple sentence of the most ordinary kind? It is as if I could not focus my mind on any meaning. Simply because I don’t look for the focus where the meaning is. As soon as I think of an everyday use of the sentence instead of a philosophical one, its meaning becomes clear and ordinary.

‘I know that that’s a tree’ –

perhaps you don’t understand the sentence –

because the ‘I know’ –

which could well be seen as the focus of the sentence –

is irrelevant

the claim of knowledge is a claim of authority –

the only authority is authorship –

claiming the authorship – of your sentence –

which is just what ‘I know’ amounts to –

is irrelevant

if ‘I know’ is to be a claim of authority –

other than the claim of authorship –

it is false

perhaps it has rhetorical effect –

if so that effect –

can only be based on deception

meaning is not a ghost in the syntax –

the meaning of the non-rhetorical sentence –

‘that is a tree’ –

is the use the sentence is put to –

be that a sentence of ‘an everyday use’ –

or one of a ‘philosophical use’

and yes – just what that amounts to –

how it is interpreted –

will be uncertain –

it will be a matter open to question –

open to doubt –

and never in any final sense –

resolved

on certainty 348

348. Just as the words “I am here” have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not when I say them to someone who is sitting in front of me and sees me clearly, – and not because they are superfluous, but because their meaning is not determined by the situation, yet stands in need of such determination.

‘context’

like meaning –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

and any determination –

is uncertain

on certainty 349

349.  “I know that that’s a tree” – this may mean all sorts of things: I look at a plant that I take for a young beech and that someone else thinks is a black-currant. He says “that is a shrub”; I say it is a tree – We see something in the mist which one of us takes for a man, and the other says “I know that that’s a tree”. Someone wants to test my eyes etc. etc. –etc. etc. Each time ‘that’ which I declare to be a tree is of a different kind.

But what when we express ourselves more precisely? For example: “I know that that thing there is a tree, I can see it quite clearly.” – Let us even suppose that I made this remark in the context of a conversation (so that it was relevant when I made it); and I add “I mean these words as I did five minutes ago”. If I added, for example, that I had been thinking of my bad eyes again and it was a kind of sigh, then there would be nothing puzzling about my remark.

For how a sentence is meant can be expressed by an expansion of it and may therefore be made part of it.

‘I know that that’s tree’ –

first up –

the ‘I know’ – is either a logical irrelevancy –

or a rhetorical ploy

drop the ‘I know’ –

and you have the basic sentence –

‘that’s a tree’

secondly –

you can expand a sentence –

but expanded or not –

the sentence –

or if you like it’s ‘meaning’ –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 350

350.  “I know that that’s a tree” is something a philosopher might say to demonstrate to himself or someone else that he knows something that is not a mathematical or logical truth. Similarly, someone who was entertaining the idea that he was no use anymore might keep repeating to himself “I can still do this and this and this”. If such thoughts often possessed him one would not be surprised if he, apparently out of all context, spoke such a sentence out aloud. (But here I have already sketched a background, a surrounding, for this remark, that is to say given it context.) But if someone, in quite heterogeneous circumstances, called out with the most convincing mimicry: “Down with him!”, one might say of these words (and their tone) that they were a pattern that does indeed have familiar applications, but that in this case it was not even clear what language the man in question was speaking. I might make with my hand the movement I should make if I were holding a hand-saw and sawing through a plank; but would one have any right to call this movement sawing, out of all context? – (It might be something quite different!)

any account of context –

is open to question –

open to doubt

a claim of context –

or a sense of context –

guarantees nothing –

yes – we make assumptions –

and proceed on their basis –

but this is not certainty –

this is operating –

with and in uncertainty –

and getting on with it

on certainty 351

351. Isn’t the question “Have these words a meaning?” similar to “Is that a tool” asked as one produces, say, a hammer? I say “Yes, it’s a hammer”. But what if the thing that any of us would take for a hammer were somewhere else a missile, for example, a conductor’s baton? Now make the application yourself.

have these words a meaning?

yes – but the matter is uncertain

is that a tool?

yes – but it’s application –

is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 352

352. If someone says, “I know that that’s a tree” I may answer: “Yes, that is a sentence. An English sentence. And what is it supposed to be doing?” Suppose he replies: “I just want to remind myself that I know things like that”? –

‘I know’ – is a claim to authority –

the only authority – is authorship –

if ‘I know’ is to have a logical function –

‘I know’ = ‘I am the author of’

is Wittgenstein seriously suggesting –

that you need to remind yourself –

that you are the author –

of your assertions?

on certainty 353

353. But suppose he said “I want to make a logical observation”? – If a forester goes into a wood with his men and says “This tree has got to be cut down, and this one and this one” – what if he then observes “I know that that’s a tree? – But might not I say of the forester “He knows that that’s a tree – he doesn’t examine it, or order his men to examine it”?

if he says ‘I know that’s a tree’ –

he corrupts a straightforward assertion – ‘that’s a tree’ –

with irrelevant rhetoric –

and if you say –

‘he knows that that’s a tree’ –

you do the same

regardless of what is examined or not –

with or without rhetoric –

any proposition – any proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 354

354. Doubting and non-doubting behaviour. There is the first only if there is the second.

non-doubting behaviour –

is ignorant behaviour –

unlikely –

we’ll see the end of that

but doubting behaviour –

behaviour that is open and critical –

does not depend on –

stupidity –

what it depends on –

is understanding –

understanding that –

whatever we say or do –

is open to question –

is open to doubt

this understanding –

is quite natural –

but we are all victims –

to some extent –

of those who wish to control –

those who wish to play –

the authoritarian game –

it’s a game well entrenched –

in many forms –

in every culture

the only way to beat it –

is to not play it –

don’t bow –

question

on certainty 355

355.  A mad doctor (perhaps) might ask me “Do you know what that is?” and I might reply “I know that it’s a chair; I recognize it, its always been in my room”. He says this, possibly, to test not my eyes but my ability to recognize things, to know their names and functions. What is in question here is a kind of knowing one’s way about. Now it would be wrong for me to say “I believe that it’s a chair” because that would express my readiness for my statement to be tested. While “I know that it…’ implies bewilderment if what I said is not confirmed.

the real question here is – ‘what is that?’

and the real answer is ‘that is a chair’

the prefaces ‘do you know’ – and ‘I know’ –

are irrelevant rhetoric

and so too the preface ‘I believe’ –

what is in question here –

is plain dealing and plain thinking

test the statement by all means –

but consign the rhetoric –

to the logic rubbish bin

once you see that there is nothing –

to the claim to know –

but irrelevancy and rhetoric

bewilderment dissolves into –

clarity

on certainty 356

356.  My “mental state”, the ‘knowing”, gives me no guarantee of what will happen. But it consists in this, that I should not understand where a doubt could get a foothold nor where a further test was possible.

your mental state guarantees nothing –

and this ‘knowing’ –

in so far as it obstructs doubt and testing –

is ignorance

on certainty 357           

357.  One might say: “ ‘I know’ expresses comfortable certainty, not the certainty that is still struggling.”

the certainty ‘that is still struggling’ –

is uncertainty –

although once you understand that all propositions are uncertain –

that all practices are uncertain –

there will be no struggle

‘comfortable certainty’ –

is stupidity

on certainty 358

358.  Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably thought as well)

the argument for certainty –

is essentially the attempt to close down thinking –

to put an end to critical activity

it is to argue for a form of life –

that is deceptive and delusional

such an argument is  –

stupid and immoral

on certainty 359

359.  But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal.

a conception – that is not to be evaluated –

is a prejudice

calling it ‘animal’ –

is a misconception –

animals –

are not prejudiced

on certainty 360

360. I KNOW that this is my foot. I could not accept any experience as proof to the contrary. – That may be an exclamation; but what follows from it? At least that I shall act with a certainty that knows no doubt, in accordance with my belief.

for a start –

there is no proof in experience –

experience is uncertain

so the claim ‘I know ..’ –

is in fact a denial of experience –

what follows from it?

ignorance and stupidity

if you act with a certainty –

that knows no doubt –

you are a fool

on certainty 361

361. But I might also say: It has been revealed to me by God that it is so. God has taught me that this is my foot. And therefore if anything happened that seemed to conflict with this knowledge I should have to regard that as deception.

this statement makes clear –

that the claim of knowledge –

is a claim to authority

the only real authority –

is authorship

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority –

is rhetorical rubbish

the argument for authority –

is an argument for –

control and domination

it’s a false argument –

based on delusion –

and deception

and those who peddle it –

are frauds

on certainty 362

362. But doesn’t it come out here that knowledge is related to a decision?

yes – our knowledge is uncertain –

our decisions are uncertain

on certainty 363

363. And here it is difficult to find the transition from the exclamation one would like to make, to its consequences in what one does.

there is no difficulty –

there is no transition –

your proposition –

you proposal –

exclamation or not –

is uncertain –

and in its consequence –

is uncertain

on certainty 364

364. One might also put the question: “If you know that that is your foot, – do you also know, or do you only believe, that no future experience will seem to contradict your knowledge?” (That is, that nothing will seem to you yourself to do so.)

any ‘knowledge’ you have –

will be uncertain

any belief you have regarding the future –

will be uncertain

what seems to be the case –

is not what is certain –

it is that which is uncertain –

that which is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 365

365. If someone replied: “I also know that it will never seem to me as if anything contradicted that knowledge”, – what could we gather from that, except that he himself had no doubt that it would never happen? –

if he had no doubt that it would never happen –

what we would gather from that –

is that he is a fool

on certainty 366

366.  Suppose it were forbidden to say “I know” and only allowed to say “I believe I know”?

if you say I believe I know’ –

you are saying my knowledge is uncertain –

for any belief is open to question –

open to doubt

however if you understand –

that any proposition – any proposal –

is open to question –

open go doubt –

is uncertain –

then the preface ‘I believe I know’ –

as a statement of uncertainty

is unnecessary

the assertion without the preface  -

is all that is required

on certainty 367

367. Isn’t it the purpose of constructing a word like “know” analogously to “believe’ that the opprobrium attaches to the statement “I know” if the person who makes it is wrong?

As a result a mistake becomes something forbidden.

firstly –

if you hold with the idea of certain knowledge –

there will be no mistakes –

how could there be if your knowledge is certain?

on the other hand –

if you hold with uncertainty –

there are no mistakes –

what you deal with is – uncertainties

Wittgenstein presents ‘mistake’ –

as a key philosophical notion –

when it is really just a term of common parlance –

that when analysed –

is shown to have no philosophical significance at all

it’s not in the logical picture –

it’s a red herring

I suspect Wittgenstein knows this –

and that he is just using it –

to prop up the worthless notion of certainty

why you ask?

well it strikes me that Wittgenstein –

in one of his moods –

wants there to be certainty –

and has decided that if he has to –

he will be philosophically disingenuous –

in order to get it up

just another language-game hey?

secondly –

if you understand that ‘know’ –

can only mean uncertainty

where’s the opprobrium in being uncertain –

open to question – open to doubt?

and furthermore –

in an uncertain reality –

nothing is forbidden

on certainty 368

368. If someone says he will recognize no experience as proof of the opposite,  that is after all a decision. It is possible that he will act against it.

first up there is no proof –

one way or the other – of any proposition –

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt

to decide that your proposition is certain –

is to either –

not understand the logic of the proposition –

i.e. that it is open to question – open to doubt –

or it is to engage in rhetoric –

rhetoric that is disingenuous –

and deceptive

if you decide to act against a proposition you have held –

what that means –

is that for whatever reason –

the proposition no longer commands your assent

that’s all there is to it –

simple as that

on certainty 369

16.3.51

369. If I wanted to doubt if this was my hand, how could I avoid doubting whether the word “hand” has any meaning? So that it is something that I seem to know after all.

any language use is open to question –

open to doubt

i.e. in certain contexts –  scientific – artistic – philosophic –

the appropriateness – the usefulness – of the description –

‘this is my hand’ –

or the appropriateness or usefulness of the word –

‘hand’ –

might be called into question

it would be unusual –

but you could question whether a word has any meaning

doing a crossword puzzle may raise this question

‘something that I seem to know after all’ –

‘seeming to know’ – is hardly being certain

if seeming to know –

is what ‘know’ amounts to –

to know is to be uncertain

on certainty 370

370. But more correctly: The fact that I use the word “hand” and all the other words in my sentence without a second thought, indeed that I should stand before the abyss if I wanted so much as to try doubting their meanings – shews that absence of doubt belongs to the language-game, that the question “How do I know…” drags out of the language game, or else does away with it.

standing before the abyss if you so much as question –

is over doing the dramatics somewhat –

yes there are times where we use language without a second thought –

even so –

this is not to say that such language use–

is without question –

is without doubt –

is Wittgenstein suggesting that mindless language use –

is all there is to it?

I doubt it – but if that is what he is saying –

then he’s not living in the real world –

where people question – people doubt –

and where claims to knowledge –

are central to actual language use

you get the impression here –

that for Wittgenstein – if you ask a question –

the game is over – that’s it –

he takes his bat and ball and goes home –

he shuts down – and wants everything else –

to shut down too

on certainty 371

371. Doesn’t “I know that that’s a hand”, in Moore’s sense, mean the same, or more or less the same, as: I can make statements like “I have pain in this hand” or “this hand is weaker than the other” or “I once broke this hand”, and countless others, in a language-game where a doubt as to the existence of this hand does not come in?

what exists –

is what is described –

and any description –

or any part of any description –

is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 372

372. Only in certain cases is it possible to make an investigation “is that really a hand?” (or “my hand”). For “I doubt whether that is really my (or a) hand” makes no sense without some more precise determination. One cannot tell from these words alone whether any doubt at all is meant – nor what kind of doubt.

you can always question –

you can always doubt

logically speaking –

what you are dealing with in any language use –

is uncertainty

and whether doubt is meant or not –

and how any doubt meant might be characterized –

is like any other assessment –

open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 373

373. Why is it supposed to be possible to have grounds for believing something if it isn’t possible to be certain?

logically – what we deal with is propositions – proposals –

so called grounds for propositions –

amount to restatements of the original proposition –

so what you have is repetition –

and repetition is logically irrelevant

if a restatement of a proposition is meant to be persuasive –

then what you have with a statement of grounds –

is rhetoric

if you recognize that what you are dealing with is uncertainty –

then most likely you will have argument –

argument is an exploration of uncertainty –

if it is meant to be persuasive –

it’s rhetoric

on certainty 374

374. We teach a child “that is your hand”, not “that is perhaps (or ‘probably’) your hand”. That is how a child learns the innumerable language-games that are concerned with his hand. An investigation or question ‘whether this is really a hand’ never occurs to him. Nor on the other hand, does he learn that he knows that this is a hand.

                                                                                                                                    

for the child to learn innumerable language-games –

it must learn to deal with the uncertainty of language application –

the uncertainty of language usage –

‘whether this is really a hand’ – may never occur to him –

but it has occurred to someone –

it is a question that can be asked –

Wittgenstein seems to think children don’t learn to doubt –

it is natural for a child to question

‘Nor on the other hand, does he learn that he knows that this is a hand’

the claim of knowledge is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

and the authorship of a proposition is logically irrelevant

where an authority other than authorship is claimed –

then the claim is rhetorical –

children are taught – and learn –

rhetoric

on certainty 375

375.  Here one must realize that complete absence of doubt at some point, even where we would say that legitimate doubt can exist, need not falsify a language-game. For there is also something like another arithmetic.

I believe that this admission must underlie any understanding of logic.

first up there is no ‘falsification’ of a language-game –

the language game is – uncertain

if you say that there is certainty – where doubt can exist –

then you are a fraud

and so this other ‘arithmetic’ is –

deception

and yes if you hold with certainty –

this deception will underlie your ‘understanding’ of logic –

and your logic will be –

worthless

on certainty 376

17.3

376. I may claim with passion that I know that this (for example) is my foot.

yes – you may do this –
and to say this is just to emphasize the fact that the claim to knowledge –
is rhetorical

on certainty 377

377.  But this passion is after all something very rare, and there is no trace of it when I talk of this foot in the ordinary way.

‘when I talk of this foot in the ordinary way’ –

yes – when I say – ‘this is my foot’ –

without the rhetorical baggage of –

‘I know’ –

I talk without pretence –

and without deception

on certainty 378

378. Knowledge in the end is based on acknowledgement.

ok – I acknowledge an assertion –

either by – affirming it – or denying it

assertion – affirmation – denial –

these are logical actions

as to knowledge –

your ‘knowledge’ just is –

the propositions – the proposals –

you operate with

and any proposition – any proposal –

you operate with –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 379

379.  I say with passion “I know that this is a foot” – but what does it mean?

with or without passion –

‘I know’ – amounts to a claim of authority – for the assertion

the only authority – is authorship –

beyond authorship any claim to an authority –

is false –

‘I know’ – may well have rhetorical effect –

but if so – it is an effect –

based on a falsehood –

it is an effect –

the object of which is –

deception

on certainty 380

380. I might go on: “Nothing in the world will convinces me of the opposite!” For me this fact is at the bottom of all knowledge. I shall give up other things but not this.

‘at the bottom of all knowledge’ –

as if there is a foundation to knowledge

knowledge is the  propositions –  the proposals –

we operate with

any proposition – any proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt

our knowledge is uncertain

to say there is a proposition that is beyond doubt –

is to turn your back on knowledge –

to reject knowledge

it is to opt for prejudice

it is to take a stand for –

ignorance

on certainty 381

381.  This “nothing in the world” is obviously an attitude which one hasn’t got towards everything one believes or is certain of.

this attitude of –

‘nothing in the world will convince me of the opposite’ –

is an argument for prejudice –

an argument for ignorance

if it’s not an attitude you have towards everything you believe –

then you’re half way there

and furthermore –

it’s not about being convinced –

one way or the other –

it’s about recognizing that what we believe –

is uncertain –

open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 382

382. That is not to say that nothing in the world will in fact be able to convince me of anything else.

the problem here is the idea of being convinced –

if you are convinced of anything –

you have missed the point

on certainty 383

383. The argument “I may be dreaming” is senseless for this reason: if I am dreaming, this remark is dreamed as well – and it is also being dreamed that these words have any meaning.

an assertion is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

and this is the case –

whether it is dreamt –

or not

on certainty 384

384. Now what kind of sentence is “Nothing in the world…”?

the ‘nothing in the world …’ sentence –

denies that there is a question –

that there is doubt –

a proposition is a proposal – open to question –

open to doubt –

‘nothing in the world …’ –

what kind of sentence is this?

it is a sentence that –

denies the proposition –

denies propositional reality –

denies logic

on certainty 385

385. It has the form of a prediction, but of course it is not one that is based on experience

nothing in the world – will convince me of anything else

a prediction – anticipates a state of affairs – as yet not experienced

if you hold that there will be no change to how things are –

you are not predicting anything

the claim ‘nothing in the world …’

is a denial of experience – of possibility –

its basis is ignorance

on certainty 386

386. Anyone who says, with Moore, that he knows that so and so …– gives the degree of certainty that something has for him. And it is important that this degree has a maximum value.

a ‘degree of certainty’ –

is uncertainty

if we are talking about knowledge –

what we are talking about is uncertainty –

propositions – proposals –

open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 387

387. Someone might ask me: “how certain are you that that is a tree over there; that you have money in your pocket; that that is your foot?” And the answer in one case might be “not certain”, in another “as good as certain”, in the third “I can’t doubt it”. And these answers would make sense even without grounds. I should not need, for example, to say: “I can’t be certain whether that is a tree because my eyes aren’t sharp enough”. I want to say it made sense for Moore to say “I know that is a tree”, if he meant something quite particular by it.

[I believe it might interest a philosopher, one who can think himself, to read my notes. For even if I have hit the mark only rarely, he would recognize what targets I had been ceaselessly aiming at.]

consider an alternative set of questions –

‘is that a tree over there, do you have money in your pocket, is that your foot?’

yes / no answers are all that is required

these questions do not ask for grounds – and the answers do not give grounds –

and the questions and answers focus on the matters at hand

the issues of ‘certainty’ and ‘grounds’ do not arise –

they are not in the picture –

to introduce them is to corrupt the picture

as to Moore’s ‘I know that is a tree’ –

if Moore was actually interested in the tree – ‘that is a tree’ – will suffice –

the tree though is a prop for Moore to hang his pretence on

                                                                                                                              

[it is a such a delight to read these notes –

I feel so privileged to have direct access to such a brilliant and indomitable mind

with each reading I am struck by Wittgenstein’s unflinching integrity – and I wonder at the price he paid for this

On Certainty is a great work of art]

on certainty 388

388. Every one of us often uses such a sentence, and there is no question but that it makes sense. But does that mean it yields any philosophical conclusion? Is it more of a proof of the existence of external things, that I know that this is a hand, than that I don’t know whether that is gold or brass?

in a world of pretence –

such sentences do make sense

do such sentences yield a philosophical conclusion?

yes the conclusion is that claims of certainty –

are logically baseless –

and that their only value –

is rhetorical

if by ‘proof’ you mean certainty –

there is no proof – of anything

a proposition may well be interpreted –

as asserting the existence of external things –

and what such an interpretation amounts to –

how it is understood –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

the claim to know –

is a claim to an authority for a proposition –

the only authority is authorship –

logically speaking ‘I know’ = ‘I am the author of’ –

it is irrelevant to assert authorship of your assertions

beyond authorship –

any claim to an authority –

can only be regarded as –

rhetorical

on certainty 389

18.3.

389. Moore wanted to give an example to shew that one really can know propositions about physical objects. – If there were a dispute about whether one could have a pain in such and such a part of the body, then someone who just then had a pain in that spot might say: “I assure you, I have a pain there now.” But it would sound odd if Moore had said: ‘I assure you, I know that’s a tree.” A personal experience simply has no relevance for us here.

‘I assure you ‘ – is rhetoric

the point of rhetoric is persuasion

‘I know’ – is rhetoric –

‘I assure you, I know’ –

is just overdoing it 

a personal experience – is uncertain –

this is not to say it is has no relevance –

it’s ‘relevance’ is open to question –

open to doubt

this whole enterprise of Moore’s –

‘of showing that one can really know propositions’ –

is either delusional or fraudulent

the logical reality is this –

we propose – we assert

our proposals – our propositions –

our assertions –

are open to question –

open to doubt

the concept of knowledge is irrelevant –

but if you still want to run with it –

understand –

your ‘knowledge’ –

is uncertain

on certainty 390

390. All that is important is that it makes sense to say that one knows such a thing; and consequently the assurance that one does know it can’t accomplish anything here.

assurance is rhetoric –

the whole point of rhetoric is persuasion

if persuasion is your game –

then assurance –

‘saying that one knows such a thing’

may well –

accomplish something

on certainty 391

391. Imagine a language game “When I call you, come in through the door”. In any ordinary  case, a  doubt whether there really is a door will be impossible.

as long as you can think –

a doubt is not impossible

on certainty 392

392. What I need to shew is that doubt is not necessary even when it is possible. That the possibility of the language-game doesn’t depend on everything being doubted. (This is connected with role of contradiction in mathematics.)

whether doubt is exercised or not –

will depend on circumstances

the ground of any language use –

is uncertainty

if you try to avoid uncertainty  –

to deny it –

you will not function effectively

in mathematics –

contradiction renders a proposition –

non-functional

on certainty 393

393. The sentence “I know that that’s a tree” if it were said outside its language-game, might also be a quotation (from an English grammar-book perhaps). – “But suppose I mean it while I am saying it? The old misunderstanding about the concept ‘mean’.

‘I know’ – is a claim to an authority for a sentence –

the only authority – is authorship –

claiming authorship of your sentence –

is unnecessary and irrelevant

beyond authorship – any claim to authority –                                                                                                                                   

is rhetorical

‘I know’ – transforms any sentence it prefaces –

into rhetoric

saying to yourself – or to others – ‘I mean it’ –

is just another piece of rhetoric

drop the rhetoric and you have the unadulterated sentence –

‘that’s a tree’ –

and really – logically – that all you need –

you make your assertion –

it’s either assented to – for whatever reason –

or dissented from – for whatever reason

get into the business of persuading –

yourself – or others –

if that’s what you want to do –

but persuasion is not logic –

its rhetoric

on certainty 394

394.  “This is one of the things that I cannot doubt.”

if that’s the case –

you are just full of it –

rhetoric –

your own rhetoric –

and good luck to ya

on certainty 395

395. “I know all that.” And that will come out in the way I act and the way I speak about the things in question.

the way I act and the way I speak about things –

in an objective sense is – unknown

what will ‘come out’ of my actions –

is whatever interpretation is ‘placed on’ my actions –

by myself and by others

it’s a question of description –

and there is no definite description

on certainty 396

396. In the language-game (2),* can he say that he knows that those are building stones? – “No, but he does know it.”

the claim to know –

is either logically irrelevant –

or it is rhetorical

he can say he knows –

there is nothing to stop anyone –

making an irrelevant –

or rhetorical claim

if you drop the ‘I know’ –

what you have is the basic statement –

‘those are building stones’

his ‘knowledge’ here –

his proposition – his proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

if Wittgenstein is suggesting –

that knowledge –is not proposed –

that it is non-propositional –

what we have from Wittgenstein –

is mystical rubbish

*Philosophical Investigations 1 No. 2 Eds.

on certainty 397

397. Haven’t I gone wrong and isn’t Moore perfectly right? Haven’t I made the elementary mistake of confusing one’s thoughts with one’s knowledge? Of course I do not think to myself “The earth already existed for some time before my birth”, but do I know it any the less? Don’t I show that I know it by always drawing its consequences?

‘I do not think to myself ….’

but I draw its consequences –

if you don’t think it –

in fact you don’t draw its consequences

for Wittgenstein it seems –

it is not necessary –

for this so called ‘knowledge’ –

to be actually known

mysticism –

is the last refuge –

of the fraud

on certainty 398

398. And don’t I know that there is no stairway in this house going six floors deep into the earth, even though I have never thought about it?

if I haven’t thought about it –

I don’t know it

on certainty 399

399. But doesn’t my drawing the consequences only show that I accept this hypothesis?

do you draw the consequence from an hypothesis –

that you haven’t entertained?

no