on certainty 1-199

on certainty 1

1. If you do know that here is one hand, we will grant you all the rest.

When one says that such and such a proposition can’t be proved, of course that does not mean that it can’t be derived from other propositions; any propositions can be derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain than it is itself. (On this a curious remark by H. Newman.)

‘If you do know that here is one hand, we will grant you all the rest.’

if you are certain of one proposition  -

any derived from it – will be certain?

the question is can you be certain of any proposition?

certainty is what?

a claim to an authority that is beyond question –

first up the only authority you have is authorship –

secondly any proposition – any proposal – you put forward –

is open to question – open to doubt

the claim of certainty is at best no more than a rhetorical claim –

the point of which is to persuade – yourself – or others –

of an authority (beyond authorship) – that you don’t have –

it’s a false claim – based on deception or ignorance

and yes – derivation – is really just a language game –

it guarantees nothing

on certainty 2

2. From it seeming to me – or to everyone – to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so.

What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it.

saying something seems to be the case –

is to regard it as uncertain

any proposal as to what is the case –

is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 3

3. If e.g. someone says “I don’t know if there is a hand here’ he might be told “Look closer”. – This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. It is one of its essential features.

if ‘looking closer’ – ends your doubt –

it is because you have decided –

that ‘looking closer’ – ends doubt

doubt ends –

if you stop questioning what you see

it doesn’t follow though –

that what you see – by looking closer –

is beyond doubt

it is the essential feature of the ‘language-game’ –

that doubt does not end

on certainty 4

4. “I know that I am a human being.” In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be taken to mean “I know I have the organs of a human.” (E.g. a brain which, after all no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as “I know I have a brain”? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it is operated on.

a proposition is a proposal –

a  proposal is open to question –

open to doubt – uncertain

the proposition – ‘I am a human being’ –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

prefacing this proposition – or any proposition –

with ‘I know’ –

is to claim an authority for the proposition –

the only authority – is authorship

it is unnecessary and irrelevant –

to claim authorship of your proposition

‘I know’ – or any such claim of authority / authorship –

is from a logical point of view – irrelevant

authorship does not guarantee a proposition

the claim of authority – the claim of knowledge –

is a rhetorical claim –

the point of which is to persuade –

of an authority – for a proposition –

an authority – that doesn’t exist

rhetoric is the art of deception –

‘I know’ is a deception

Wittgenstein says here – ‘grounds for doubt are lacking’ –

doubt does not require grounds –

doubt is the questioning of grounds

‘everything speaks in favour of it, nothing against it’ –

is just rhetoric – plain and simple

even if it was the case that –

‘my skull should turn out empty when operated on’ –

the proposition – ‘I have a brain ‘ –

like any proposition –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 5

5. Whether a proposition can turn out false after all depends on what I make count as determinants for that proposition.

a proposition is false –

if I dissent from it

what I make count –

as determinants for that proposition –

for my dissent –

will be open to question –

open to doubt –

will be uncertain

on certainty 6

6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. – For otherwise the expression “I know” gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed.

whether you use ‘I know’ in the way Moore does –

or restrict its use to some special case –

the fact of it is –

‘I know’ – is a claim to an authority –

for a proposition –

the only authority is authorship –

and the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant

any claim to an authority – beyond authorship –

is logically false

the point of any such claim is rhetorical

rhetoric is about persuasion –

its basis is deception –

deception –

is the ‘mental state’ revealed –

by ‘I know’ –

whenever it is used

on certainty 7

7. My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on – I tell a friend e.g. “Take that chair over there”, “Shut the door’, etc. etc.

if I claim knowledge and certainty –

my life shows that I make these claims

it does not show that there is a basis to these claims

in fact the making of these claims –

invites – doubt

my life is an invitation –

to doubt

on certainty 8

8. The difference between the concept of ‘knowing’ and the concept of ‘being certain’ isn’t of any great importance at all, except where “I know” is meant to mean I can’t be wrong. In a law court, for example, “I am certain” could replace “I know” in every piece of testimony. We might even imagine its being forbidden to say “I know” there. [A passage in Wilhem Meister, where “you know” or “You knew” is used in the sense “You were certain”, the facts being different from what he knew.]

the facts being different from what he knew –

nevertheless he was certain –

if so –

certainty is either an irrelevancy –

a delusion –

or a pretence –

and once certainty has been dropped –

if we are to use the term ‘knowing’ –

it needs to understood as meaning –

being uncertain

on certainty 9

9. Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand – my own hand, that is?                                                                                                                                     

how do I make sure?

do I know how ‘to make sure’?

am I certain about how to make sure?

do I make sure?

no

on certainty 10

10. I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, I am looking attentively into his face. – So I don’t know, then, that there is a sick man lying here? Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense. Any more than the assertion “I am here”, which I might yet use at any moment, if the suitable occasion presented itself. – Then is “2 x 2 + 4” nonsense in the same way, and not a proposition of arithmetic, apart from particular occasions? “2 x 2 = 4” is a true proposition of arithmetic – not “on particular occasions” nor “always” – but the spoken or written sentence “2 x 2 = 4” in Chinese might have a different meaning or be out and out nonsense, and from this is seen that it is only in use that a proposition has sense. And “I know that there’s a sick man lying here”, used in an unsuitable situation, seems not to be nonsense but rather seems matter-of-course, only because one can fairly easily imagine a situation to fit it, and one thinks that the words “I know that…..” are always in place where there is no doubt, and hence even where the expression of doubt would be unintelligible.

‘I know’ – is a claim to an authority for a proposition –

the only authority is authorship –

authorship is logically – irrelevant

any other claim of authority –

is rhetorical

as to what makes sense –

that is always a matter –

open to question – open to doubt

a proposition of arithmetic is true –

if it is assented to

it is customary to assent to –

the propositions of arithmetic –

not – I think in general –

for good reasons –

but nevertheless – that is the case

be that as it may –

custom does not equal – certainty

any spoken or written sentence –

is open to question – open to doubt

doubt is only unintelligible –

to those who do not think

NB

2 x 2 = 4 –

is a proposal for a sign game –

a game of sign substitution

the game is defined by the ‘=’ sign –

the operation to the left of the ‘=’ sign –

can be substituted for the sign to the right –

that’s the game –

if you play the game –

as it is designed to be played

you play it without question –

there are no questions in the game –

the equal sign is not a question mark

however this is not to say –

the game itself – is without question –

its terms – its operations – its concepts –

are all – uncertain

the propositions of mathematics  –

are like any other proposition –

open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 11

11. We just do not know how specialized the use of “I know” is.

if we don’t know the specialized use of ‘I know’-

then there is no specialized use

on certainty 12

12. – For “I know” seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression “I thought I knew”.

the preface ‘I know’ – is a claim of authority –

the only authority is authorship

claiming authorship of a proposition –

which is what ‘I know’ amounts to –

if it makes any logical sense at all –

does not guarantee the proposition

and asserting that you are the author of your proposition –

is unnecessary and irrelevant

a proposition is a proposal –

there is no guarantee for a proposal –

and furthermore –

there are no guarantees –

any statement masquerading as a ‘guarantee’ –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

any claim to an authority other than authorship –

is rhetorical –

its point is persuasion –

and its basis is deception

the statement – ‘I thought I knew’ –

indicates doubt – indicates uncertainty –

in a world of epistemological delusion and pretence –

it’s a step forward

on certainty 13

13. For it is not as though the proposition “It is so” could be inferred from someone else’s utterance: “I know it is so”. Nor from the utterance together with it not being a lie. – But can’t I infer “It is so” from my own utterance “I know etc.” Yes; and also “There is a hand there’ follows from the proposition “He knows that there’s a hand there”. But from his utterance “I know….” it does not follow that he does know it.

‘I know it is so’ –

‘I know’ is a claim of authority –

the only authority is authorship –

therefore ‘I know’ = ‘I am the author of …’

and to claim authorship for your assertion –

is unnecessary and irrelevant

logically speaking ‘I know’ –

is irrelevant

any claim to an authority –

other than authorship –

is logically false

invariably –

the claim of authority in ‘I know’ –

is not logical –

is not a claim of authorship –

it is rhetorical

and here the point of ‘I know’ –

is persuasion –

persuasion on the basis of an authority –

that doesn’t exist

what we are dealing with in ‘I know’ –

is deception and pretence

and it makes no difference –

whether I say ‘I know’ –

or someone else does –

or whether it is persuasive or not –

logically speaking –

it is empty rhetoric

what are we to infer from empty rhetoric?

a fraud

on certainty 14

14. That he does know remains to be shewn.

regardless of who makes the claim –

‘I know’ is a claim to an authority

the only authority is authorship

if you preface a statement with ‘I know’ –

logically speaking – you are saying –

‘I am the author  of …’

asserting that you are the author –

of your assertion –

is unnecessary and irrelevant –

‘I know ‘ –

is unnecessary and irrelevant

if we drop ‘I know’ –

as logically irrelevant –

what we are left with

is the basic assertion  –

plain and unadulterated –

open to question –

open to doubt

in so far as ‘I know’ –

is a claim of authority –

other than authorship –

it is a rhetorical claim –

and as such –

it is to claim to an authority –

that doesn’t exist

it is false and deceptive –

and yes it may be persuasive –

nevertheless –

it is a fraud

on certainty 15

15. It needs to be shewn that no mistake was possible. Giving the assurance “I know” doesn’t suffice. For it is after all only an assurance that I can’t be making a mistake, and it needs to be objectively established that I am not making a mistake about that. 

if you are certain – there is no mistake –

if on the other hand –

you recognize that your propositions –

your proposals –

are open to question – open to doubt  –

are uncertain –

what you then deal with is uncertainties –

not mistakes –

the point being – certain or uncertain –

there are no mistakes –

the ‘mistake’ is not in the logical picture –

yes – it is a commonly used term –

but when analysed –

is shown to have no logical value

and to be of no philosophical use

on certainty 16

16. “If I know something, then I also know that I know it, etc” amounts to: “I know that” means “I am incapable of being wrong about that.” But whether I am so must admit of being established objectively.

if the matter is to be ‘established’ –

it must be put to the  question –

and if so – being objective –

is to recognize uncertainty –

for questioning –

presupposes uncertainty

in an uncertain reality –

there is no right and wrong –

what you have –

is uncertain knowledge –

propositions   –

open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 17

17. Suppose now I say “I’m incapable of being wrong about this: this book.” while I point to an object. What would a mistake here be like? And have I any clear idea of it?

whether you are pointing at something or not

any proposition is open to question – open to doubt

if you are certain – there can be no mistake –

and in an uncertain reality –

there will be no mistakes –

what we deal with is uncertainties – not mistakes

this concept of the mistake –

has no place in the epistemological debate –

it is a superficial concept –

it does not stand up to analysis –

epistemologically speaking –

it is useless

on certainty 18

18. “I know” often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement. So if the other person is acquainted with the language-game, he would admit that I know. The other if he is acquainted with the language-game, must be able to imagine how one may know something of the kind.

‘I know’ is a claim to an authority

the so called ‘proper grounds’ –

will be reassertions of this claim to authority

any so called ‘argument’ put up –

will be a reworking of the original claim

if someone is persuaded by this –

they will give their assent

the language game we are talking about here –

is rhetoric

on certainty 19

19. The statement “I know that here is a hand” may then be continued: “for it is my hand that I’m looking at”. Then a reasonable man will not doubt that I know. – Nor will the idealist; rather he will say that he was not dealing with the practical doubt which is being dismissed, but there is a further doubt behind that one. – That this is an illusion has to be shewn in a different way.

the ‘I know  ….’ –

and the follow up –

‘for it is my hand I am looking at’

are rhetorical assertions

if you drop all the rhetoric here –

all the ‘persuasion’ –

what you have is the basic statement –

‘here is my hand’ –

the statement is not certain –

it is open to question –

it is open to doubt –

but at least it is honest –

and it comes without –

                                                                                                                                   irrelevant and misleading baggage

idealism –

is a possible description of reality –

and as with any other description –

open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

‘that this is an illusion’ –

as with any claim –

is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 20

20. “Doubting the existence of the external world” does not mean for example doubting the existence of a planet, which later observations prove to exist. – Or does Moore want to say that here is his hand is different in kind from knowing the existence of the planet Saturn? Otherwise it would be possible to point out the discovery of the planet Saturn to the doubters and say that its existence has been proved, and hence the existence of the external world as well.

‘here is this hand’ –

as with any proposition – any proposal –

i.e. a proposition regarding the existence of Saturn –

or a proposition regarding the existence of the external world –                                                                                                                           

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain –

and furthermore –

any proposed relationship between propositions –

is likewise –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 21

21. Moore’s concept really comes down to this: the concept ‘know’ is analogous to the concepts ‘believe’, ‘surmise’, ‘doubt’, ‘be convinced’ in that the statement “I know…..” can’t be a mistake. And if that is so, then there can be an inference from such an utterance to the truth of an assertion. And here the form “I thought I knew” is being overlooked. – But if this latter is inadmissible, then a mistake in the assertion must be logically impossible too. And anyone who is acquainted with the language-game must realize this – an assurance from a reliable man that he knows cannot contribute anything.

there are no mistakes –

if you are certain – there is no mistake –

if you are uncertain –

what you deal with – is uncertainties –

not mistakes

‘mistake’ – may well be a commonly used word –

however when analysed –

it comes to nothing –

nothing but a confused turn of phrase –

it has no epistemological significance

the claim to know – is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

the authorship of a proposition –

does not guarantee a proposition –

there are no guarantees –

and any claim of a guarantee –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain –

and claiming authorship of a proposition –

which is what the claim to know amounts to –

adds nothing to the proposition –

the claim of  knowledge  – is logically – irrelevant

and in relation to inference –

it should also be pointed out –

that an inference is a proposal –

is a proposition –

and as such – open to question –

open to doubt –

                                                                                                                                     

uncertain

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority – is rhetorical –

here the function of ‘know’ –

is to persuade on the basis of an authority –

that doesn’t exist

the claim of  knowledge – is a deception –

the claim of knowledge – contributes nothing –

nothing but irrelevance – or rhetoric –

whether from a so called ‘reliable’ man –

or not

on certainty 22

22. It would surely be remarkable if we had to believe the reliable person who says “I can’t be wrong”; or who says “I am not wrong”.

the point is –

what anyone says –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

the tag ‘reliable’ –

is really just a piece of  rhetoric –

if you fall for it –

you are a fool

on certainty 23

23. If I don’t know whether someone has two hands (say whether they have been amputated or not) I shall believe his assurance that he has two hands, if he is trustworthy. And if he says he knows it, that can only signify to me that he has been able to make sure, and hence that his arms are e.g. not still concealed by coverings and bandages, etc. etc. My believing the trustworthy man stems from my admitting that it is possible for him to make sure. But someone who says that perhaps there are no physical objects makes no such admissions.

any statement is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain –

to believe someone’s assurance –

is to simply fall into their rhetoric –

it is to fooled by them –

or to fool yourself

regarding someone as trustworthy –

is to say –

I will accept what they have to say –

without doubt

to take such an approach –

to propositions – to people –

is to be deluded

Wittgenstein goes on to say –

if someone says he knows it –

that can only signify –

that he has been able to make sure

this is rubbish –

but it shows just how ready Wittgenstein is –

to swallow empty rhetoric –

and more to the point –

propagate it

saying perhaps there are no physical objects –

is to doubt – it is to question

it is not to engage in –

worthless rhetoric

on certainty 24

24. The idealist’s question would be something like: “What right have I not to doubt the existence of my hands?” (And to that the answer can’t be: I know that they exist.) But someone who asks such a question is overlooking the fact that a doubt about existence only works in a language game. Hence, that we should first have to ask: what would such a doubt be like?, and I don’t understand this straight off.

the idealist doesn’t doubt the existence of his hands –

he doubts the materialist description of his hands

his hands as such – in the absence of any description –

are unknown

a doubt about existence – is a doubt about description –

no great mystery as ‘what it would be like’ –

it is like – a question –

how hard is that to understand?

on certainty 25

25. One may be wrong even about “there being a hand here”. Only in particular circumstances is it impossible. – “Even in a calculation one can be wrong – only in certain circumstances one can’t.”

it is not a case of being right or wrong –

the ground of any proposition is uncertainty

the fact is you proceed with a proposition –

or you don’t –

and any decision you make here –

is like the proposition itself –

open to question – open to doubt

the calculation is a game –

a game of sign substitution –

if you play the game –

you play it as designed –

your only question – as a game player is –

do you have a use for it?

                                                                                                                                    which is just to ask – do you need to calculate?

if you don’t – you won’t play –

if you do – you will

the propositions on which the game is based –

are open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 26

26. But can it be seen from a rule what circumstances logically exclude a mistake in the employment of rules of calculation?

What use is a rule here? Mightn’t we (in turn) go wrong in applying it?

the employment of any rule is open to question –

open to doubt – is uncertain

if you are certain about your rule –

there will be no mistake –

if on the other hand you are recognize –

that any ‘rule’ is open to question –

open to doubt –

again there will be no mistakes –

what you will face – what you will deal with –

is uncertainties –

questions – doubts

the mistake is not in the picture

‘what use is a rule here?’ –

it may be of use as a working hypothesis

you can’t go wrong in applying it –

however its application will be uncertain –

open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 27

27. If, however, one wanted to give something like a rule here, then it would contain the expression “in normal circumstances”. And we recognize normal circumstances but cannot precisely describe them. At most, we can describe a range of abnormal ones.

the expression ‘in normal circumstances’ –

like the rule that might contain it –

is open to question –

open to doubt

and any description of a range of abnormal circumstances –

useful as that might be –

will be open to question –

open to doubt –

will be uncertain

on certainty 28

28. What is ‘learning a rule’? – This.

What is ‘making a mistake in applying it’? – This. And what is pointed to here is something indeterminate.

yes – and this – could amount to anything –

that is to say –

‘this’ – ‘the learning of the rule’ –

could be described in any number of ways

‘making a mistake in applying it’ –

the application of any rule – is uncertain –

there are no mistakes here –

what you have – is uncertainties –

or as Wittgenstein has put it –

‘something indeterminate’

on certainty 29

29. Practice in the use of a rule also shews what is a mistake in its employment

practice in the use of a rule –

will show that despite any rhetoric –

of correct use or mistaken use –

the rule is nothing more than a proposal –

and it’s application – uncertain

on certainty 30

30. When someone has made sure of something, he says: “Yes, the calculation is right”, but he did not infer from his condition of certainty. One does not infer how things are from one’s own certainty.

Certainty is as it were a tone of voice in which one declares how things are, but one does not infer from the tone of voice that one is justified.

yes –‘a tone of voice’ – effectively – just rhetoric

what is justification?

your claim of authority – for your proposition

and your authority?

if it is anything more than your authorship –

it’s rhetoric

on certainty 31

31. The propositions which one comes back to again and again as if bewitched – these I should like to expunge from philosophical language.

all propositions are a response to the unknown –

it is not propositions per se that we come back to time and again –

but the object of these propositions –

the unknown –

and it cannot be anything but – bewitching

on certainty 32

32. It’s not a matter of Moore’s knowing that there is a hand there, but rather we should not understand him if he were to say “Of course I may be wrong about this”.  We should ask “What is it like to make such a mistake as that?” – e.g. what’s it like to discover that it is a mistake?

if when Moore claims to know –

he is claiming certainty –

the point of such a claim is that there is no mistake –

if he goes on to say ‘of course I could be wrong about that’ –

he is either logically confused –

or his initial statement is rhetorical –

and his follow up statement –

‘of course I could be wrong’

is just another piece of rhetoric –

and questions like –

‘what is it like to make such a mistake like that?’

‘what is it like to discover that it is a mistake?’

become questions about his rhetoric –

i.e. what games he is playing – and why –

in order to persuade?

if his original claim to know –

is a claim of uncertainty

again there will be no mistake –

what you have is an uncertainty –

and if it is understood that any proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt

is uncertain –

‘I know’ – and any follow up statement –

like ‘I am unsure about that’ –

are unnecessary and irrelevant

all that is required here is the basic assertion –

‘there is a hand here’ –

open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 33

33. Thus we expunge the sentences that don’t get us any further

a sentence may drop from use –

from favour

this is not to say that it might not have a rebirth –

in a different setting –

in different circumstances

the matter is uncertain

what sentences we use and when we use them –

is an open matter

in the propositional reality –

                                                                                                                               

the reality of uncertainty –

nothing is ‘expunged’

on certainty 34

34. If someone is taught to calculate, is he also taught that he can rely on a calculation of his teacher’s? But these explanations must after all sometime come to an end. Will he also be taught that he can trust his senses – since he is indeed told in many cases that in such and such a special case you cannot trust them? –

Rule and exception.

being taught to rely on the calculation of  the teacher –

is being taught to accept an ‘authority’

logically speaking –

the only authority is authorship –

and the authorship of a proposition –

does not guarantee the proposition

beyond authorship – any claim to authority –

is rhetorical

being taught to calculate –

is being taught a game –

the game of sign substitution –

authoritarian rhetoric –

is irrelevant to this

rhetoric – rhetorical ‘explanations’ –

will come to an end –

when people stop producing them –

and people stop requesting them

and when they appreciate –

that the claim of authority –

is a fraud

there is no issue of authority –

in relation to the senses –

so there is no need for ‘trust’

to trust is to accept without question –

if you trust you are deceived –

or you deceive yourself

the senses display what they display –

the question is –

how do you interpret what is displayed?

and here we are in the realm of uncertainty

rule and exception?

a rule is a proposition  –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

and likewise any ‘exception’ –

to the rule

on certainty 35

35. But can’t it be imagined that there should be no physical objects? I don’t know. And yet “there are physical objects” is nonsense. Is it supposed to be an empirical proposition?

And is this an empirical proposition: “there seems to be physical objects”?

‘there are physical objects’ – is a proposal –

in certain contexts – like this one here –

it will have a use

propositions are and can be described variously –

‘empirical’ is one such description

whether or not you describe a proposition as ‘empirical’ –

will be a question of context –

and in any context –

any description is open to question –

what ‘empirical’ amounts to –

is open to question

‘there seems to be …’– indicates uncertainty –

if you understand –

that any proposition is open to question –

open to doubt – is uncertain –

‘there seems to be’ –

is unnecessary

on certainty 36

36. “A is a physical object” is a piece of instruction which we give only to someone who doesn’t understand either what “A” means, or what “physical object’ means. Thus it is instruction about the use of words, and “physical object” is a logical concept. (Like colour, quantity,….) And that is why no such proposition as: “There are physical objects” can be formulated.

Yet we encounter such unsuccessful shots at every turn

‘A is a physical object’ – is a proposal – a proposition

‘physical object’ – is a description –

open to question –

open to doubt

‘there are physical objects’ – can be formulated –

and Wittgenstein – demonstrates this –

right here

on certainty 37

37. But is it an inadequate answer to the scepticism of the idealist, or the assurances of the realist, to say that “There are physical objects” is nonsense? For them after all it is nonsense. It would, however, be an answer to say: this assertion, or its opposite is a misfiring attempt to express what can’t be expressed like that. And that it does misfire can be shewn; but that isn’t the end of the matter. We need to realize that what presents itself to us as the first expression of a difficulty, or its solution, may as yet not be correctly expressed at all. Just as one who has a just censure of a picture to make will often at first offer the censure where it does not belong, and an investigation is needed in order to find the right point of attack for the critic.

be open and critical

‘a misfiring attempt to express what can’t be expressed like that’ –

if you have a definite view of reality –

and a definite view about what can expressed –

you can play the misfiring game –

but all that amounts to is pretence –

false claims of intellectual authority and superiority –

the real game – dealing with reality –

is dealing with uncertainty –

and for that you need an open mind –

and a brave heart

in reality there is no ‘misfiring’ –

what can be shown is possibility –

possible ways of understanding –

possible ways of describing –

possible ways of evaluating –

none of which are certain –

all of which are valid

‘We need to realize that what presents itself to us as the first expression of a difficulty, or its solution, may as yet not be correctly expressed at all.’

if there is a difficulty with the proposition ‘there are physical objects’ –

it will be a difficulty of use in a particular context – for a particular user – or community of users

we can’t say in advance what such a difficulty would in fact be –

that really is an empirical matter

and yes the expression of a difficulty or its solution – is an uncertain matter –

it is not that there is a ‘correct’ expression –

at best there will be a functional expression – 

that those involved decide they can work with

and this decision will not be set in stone –

it will be uncertain

nevertheless it will be what is proceeded with –

what is acted on –

if there is a move forward

‘Just as one who has a just censure of a picture to make will often at first offer the censure where it does not belong, and an investigation is needed in order to find the right point of attack for the critic.’

a so called ‘just censure’ –

will be no more than someone’s view of how the picture ‘works’ –

the point being the picture is open to interpretation –

interpretation is an uncertain affair

there is no ‘right’ point of ‘attack’ –

there is just different points of view –

and the picture like the reality it pictures – is uncertain

as to ‘investigation’ –

yes one can argue one’s point of view –

and listen to the views of others and their arguments –

who’s to say what will come of a good discussion?

on certainty 38

38. Knowledge in mathematics: Here one has to keep on reminding oneself of the unimportance of the ‘inner process’ or ‘state’ and ask “Why should it be important? What does it matter to me?” What is interesting is how we use mathematical propositions.

yes

on certainty 39

39. This is how calculation is done, in such circumstances a calculation is treated as absolutely reliable, as certainly correct.

‘This is how a calculation is done’ –

is a proposal

and any proposal is open to question –

open to doubt

saying it is ‘absolutely reliable’ and ‘certainly correct’ – etc

is really just ornamentation –

unnecessary and irrelevant –

rhetoric

on certainty 40

40. Upon “I know that here is my hand” there may follow the question “How do you know?” and the answer to that presupposes that this can be known in that way. So, instead of “I know that here is my hand”, one might say “Here is my hand”, and then add how one knows.

dropping ‘I know’ is a good start –

the assertion is all that is required

adding how one knows –

is rhetoric

on certainty 41

41. “I know where I am feeling pain”, “I know that I feel it here” is as wrong as “I know that I am in pain”. But “I know where you touched my arm” is right.

‘I know’ is a claim to authority –

the only authority is authorship –

‘I know’ = ‘I am the author of …’

the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant –

and the authorship of a proposition –

guarantees nothing

any claim to an authority beyond authorship –

is logically false –

it is the claim to an authority –

that doesn’t exist –

any such claim is deceptive

invariably the point of such claims is not truth –

but persuasion

here we are in the realm of rhetoric –

not logic

the preface ‘I know’ – adds nothing to any assertion –

nothing but rhetoric –

best to drop it altogether

‘I am feeling pain’ –  ‘I feel it here’ – ‘I am in pain’ –

and ‘you touched my arm’ –

these statements are neither right or wrong –

logically speaking they are proposals –

open to question – open to doubt

how they are used –

how they function – how they are understood –

how they are evaluated –

is a question of circumstance –

is a matter of uncertainty

   

on certainty 42

42. One can say “He believes it, but it isn’t so”, but not “He knows it, but it isn’t so”. Does this stem from the difference between the mental states of belief and of knowledge? No. – One may for example call “mental state” what is expressed by tone of voice in speaking, by gestures etc. It would thus be possible to speak of a mental state of conviction, and that may be the same whether it is knowledge or false belief. To think that different states must correspond to the words “believe” and “know” would be as if one believed that different people had to correspond.

all you need to say here is ‘it isn’t so’ –

claiming authority for the proposition – for the proposal –

be it the authority of belief – or the authority of knowledge –

is rhetoric –

and furthermore –

‘explaining’ the difference between –

the claim of belief and the claim of knowledge –

in terms of ‘mental states’ –

or indeed in other terms –

is just more rhetoric –

rhetoric –

on rhetoric

on certainty 43

43. What sort of proposition is this: “We cannot have miscalculated in 12 x 12 = 144”? It must surely be a proposition of logic.

–But now, is it not the same, or doesn’t it come to the same, as the statement 12 x 12 = 144’

the claim – ‘we cannot have miscalculated in …’

is a rhetorical claim –

as is the follow up statement here –

‘it must surely be a proposition of logic’

12 x 12 = 144 –

is a game proposition –

if you follow the instruction that is 12 x 12 = 144 –

you play the game –

the game of sign substitution –

and presumably you do so –

because you have a use for it

and if you actually play the game –

you play it as it as directed –

you play – without question

however

the mathematical proposition itself  –

the game proposition – if you like –

is the product of uncertainty

its terms and concepts –

have emerged –

out of argument and dispute

there is no certainty –

in mathematics

on certainty 44

44. If you demand a rule from which it follows that there can’t have been a miscalculation here, the answer is that we did not learn this through a rule, but by learning to calculate.

if you follow the directive that is the calculation –

you will calculate

if you don’t – or you can’t –

it’s not that you miscalculate –

you just don’t –

calculate

on certainty 45

45. We got to know the nature of calculating by learning to calculate.

what we know – is a practise –

and any practise – is uncertain

on certainty 46

46. But then can’t it be described how we satisfy ourselves of the reliability of a calculation? O yes! Yet no rule emerges when we do so. – But the most important thing is: The rule is not needed. Nothing is lacking. We do calculate according to a rule, and that is enough.

yes – we  play the game of sign substitution –

according to a rule –

if we question the rule –

we are not playing the game

nevertheless the rule – like any proposal –

any proposition –

is open to question – open to doubt

and indeed –

as the history of mathematics shows –

its rules – concepts – operations –

are open to question – open to doubt -

and indeed –

are the product of questioning –

of doubt –

of uncertainty

on certainty 47

47. This is how one calculates. Calculating is this. What we learn at school, for example. Forget this transcendent certainty, which is connected with your concept of spirit.

calculation is a game –

a game of sign substitution –

if you follow the rules of the game –

you calculate –

if you don’t follow the rules –

you don’t calculate

what ‘this’ is –

what calculation is –

can be variously described –

and any description –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

and likewise –

and the rules of the game

are open to question –

open to doubt

however –

description and questioning –

is quite a different matter –

to the playing of the game

if you play –

you don’t question –

if you question –

you are not  playing

forget the rhetoric –

this rhetoric of certainty –

it is deceptive –

and irrelevant

on certainty 48

48. However, out of a host of calculations certain ones might be designated as reliable once for all, others are not yet fixed. And now, is this a logical distinction?

a calculation is a word game –

a game of sign substitution –

if the rules for the sign substitution are followed –

the calculation will be performed

the rules are open to question –

open to doubt

and the assumptions underlying the calculation –

are open to question – open to doubt

‘reliable once and for all’ – is rhetoric –

and any distinction between – 

‘reliable once and for all’ –

and ‘not yet fixed’ – is rhetorical –

not logical

on certainty 49

49. But remember even when calculation is something fixed for me, this is only a decision for a practical purpose.

we can drop this notion of ‘fixed’ –

the fact of is –

that in the face of uncertainty –

we can and do proceed –

and any reason we have for proceeding –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

                                                                                                                                   

on certainty 50

50. When does one say, I know that …x… = …? When one has checked the calculation.

you don’t say –

‘I know that …x… = …?’

if you are going to say anything here –

you just assert the proposition –

‘…x… = …’

to claim to know –

is to claim an authority –

the only authority you have –

is authorship –

beyond that –

any claim to an authority –

is nothing more than rhetoric

as to checking –

any checking –

is itself open to question –

open to doubt

you make assumptions –

and you proceed –

in uncertainty

on certainty 51

51. What sort of proposition is: “What could a mistake here be like!”? It would have to be a logical proposition. But is it a logic that is not used, because what it tells us is not taught by means of propositions. – It is a logical proposition; for it does describe the conceptual (linguistic) situation.

Wittgenstein must be joking –

‘what could a mistake here be like!’? –

is not a logical proposition –

it is a rhetorical exclamation and question

what it tells us is nothing –

what it describes is nothing –

it is just worthless rhetoric

on certainty 52

52. This situation is thus not like “At this distance from the sun there is a planet” and “Here is a hand” (namely my own hand). The second can’t be called a hypothesis. But there isn’t a sharp boundary line between them.

‘here is a hand’ – and –‘at this distance from the sun is a planet’ –

are propositions – proposals

in each case we have a description of a state of affairs –

and in each case it is not the only possible description

‘a state affairs’ – undescribed – is unknown –

a description makes known  –

and any ‘knowledge’ here –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 53

53. So one might grant that Moore was right, if he is interpreted like this: a proposition saying that there is a physical object may have the same logical status as one saying there is a red patch.

in so far as Moore claimed that his propositions are certain –

he was on the wrong track

however –

if we are talking about basic propositions –

propositions without the claim of certainty –

without the rhetoric of ‘I know’ –

then yes –

‘there are physical objects’ – and ‘there is a red patch’ –

have the same logical status –

and that is to say they are proposals –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 54

54. For it is not true that a mistake merely gets more and more improbable as we pass from the planet to my own hand. No: at some point it ceases to be conceivable.

This is already suggested by the following: if it were not so, it would also be conceivable that we should be wrong in every statement about physical objects; that any we make are mistaken.

if you are certain –

there can be no mistake –

if on the other hand you recognize –

that the propositions is a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

then you see that what you face –

is uncertainties –

the ‘mistake’ –

is not in the logical picture

and it’s not a question –

of being right or wrong

a proposition about physical objects –

like any other proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 55

55. So is the hypothesis possible, that all things around us don’t exist? Would that not be like the hypothesis of our having miscalculated our calculations?

the hypothesis that all things around us don’t exist –

is possible –

for one – Wittgenstein has advanced it here

what sense if any you make of it –

will depend on the context of its use

it obviously has a use for Wittgenstein –

in this context of propositional logic

and there will be other contexts – other uses –

for example in a poetic context –

it may well be regarded as significant

as to miscalculating our calculations –

you either calculate – or you don’t

if you don’t follow the ‘rules’ of calculation –

it is not that you miscalculate –

you don’t calculate – you just don’t do it –

you don’t play the game

the ‘rules’ of calculation –

are open to question – open to doubt –

and historically speaking –

are the outcome of question and doubt

however questioning the game –

is a different matter –

to playing it

on certainty 56

56. So when one says: “Perhaps this planet doesn’t exist and the light-phenomenon arises in some other way”, then after all one needs an example of an object which does exist. This doesn’t exist, - as for example does….

Or are we to say that certainty is merely a constructed point to which some things approximate more, some less closely? No. Doubt gradually loses its sense. This language-game just is like that.

And everything descriptive of a language-game is part of logic.

outside of description – what exists – is unknown –

description makes known –

however any description is open to question –

open to doubt –

our knowledge of what exists –

is uncertain

where a description – for one reason or another –

doesn’t function –

then we advance and consider other proposals–

and put them to the test of circumstance and utility

‘Doubt gradually loses its sense.’

yes – if you stop questioning – if you stop thinking

‘This language-game just is like that’ –

any use of language –

is a open to question –

open to doubt

‘And everything descriptive of a language-game is part of logic’

logic itself is a language game –

open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 57

57. Now might not “I know, I am not just surmising, that here is my hand” be conceived as a proposition of grammar? Hence not temporally. –

But in that case isn’t it like this one: “I know, I am not just surmising, that I am seeing red”?

And isn’t the consequence “So there are physical objects” like: “So there are colours”

grammar – is a language theory –

open to question – open to doubt

hence – temporal –

the idea that a proposition exists outside of time –

is metaphysical rubbish

‘I know, I am not just surmising, that here is my hand’ –

‘I know, I am not just surmising, that I am seeing red’ –

is to say –

‘I am certain, here is my hand’ –

‘I am certain I am seeing red’

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt

if you claim certainty for a proposition –

you are involved in logical fraud

‘And isn’t the consequence “So there are physical objects” like: “So there are colours”’ –

‘so there are physical objects’ –

 is a way of explaining ‘hand’ –

‘so there are colours’ –

is a way of explaining ‘red’ –

in so far as the concepts of physical object and colour –

are explanatory concepts –

open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

yes they are alike

on certainty 58

58. If “I know etc.” is conceived as a grammatical proposition, of course the “I” cannot be important. And it properly means “there is no such thing as doubt in this case” or “The expression ‘I don’t know’ makes no sense in this case”. And of course it follows from this that “I know” makes no sense either.

‘I know’ is a claim to an authority –

the only authority is authorship –

therefore –

‘I know’ = ‘I am the author of …’

claiming authorship of your proposition –

is irrelevant

beyond authorship –

any claim to an authority  –

is deceptive

such claims are rhetorical –

their point is persuasion

it is not that ‘I know’ makes no sense –

‘I know’ is either – irrelevant –

or fraudulent

on certainty 59

59. ‘I know’ is here a logical insight. Only realism can’t be proved by means of it

‘I know’ –

has no logical function –

its function is rhetorical  

if it is an ‘insight’ –

it’s an insight into –

deception

on certainty 60

60. It is wrong to say that the ‘hypothesis’ that this is a bit of paper would be confirmed or disconfirmed by later experience, and that, in “I know that this is a bit of paper,” the “I know” either relates to such an hypothesis or to a logical determination.

this ‘hypothesis’ –

will not be confirmed or disconfirmed –

it will be used or it won’t be used

the ‘I know’ –

does not relate to the hypothesis –

                                                                                                                                     

it is logically irrelevant –

it’s only value is –

rhetorical

on certainty 61

61. …A meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it.

For it is what we learn when the world is incorporated into our language.

a meaning of a word –

is an employment of it –

a use of it

its meaning / employment –

its use –

is always open to question –

open to doubt

the world in the absence of description –

of language – of words –

is unknown

the world described –

is the world known

any description –

is uncertain

on certainty 62

62. That is why there exists a correspondence between the concepts ‘rule’ and ‘meaning’.

meaning is

is open to question –

open doubt –

uncertain

any so called ‘rule ‘ –

is open to question –

open to doubt

is uncertain

on certainty 63

63. If we imagine the facts other than they are, certain language-games lose some of their importance, while others become important. And in this way there is an alteration – a gradual one – in the use of the vocabulary of a language.

‘facts’ are descriptions

in the absence of description –

there are no facts

so to ‘imagine the facts other than they are’ –

is to imagine different description

any description is open to question –

open to doubt

our descriptions are uncertain –

our facts are uncertain

we can expect descriptive change –

gradual – or not

what’s ‘important’ –

is a question of –

fashion

on certainty 64

64. Compare the meaning of a word with the ‘function’ of an official. And ‘different meanings’ with ‘different functions’.

yes – that is the point

the function of a word –

is just what a word does –

and what it does  –

is an open question –

‘meaning’ –

is this uncertainty

on certainty 65

65. When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of the words change.

‘a change of concepts’ –

is one way of describing –

the uncertainty of language –

its use and practise

and meaning –

whether you have a change of usage –

or not –

is uncertain

on certainty 66

66. I make assertions about reality, assertions which have different degrees of assurance. How does the degree of assurance come out? What consequences has it?

We may be dealing, for example, with the certainty of memory, or again of perception. I may be sure of something, but still know what test might convince me of error. I am, e.g. quite sure of the date of a battle, but if I should find a different date in a recognized work of history, I should alter my opinion, and this would not mean I lost all faith in judging.

yes –

you make assertions about reality –

there is no assurance –

for any assertion

any so called ‘assurance’ –

is rhetorical

to be convinced –

is to be conned

in judging we face uncertainty –

and any judgment we make –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 67

67. Could we imagine a man who keeps on making mistakes where we regard a mistake as ruled out, and in fact never encounter one?

E.g. he says he lives in such a such a place, is so and so old, comes from such and such a city, and he speaks with the same certainty (giving all the tokens of it) as I do, but he is wrong.

But what is his relation to his error? What am I to suppose?

there is no mistake here –

there is no error –

no one is right or wrong

what you have here is conflicting claims –

disagreement

unless one side folds and says – ‘yes you are right’ –

there is no resolution

and any so called ‘resolution ‘ –

is open to question –

open to doubt

I can continue to insist on my view of the matter –

argue the case

all that amounts to is –

rhetoric

despite what I may think –

there is nothing that guarantees –

my point of view –

and therefore –

it should be seen for what it is –

as uncertain

on certainty 68

68. The question is: what is the logician to say here?

the logician should say –

what we have here is a disagreement

on certainty 69

69. I should like to say: “If I am wrong about this, I have no guarantee that anything I say is true.” But others won’t say that about me, nor will I say it about other people.

your proposition –

is neither right or wrong –

it’s uncertain –

truth is a matter of assent –

not guarantee

and assent – and dissent –

are uncertain

and if others won’t say to you –

there are no guarantees –

and you won’t say that –

to others –

then you – and the ‘others’ –

live in a world of pretence-

and ignorance

on certainty 70

70. For months I have lived at address A, I have read the name of the street and the number of the house countless times, have received countless letters and have given countless people the address. If I am wrong about it, the mistake is hardly less than if I were (wrongly) to believe I was writing Chinese and not German.

you have beliefs that you operate with –

and regardless of how strongly you hold to them –

they are open to question – open to doubt

on certainty 71

71. If my friend were to imagine one day that he had been living for a long time in such and such a place, etc. etc., I should not call this a mistake, but rather a mental disturbance, perhaps a transient one.

your friend puts forward the proposition –

that he has been living for a long time in such and such a place –

you have a different view of the situation –

there are no mistakes here –

what you have – is conflicting propositions –

conflicting views

and any proposition – or set of propositions –

and for that matter –

any description – or so called ‘explanation’ –

i.e. ‘mental disturbance’ –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 72

72. Not every false belief is this sort of mistake.

a false belief –

is a belief – you dissent from –

your dissent – like the belief itself –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

                                                                                                                                     logically speaking there are no mistakes –

if you are certain there cannot be a mistake

if on the other hand –

you recognize that your belief is uncertain

what you face is uncertainties –

not mistakes

‘mistake’ is a commonly used word –

it’s a word you might use –

when you haven’t thought the matter through

once subjected to analysis –

the ‘mistake’ is shown to have no place –

in the epistemological debate –

concerning certainty and uncertainty

once subjected to analysis –

the ‘mistake’ –

disappears

on certainty 73

73. But what is the difference between a mistake and a mental disturbance? Or what is the difference between my treating it as a mistake and my treating it as a mental disturbance?

first up there are no mistakes –

what we face at every turn is –

uncertainties

as to ‘mental disturbance’ –

it’s a description of someone’s behaviour –

which like any other description –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 74

74. Can we say: a mistake doesn’t only have a cause, it also has a ground? I.e. roughly: when someone makes a mistake, this can be fitted into what he knows aright.

if you are certain –

there is no mistake –

that is the whole point –

of being certain

if you are uncertain –

there are no mistakes

in an uncertain world –

what you deal with –

is uncertainties

the point being –

the mistake –

doesn’t fit in – anywhere

as to what one knows ‘aright’ –

the propositions –

you operate with –

are open to question –

open to doubt

are uncertain

on certainty 75

75. Would this be correct: If I merely believed wrongly that there is a table here in front of me, this might still be a mistake; but if I believe wrongly that I have seen this table, or one like it, every day for several months past, and have regularly used it, that isn’t a mistake?

once you realise –

that any point of view you operate with –

is uncertain –

the ‘mistake’ –

has no epistemological value

on certainty 76

76. Naturally, my aim must be to give the statements that one would like to make here, but cannot make significantly.

a statement is a sign –

if you make a statement -

you make it significantly –

if you cannot make it –

significantly –

there is no statement

on certainty 77

77. Perhaps I shall do a multiplication twice to make sure, or perhaps get someone else to work it over. But shall I work it over again twenty times, or get twenty people to go over it? And is that some sort of negligence? Would the certainty really be greater for being checked twenty times?

there is no certainty –

to be checked

any human action –

is open to question –

open to doubt

and that’s how it is –

you proceed –

in uncertainty

and yes –

you may assume –

you’ve got it right –

but logically speaking –

that is really just –

pretence

and pretence –

I would suggest –

is an ever present feature –

of human affairs

on certainty 78

78. And can I give a reason why it isn’t?

why isn’t there greater certainty –

as a result of more checking?

there is no certainty to begin with

and just by the by –

you are either certain or you are not –

‘greater certainty’ –

is just uncertainty –

in a tu tu

on certainty 79

79. That I am a man and not a woman can be verified, but if I were to say I was a woman, then tried to explain the error by saying I hadn’t checked the statement, the explanation would not be accepted.

no statement is finally verified

and any proposition –

whether it makes sense or not –

checked or not –

accepted or not –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 80

80. The truth of my statements is the test of my understanding of these statements.

my statements are true –

if I assent to them

my statements are open to question –

open to doubt –

my statements are uncertain

my understanding –

is uncertain

the test of my statements –

the test of my understanding –

is never complete

on certainty 81

81. That is to say: If I make certain false statements, it becomes uncertain whether I understand them.

if I make a statement I do not assent to –

then I play at deception

my understanding of any statement –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

my understanding –

is uncertain

on certainty 82

82. What counts as an adequate test of a statement belongs to logic. It belongs to the description of the language-game.

description  –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 83

83. The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference.

a proposition is true –

if you give your assent to it

as to the why and wherefore of your assent –

that is a matter – open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 84

84. Moore says he knows that the earth existed long before his birth. And put like that it seems to be a personal statement about him, even if it is in addition a statement about the physical world. Now it is philosophically uninteresting whether Moore knows this or that, but it is interesting that, and how, it can be known. If Moore had informed us that he knew the distance separating certain stars, we might conclude from that he had made some special investigations, and we shall want to know what they were. But Moore chose precisely a case in which we all seem to know the same as he, and without being able to say how. I believe e.g. that I know as much about this matter (the existence of the earth) as Moore does, and if he knows that it is as he says, then I know it too. For it isn’t, either, as if he has arrived at his proposition by pursuing some line of thought which, while it is open to me, I have not in fact pursued.

Moore can say whatever he likes

when he prefaces an assertion with ‘I know’ –

he is claiming an authority for his assertion

the only authority he has –

is authorship –

and so if ‘I know’  amounts to anything –

it amounts to – ‘I am the author of …’ –

which is an irrelevant and redundant preface –

the real function of ‘I know’ –

is rhetorical –

the idea being that if you assert an authority

others may be persuaded to your view –

you may even fall into your own rhetoric –

and imagine you speak with an authority –

other than authorship

our knowledge –

amounts to those propositions we operate with

and regardless of how useful they may be –

they are proposals –

and as such open to question –

open to doubt – uncertain

the fact that others give their assent –

to such propositions –

guarantees nothing

if ‘I know’ –

is used to indicate certainty –

then ‘I know’ –

is used to deceive

on certainty 85

85. And what goes into someone’s knowing this? Knowledge of history, say? He must know what it means to say: the earth has already existed for such and such a length of time. For not any intelligent adult must know that. We see men building and demolishing houses, and are led to ask: “How long has this house been here?” But how does one come on the idea of asking this about a mountain, for example? And have all men the notion of the earth as a body, which may come into being and pass away? Why shouldn’t I think of the earth as flat, but extending without end in every direction (including depth)? But in that case one might still say “I know that this mountain existed long before my birth.” But suppose I met a man who didn’t believe that?

the point is that the claim to know is irrelevant –

we use propositions that we regard as useful –

and if others think as we do – so be it

much of what we do use –

we use because it is ‘commonly accepted’ –

and this just may be the source of its usefulness –

if I meet some one who has different beliefs –

uses different propositions –

again – so be it

any proposition put forward is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain –

the claim to know – to know with certainty –

is nothing more than rhetoric –

and the problem with rhetoric –

is that it creates a smokescreen –

a smokescreen to clarity –

the clarity of the straightforward – unadulterated –

assertion

assertion that stands or falls –

only on a yea or a nay

this is logical reality –

this is clarity

on certainty 86

86. Suppose I replaced Moore’s “I know” by “I am of an unshakeable conviction”?

if you do that –

you replace one piece of rhetoric –

with another

‘unshakeable conviction’ –

has no logical basis

any ‘conviction’ is open to question –

open to doubt –

is shakeable

and if you hold to the idea –

of ‘unshakeable conviction’ –

                                                                                                                                 

you are either a fraud –

or a fool

on certainty 87

87. Can’t an assertoric sentence, which was capable of functioning as an hypothesis, also be used as a foundation of research and action? I.e. can’t it simply be isolated from doubt, though not according to any explicit rule? It simply gets assumed as a truism, never called in question, perhaps not even ever formulated.

any proposition can function as a foundation for research and action –

if by ‘foundation’ you mean – ‘starting point’ –

but if you mean a certainty – that which cannot be doubted  –

there is no such foundation

a proposition can be isolated from doubt – if you don’t think about it and never propose it to anyone

if by ‘truism’ – is meant a proposition that cannot be dissented from –

there is no such proposition

a proposition that is never called into question –

is a proposition no one considers

and as to a proposition that is never formulated –

in that case –

there is no proposition

on certainty 88

88. It may be for example that all enquiry on our part is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt, if they are ever formulated. They lie apart from the route travelled by the enquiry.

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt

no proposition is exempt from doubt

‘if they are ever formulated’ –

a proposition that is not formulated –

doesn’t exist

on certainty 89

89. One would like to say: “Everything speaks for, and nothing against the earth’s having existed long before….”

Yet might not I believe the contrary after all? But the question is: What would the practical effect of this belief be? – Perhaps someone says: “That’s not the point. A belief is what it is whether it has any practical effects or not.” One thinks: It is the same adjustment of the human mind anyway.

any so called practical effect –

is a matter of interpretation and speculation –

what is important –

is that a belief is held open to question –

open to doubt

if not – it functions –

as a prejudice

on certainty 90

90. “I know” has a primitive meaning similar to and related to “I see” (“wissen”, “videre”). And “I knew he was in the room, but he wasn’t in the room” is like ”I saw him in the room but he wasn’t there.” “I know” is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition (like “I believe”) but between me and a fact. So that the fact is taken into my consciousness. (Here is the reason why one wants to say that nothing that goes on in the outer world is really known, but only what happens in the domain of what are called sense-data.) This would give us a picture of knowing as the perception of an outer event through visual rays which project it as it is into the eye and the consciousness. Only then the question at once arises whether one can be certain of this projection. And this picture does indeed show how our imagination presents knowledge, but not what lies at the bottom of this presentation.

‘I know’ is a claim to an authority for a proposition –

the only authority is authorship –

authorship guarantees nothing –

and it is logically irrelevant

any claim to an authority – beyond authorship –

is false and deceptive –

‘I know’ may have rhetorical effect –

if so – it is an effect – based on  deception

‘I know he was in the room, but he wasn’t in the room’

is an example of the delusion –

that is the claim of certain knowledge

Wittgenstein considers the sense data theory of  knowledge –

and asks – can we be certain of this projection?

the answer is no –

any theory is open to question – open to doubt –

what lies at the bottom of imagination –

is uncertainty

on certainty 91

91. If Moore says he knows the earth existed etc., most of us will grant him that it has existed all that time, and also believe him when he says he is convinced of it. But has he also got the right ground for his conviction? For if not, after all he doesn’t know (Russell).

a proposition is a proposal –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

the ground of the proposition –

of any proposition –

is the unknown

if Moore is convinced –

he is certain –

and if he claims certainty –

he is either a fraud –

or a fool

any ‘knowledge’ we have –

is uncertain

on certainty 92

92. However, we can ask: May someone have telling grounds for believing that the earth has only existed for a short time, say since his own birth? – Suppose we had always been told that, - would we have any good reason to doubt it? Men have believed that they could make rain; why should not a King be brought up to believe that the world began with him? And if Moore and this King were to meet and discuss, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say Moore could not convert the King to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the King would be brought to look at the world in a different way.

Remember that one is sometimes convinced of the correctness of a view by its simplicity or symmetry, i.e. these are what induce one to go over to this point of view. One can then say something like: “That’s how it must be.”

why people believe what they believe –

 is an open question –

and always interesting

‘telling grounds’ – is about justifying your belief –

and that is to say –

claiming an authority for your belief

your only authority is authorship –

and authorship guarantees nothing

any claim to authority beyond authorship –

is an act of logical deception

converting someone –

is successfully deceiving them –

even if it is with the best intentions

and yes if you are conned into a different perspective –

you will see the world differently

simplicity and symmetry –

are rhetorical tricks

and ‘that’s how it must be’ –

is common and garden rhetoric –

of no logical value

on certainty 93

93. The propositions presenting what Moore ‘knows’ are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine why anyone should believe the contrary. E.g. the proposition that Moore has spent his whole life in close proximity to the earth – Once more I can speak of myself here instead of Moore. What could induce me to believe the opposite? Either a memory, or having been told. – Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite.

the logical reality here – is –

your propositions –

your proposals –

are open to question –

open to doubt –

whether you are or not

your ‘conviction’ –

is self-induced rhetoric –

pretence

on certainty 94

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish true and false.

your picture of the world is never stable –

is never certain –

‘inherited background’ –

may well be how you explain this picture –

however this explanation –

as with any explanation –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 95

95. The propositions describing this world picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of the rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.

mythology is not certain –

the rules of a game –

implicit or explicit –

are not certain –

any so called game –

practical or not –

is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 96

96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones become fluid.

yes – you could imagine this

on certainty 97

97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.

and yes –

poetry –

may just be –

the way –

to go

on certainty 98

98. But if someone were to say “So logic too is empirical science” he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing.

how a proposition is described – depends on how it is used –

there is no definite use – no definite description

on certainty 99

99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.

what we have here from Wittgenstein is poetry –

and I would suggest –

in the end –

that is all any description is –

poetry –

some kind of imaginative representation –

of that which –

independent of description –

is unknown

on certainty 100

100. The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them.

‘if he knows them’

in claiming to know –

Moore claims an authority for his assertions –

his only authority is authorship –

and to state that you are the author of your assertions –

is unnecessary and irrelevant

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority is false

such a claim may have rhetorical value –

however the ground of any such rhetoric –

is delusion –

or deception

on certainty 101

101. Such a proposition might be e.g. “My body has never disappeared and reappeared again after an interval”

yes – you can make this assertion –

‘my body has never disappeared and reappeared again after an interval’ –

and as with any assertion –

it’s open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

if you claim to know this proposition  –

in the way that Moore claims to know –

you claim an authority for it –

the only authority – is authorship

authorship does not guarantee the proposition –

it’s irrelevant to the logical status of the proposition

and any claim of authority –

other than authorship –

is logically baseless

on certainty 102

102. Might I not believe that once, without knowing it perhaps in a state of unconsciousness, I was taken far away from the earth – that other people even know this, but do not mention it to me? But this would not fit into the rest of my convictions at all. Not that I could describe the system of these convictions. Yet my convictions do form a system, a structure.

a belief held as a conviction –

is a belief held authoritatively

logically speaking the only authority you have –

is authorship –

authorship does not guarantee your belief –

beyond this –

any claim to authority –

is pretentious –

is rhetorical

if you have a system of convictions –

what you have done is systematize –

your pretence

if your convictions have a structure –

what you have done –

is structured –

your rhetoric

on certainty 103

103. And now if I were to say “It is my unshakable conviction that etc.”, this means in the present case too that I have not consciously arrived at the conviction by following a particular line of thought, but that it is anchored in all my questions and answers, so anchored that I cannot touch it.

‘so anchored that I cannot touch it’ –

                                                `

all you have to do to ‘touch it’ –

is to think about it

and to think about it –

is to question it

‘unshakable conviction’ –

is rhetorical rubbish

on certainty 104

104. I am for example also convinced that the sun is not a hole in the vault of heaven.

the issue is not what you are convinced of –

it is that you are convinced – of anything –

what it means is that you have deluded yourself into thinking –

that you have an authority for your propositions –

when you have none at all –

and perhaps even –

that you have attempted to hoist this deception onto others

our propositions are open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain –

if you are ‘convinced’ –

you are fool

on certainty 105

105. All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.

either the argument ‘takes place already within a system’ –

and the argument then is a function or expression of the system

or the system ‘belongs to the essence of what we call an argument’

and the system then is a function and expression of the argument?

what’s it to be?

on certainty 106

106. Suppose some adult had told a child that he had been on the moon. The child tells me the story, and I say it was only a joke, the man hadn’t been on the moon; no one has ever been on the moon; the moon is a long way off and it is impossible to climb up there or fly there. – If now the child insists, saying perhaps there is a way to get there which I don’t know, etc. what reply could I make to him? What reply could I make to the adults of a tribe who believe that people sometimes go to the moon (perhaps that is how they interpret their dreams), and who indeed grant that there are no ordinary means of climbing up to it or flying there? – But a child will not ordinarily stick to such a belief and will soon be convinced by what we tell him seriously.

if the child insists – what reply could I make to him?

what reply could I make to the adults of the tribe?

all you can do is state your case –

put forward your point of view

‘But a child will not ordinarily stick to such a belief and will soon be convinced by what I tell him seriously’

Wittgenstein makes clear here –

that the real issue is rhetoric –

‘by what I tell him seriously’ –

yes you can try the ‘serious trick’ –

and you might have a win –

but if so – as with all rhetoric –

it will be –

a hollow victory

on certainty 107

107. Isn’t this altogether like the way one can instruct a child to believe in God, or that none exists, and it will accordingly be able to produce telling grounds for one or the other?

what Wittgenstein is on about here –

is indoctrination

you put a view –

and work on the child –

until he adopts –

and can operate with –

this con of ‘telling grounds’ –

and then you tell yourself –

that the job is done

the problem is –

you are just fooling yourself –

if not the child

your assumption –

of authority

and everything that flows from it

i.e. your telling grounds

is delusional

and the fact remains –                                                                                                                          

that despite what Wittgenstein suggests –

children can and do –

think for themselves –

and there’s a fair chance –

that somewhere along the way –

the child learns how to –

to pick a fraud

on certainty 108

108. “But is there no objective truth? Isn’t it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon?” If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it. For this demands answers to the questions “How did he overcome the force of gravity?” “How could he live without atmosphere?” and a thousand others which could not be answered. But suppose instead of all these answers we met the reply: “We don’t know how one gets to the moon, but those who get there know at once that they are there: and even you can’t explain everything.” We should feel ourselves intellectually very distant from someone who said this.

any ‘system’ – any proposition –

is open to  question –

open to doubt

if you protect your thought from doubt –

you transform it into prejudice

and if you don’t recognise and appreciate –

the uncertainty of your thought –

of your systems –

of your propositions –

yes – you will feel –

‘intellectually very distant’ –

from other ways of thinking

on certainty 109

109. “An empirical proposition can be tested” (we say). But how? and through what?

what constitutes a ‘test’ –

will be decided –

by whoever does the test –

and any such decision –

and the ‘how’ –

and ‘through what’ –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 110

110. What counts as its test? – But is this an adequate test? And, if so, must it not be recognizable in logic?” – As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded proposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.

‘what counts as a test?’

the short answer is -

whatever it is decided counts as a test –

by whoever decides

‘but is this an adequate test?

questions can always be raised –

regarding adequacy

‘as if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime’

the giving of grounds comes to an end –

when you stop giving grounds

‘but the end is not an ungrounded proposition’

logically speaking –

every proposition is ungrounded

‘it is an ungrounded way of acting’ –

yes – all action –

is ungrounded

on certainty 111

111. “I know that I have never been on the moon.” That sounds quite different in the circumstances which actually hold, to the way it would sound if a good many men had been on the moon, and some perhaps without knowing it. In this case one would give grounds for knowledge. Is there not a relationship here similar to that between the general rule of multiplying and particular multiplications that have been carried out?

I want to say: my not having been on the moon is as sure a thing for me as any grounds I could give for it.

firstly – Wittgenstein suggests here –

that whether grounds are required or not –

is a matter of circumstance

if so whether a claim to knowledge requires grounds or not –

is an uncertain matter –

and as a result any claim to knowledge –

is at base uncertain

secondly he asks –

‘Is there not a relationship here similar to that between the general rule of multiplying and particular multiplications that have been carried out?’

a multiplication statement is a direction –

for a sign substitution game

if you follow the direction –

you play the game –

you multiply

a ‘rule’ here is a restatement of the direction –

if you play the sign substitution game –

if you perform the multiplication –

the ‘rule’ – is redundant and irrelevant –

and if it has any function –

its function is persuasive –

is rhetorical

if you claim to know –

you claim an authority for your proposition –

the only authority – is authorship

and the authorship of a proposition –

is logically irrelevant –

and furthermore –

it does not guarantee the proposition –

any claim to an authority –

other than authorship – is false –

the only value of any such claim –

is rhetorical

a statement of grounds for a claim to know –

will be nothing more than –

a restatement of the original claim –

more rhetoric –

rhetoric on rhetoric –

and logically –irrelevant

so yes –

there is a relationship between grounds to a claim to know –

and the ‘general rule of multiplying’ and a particular multiplication –

the grounds and the ‘general rule’ –

are both examples of irrelevant rhetoric

finally –

‘my not having been on the moon is as sure a thing for me as any grounds I could give for it’

what this says is that Wittgenstein’s certainty  –

is nothing more than his assertion of it –

which is to say –

his rhetoric

on certainty 112

112. And isn’t that Moore wants to say, when he says he knows these things? – But is his knowing it really what is in question, and not rather that some of these propositions must be solid for us?

yes – his ‘knowing it’ – or anyone’s claim to ‘knowing it’ – is in question – as it should be

‘that some of these propositions must be solid for us’

why?

on certainty 113

113. When someone is trying to teach us mathematics, he will not begin by assuring us that he knows that a + b = b + a

what he’s teaching –

is game playing –

the game of sign substitution –

you either play the game –

or you don’t

any claim to know –

any claim of knowledge –

is irrelevant

on certainty 114

114. If you’re not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either.

this is quite true

however this does not mean that we cannot operate with ‘facts’ –

uncertain as they are –

we do

or that we cannot use words –

uncertain as their meaning is –

we do –

and I would say too –

that the uncertainty of facts –

and the uncertainty of the meaning of words –

is the real source –

of their utility

on certainty 115

115. If you try to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.

to doubt –

is to question

logically speaking –

there is nothing to stop you –

questioning –

every proposition –

you put forward

every proposition –

put to you

doubt –

presupposes –

uncertainty

on certainty 116

116. Instead of “I know…”, couldn’t Moore have said: “It stands fast for me that…”? And further: “It stands fast for me and many others…”

if for Moore ‘I know …’ means  -

‘I am certain …’ –

and ‘it stands fast for me that …’ means –

’I am certain that ’ –

Moore could have used –

‘it stands fast for me that …’ –

and ‘it stands fast for me  and many others …’

instead of ‘I know…’

a proposition  is a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt –

the proposition is uncertain

to claim certainty –

is to deny propositional reality –

and it is to perpetrate a fraud –

and a fraud will be a fraud –

regardless –

of what terms are used –

to express it

on certainty 117

117.  Why is it not possible for me to doubt that I have never been on the moon? And how could I try to doubt it?

First and foremost, the supposition that perhaps I have been there could strike me as idle. Nothing would follow from it, nothing be explained by it. It would not tie in with anything in my life.

When I say “Nothing speaks for, everything against it,” this presupposes a principle of speaking for and against. That is, I must be able to say what would speak for it.

any proposition can be questioned –

doubt is always possible

how you go about doubting  -

depends on how flexible you are in your thinking –

and how imaginative you are

it might strike you as idle –

however put as a problem of physics –

it is anything but idle

and if you don’t make some kind of intellectual effort –

nothing will follow

nothing will be explained

nothing will tie in with your life

‘Nothing speaks for, everything against it’

is really a comment on the speaker –

not the proposition

on certainty 118

118. Now it would be correct to say: So far no-one has opened my skull to see whether there is a brain inside: but everything speaks for, and nothing against, its being what they would find.

if you opened up Wittgenstein’s skull –

in the absence of the description – ‘brain’ –

or any other description –

what you would  find –

is that which is not described –

and that which is not described –

is unknown

description – makes known

and so –

whatever description you use –

is just what you will find

and further –

whatever description you do use –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 119

119. But can it also be said: Everything speaks for, and nothing against the table’s being there when no one sees it. For what does speak for it?

what speaks for it –

is whatever argument –

is advanced –

and any argument advanced –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

Wittgenstein asks –

is it the case that nothing speaks against it?

it depends on who you listen to –

George Berkeley for one –

put up arguments –

that cast doubt on such a view

I make the assumption –

that the table is there when no one sees it

the assumption –

is uncertain and finally baseless –

nevertheless –

I use it

on certainty 120

120. But if anyone were to doubt it, how would his doubt come out put in practice? And couldn’t we peacefully leave him to doubt it since it makes no difference at all?

‘how would his doubt come out put in practice?

who’s to say?

the doubt could come out as a philosophical argument –

and lead to an interesting discussion –

a different view of the world –

or a new insight into some state of affairs –

which might in turn –

lead to a new way of doing things

and will it make any difference at all?

if a doubt is raised –

it will make a difference –

what that is – be it great or small –

will depend on the people involved –

and the circumstances –

in which it is raised

on certainty 121

121. Can one say: “Where there is no doubt there is no knowledge either”?

yes – knowledge is uncertain

on certainty 122

122. Doesn’t one need grounds for doubt?

any so called ‘grounds for doubt’ –

will be open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 123

123. Wherever I look, I find no ground for doubting that….

to doubt – is to question –

any so called ‘ground’ –

will be open to question

so yes –

there is no ground to doubt

the point being –

doubt shows us –

there is no ground

doubt is groundless –

and it shows us –

that propositional reality –

is groundless

it is not where do you look?

but rather do you think?

do you question what is before you?

if you do –

you will see possibilities –

if you don’t –

you won’t

on certainty 124

124. I want to say: We use judgments as principles of judgment.

you judge in the face of uncertainty –

that is you consider possibilities –

and make decisions –

decisions that are open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

any so called ‘principle of judgment’ –

is another judgment –

a judgment regarding judgments

and like any judgment –

open to question –

open to doubt

uncertain

on certainty 125

125. If a blind man were to ask me “Have you got two hands?” I should not make sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt of it, then I don’t know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn’t I test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be tested by what? (Who decides what stands fast?)

And what does it mean to say such and such stands fast?

any answer you give to the blind man’s question –

is open to question – open to doubt –

there will be no ‘making sure’

if you think you are ‘making sure’ –

you are deluding yourself

what is to be tested by what?

there are no absolutes here –

decisions are made –

and any decision is open to question –

open to doubt

nothing we propose or do –

is beyond question

what does it mean to say such and such stands fast?

it means to stop questioning –

to stop thinking –

and who decides what stands fast?

a fool

on certainty 126

126. I am no more certain of the meaning of my words than I am of certain judgments. Can I doubt that this colour is called “blue”?

(My) doubts form a system.

can I doubt that this colour is called ‘blue’? 

yes – of course –

i.e. you could question –

if it is called ‘blue’ by all language users –

in all circumstance –

a fair enough question

‘(My) doubts form a system’

if you want to systematize your doubts –

categorize them –

why not – if you’ve got nothing better to do?

bear in mind though –

any system – any categorization –

any description of your doubts –

will itself be open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 127

127. For how do I know that someone is in doubt? How do I know that he uses the words “I doubt it” as I do?

how do I know someone is in doubt?

you don’t –

if by ‘know’ here – you mean – being sure

how do I know that he uses the words ‘I doubt’ as I do?

you don’t –

if by ‘know’ – you mean – being certain

on these matters –

as with any other matter –

doubt

on certainty 128

128. From a child up I learnt to judge like this. This is judging.

‘This is judging’ –

is a judgment

just what judging amounts to –

is open to question –

open to doubt

on certainty 129

129. This is how I learned to judge; this I got to know as judgment.

‘this’ –

I learnt to describe –

as ‘judgment’ –

and any description –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 130

130. But isn’t it experience that teaches us to judge like this, that is to say, that it is correct to judge like this? But how does experience teach us, then? We may derive it from experience, but experience does not direct us to derive anything from experience. If it is the ground of our judging like this, and not the cause, still we do not have a ground for seeing this in turn as a ground.

experience is uncertain –

in order to proceed –

in the face of uncertainty –

we make judgments –

we make decisions

the ‘ground’ of our judgments –

is uncertainty

our judgments –

are uncertain

on certainty 131

131. No, experience is not the ground for our game of judging. Nor is it an outstanding success.

the ground of our judging –

is uncertainty

‘experience’ – is one description –

of uncertainty

the notion of ‘success’ here –

is rhetorical

on certainty 132

132. Men have judged that a king can make rain; we say this contradicts all experience. Today they judge that aeroplanes and radio and radio etc, are the means for closer contact of peoples and cultures.

what you have here –

is different judgments –

and that is all we ever have –

at any time –

different uncertainties

on certainty 133

133. Under ordinary circumstances I do not satisfy myself that I have two hands by seeing how it looks. Why not? Has experience shown it to be unnecessary? Or (again): Have we in some way learnt a universal law of induction, and do we trust it here too? – But why should we have learnt one universal law first, and not the special one straight away?

‘how it looks’ – is always open to question –

open to doubt

if you understand this –

you can operate with uncertainty effectively –

the point being –

there is no satisfaction –

in Wittgenstein’s sense –

so why look for it?

the ground of induction is observation

observation is uncertain

a generalization based on particular observations –

may be useful –

however it is obviously –

not certain

‘have we in some way learnt a universal law of induction?’

to make such a claim –

your argument would be what?

inductive

so as to what comes first –

the chicken or the egg  –

it’s the egg

on certainty 134

134. After putting a book in a drawer, I assume it is there, unless…. “Experience always proves me right. There is no well attested case of the book’s (simply) disappearing.” It has often happened that the book has never turned up again, although we thought we knew for certain where it was. – But experience does really teach that a book, say, does not vanish away. (E.g. gradually evaporate.) But is it this experience with books etc. that leads us to assume that such a book has not vanished away? Well, suppose we were to find that under particular novel circumstances books did vanish away. – Shouldn’t we alter our assumption? Can one give the lie to the effect of experience on our system of assumption?

experience is uncertain –

‘Experience always proves me right …’ –

is just rhetoric

there is no lie – no falsity –

one way or the other here –

what we have in experience –

and in assumption –

is uncertainty

and any decision we take –

in response to a conflict –

is open to question –

open to doubt

is uncertain

on certainty 135

135. But do we simply follow a principle that what has happened always will happen again (or something like it)? What does it mean to follow this principle? Do we really introduce it into our reasoning? Or is it merely the natural law which our inferring apparently follows? This latter it may be. It is not an item in our considerations.

whether in fact such a principle is followed –

is an empirical question –

and any answer to it will be open to question –

open to doubt

what does it mean to follow such a principle?

you would have to ask those who claim to follow it –

see what they have too say

do we introduce it into our reasoning?

perhaps some people do

the idea of a natural law is just pretence –

an attempt to give an assertion –

an authority –

it doesn’t have

on certainty 136

136.  When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of empirical propositions

when Moore says he knows such and such –

he is claiming an authority for his propositions

the only authority he has –

is authorship –

it is the same authority anyone has –

who asserts –

anything

Moore’s propositions –

don’t have a peculiar logical role –

if their role is peculiar –

the peculiarity –

is rhetorical

on certainty 137

137. Even if the most trustworthy of men assures me that he knows things are thus and so, this by itself cannot satisfy me that he does know. Only that he believes he knows. That is why Moore’s assurance that he knows…does not interest us. The propositions, however which Moore retails as examples of such known truths are indeed interesting. Not because anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them, but because they all have a similar role in the system of empirical judgments.

                                                                                                                             

yes –

if these propositions have the role –

Wittgenstein thinks they do –

their role is rhetorical

on certainty 138

138.  We don’t, for example arrive at any of them as a result of investigation.

There are e.g. historical investigations and investigations into the shape and also the age of the earth, but not into whether the earth has existed during the last hundred years. Of course many of us have information about this period from our parents and grandparents; but mayn’t they be wrong? – “Nonsense!” one will say. “How should all these people be wrong?” – But is that an argument? Is it not simply the rejection of an idea? And perhaps the determination of a concept? For if I speak of a possible mistake here, this changes the role of “mistake” and “truth” in our lives.

how we arrive at – whatever we arrive at –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

what we work with –

may just be what is customary at a time and place –

or it may be what we would like to see as customary –

whatever –

the matter is uncertain

there are no mistakes –

there are uncertainties –

uncertain propositions –

used for whatever purpose –

in whatever context

the ‘truth’–

is what you give –

your assent to

on certainty 139

139.  Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing practice. Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.

a practice is what people do –

examples of it –

are examples of what people do-

a ‘rule’ – is a description of practise –

it might be useful

any description will be uncertain –

hence – ‘loopholes’

any practise –

deals with uncertainty –

and is in turn –

an example of it

on certainty 140

140. We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught judgments and their connection with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible to us.

being taught judgments –

and their connection with other judgments –

and a totality of judgments –

is not being taught judgment –

it is being taught not to judge –

it is being taught –

to accept the decrees –

of some supposed authority

the ground of judgment is uncertainty –

we ‘learn’ judgment –

by facing and dealing with uncertainty –

not by denying it

on certainty 141

141.When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)

when we first begin to believe –

what we believe –

a single proposition –

or a whole system of propositions –

is really an empirical matter

just what people believe –

and how they believe –

is like any other empirical issue –

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 142

142. It is not a single axiom that strikes me as obvious, it is rather a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support.

a so called ‘axiom’ – or a system –

obvious or not –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

and of course –

what ‘obvious’ amounts to –

on reflection –

is not obvious

on certainty 143

143. I am told, for example, that someone climbed this mountain many years ago. Do I always enquire into the reliability of the teller of this story, and whether the mountain did exist years ago? A child learns there are reliable and unreliable informants much later than it learns facts which are told it. It doesn’t learn at all that the mountain has existed for a long time: that is, the question whether it is so doesn’t arise at all. It swallows this consequence down, so to speak, together with what it learns.

                                                                                                                                   

whatever is put to you –

whatever is proposed –

is open to question –

open to doubt

the so called ‘reliability’ of an informant –

is logically irrelevant –

and reliability  –

is really just about pretence –

a pretence that holds up –

when questions are not asked

do children ‘swallow down the consequence’?

hard to say –

some probably do get conned by the rhetoric –

however –

you will find children –

who question

on certainty 144

144. The child learns to believe a  host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.

if what is ‘held fast’ –

is held fast by what is around it –

and if what is around it –

is ‘liable to shift’ –

the question is –

how can what is liable to shift –

hold anything fast?

there goes the neighbourhood –

there goes the ‘system’

on certainty 145

145.  One wants to say  “All my experiences shew that this is so”. But how do they do that? For that proposition to which they point itself belongs to a particular interpretation of them.

“That I regard this proposition as certainly true also characterizes my interpretation of experience.”

experience is uncertain –

any interpretation –

any characterization of experience –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 146

146.  We form the picture of the earth as a ball floating free in space and not altering essentially in a hundred years. I said “We form the picture etc.” and this picture now helps us in the judgments of various situations.

I may indeed calculate the dimensions of a bridge, sometimes calculate that here things are more in favour of a bridge than a ferry, etc. etc., - but somewhere I must begin with an assumption or a decision.

yes –

a picture may be of help to us in our judgments –

but who is to say what might be of use here?

anything could be

any assumption or decision we make –

is uncertain

on certainty 147

147. The picture of the earth as a ball is a good picture, it proves itself everywhere, it is also a simple picture – in short, we work with it without doubting it.

the idea here –

is that certainty –

runs in the background of our actions –

and we work with it –

without doubting it

the problem is –

if you can’t doubt it –

you can’t know it

and if you can’t know it –

you can’t work with it

if you can’t work with it –

it has no value

on certainty 148

148. Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet when I want to get up from the chair? There is no why. I simply don’t. This is how I act.

yes – this is how I act –

I act without knowing

on certainty 149

149. My judgments themselves characterize the way I judge, characterize the nature of judgment.

judgment is a response to uncertainty

any judgment is uncertain

on certainty 150

150. How does one judge which is his right and which is his left hand? How do I know that my judgment will agree with someone else’s? How do I know that this colour is blue? If I don’t trust myself here, why should I trust any else’s judgment? Is there a why? Must I not begin to trust somewhere? That is to say: somewhere I must begin with not doubting: and that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is part judging.

how does one judge which is his right and which is his left hand?

what is regarded a ‘left’ and what is regarded as ‘right’ –

is just a matter of convention

the judgment here is to follow the convention –

which amounts to learning certain behaviours

‘how do I know that my judgment will agree with someone else’s?

I don’t

how do I know that this colour is blue?

I don’t know that this colour is blue

I follow a convention of identifying this colour as ‘blue’ –

not because there is any certainty in the matter –

but rather because it is socially useful to do so –

and by the way –

you can be a stand-out if you want to –

there’s nothing to stop you

‘if I don’t trust myself  here, why should I trust any else’s judgment?’

to trust – is to not doubt – to not question –

any proposition – any judgment – is open to question –

open to doubt –

to trust is to not deal with reality of uncertainty

‘trust’ – may be in the rhetorical picture –

it is not in the logical picture

it is not that ‘somewhere I must begin with not doubting’ –

what we face is an uncertain reality –

and so we begin with a question

to begin – without doubt –

is to begin by avoiding reality –

it is to begin in ignorance –

with the prospect of staying ignorant

is there a why?

there is always a why

on certainty 151

151. I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is a part of our method of doubt and enquiry.

what stands fast for Moore –

is ignorance and prejudice

his method is not doubt and enquiry –

his method is pretence and rhetoric

on certainty 152

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. The axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

yes you’ll figure out the propositions that work for you –

but there is no certainty here –

what works for you will be a function of circumstance –

and circumstance can and does change

on certainty 153

153.  No one ever taught me that my hands don’t disappear when I am not paying attention to them. Nor can I be said to presuppose the truth of this proposition in my assertions etc., (as if they rested on it) while it only gets sense from the rest of our procedure of asserting.

a proposition –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

if it is asserted

and if it is asserted –

its sense –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

if it is not asserted –

it’s not in the picture

on certainty 154

154. There are cases such that, if someone gives signs of doubt where we do not doubt, we cannot confidently understand his signs as signs of doubt.

I.e.: if we are to understand his signs of doubt as such, he may give them only in particular cases and may not given them in others.

we cannot be sure –

of signs of doubt –

we cannot be sure –

of what any signs –

signify

the point being –

we operate in –

uncertainty

on certainty 155

155. In certain circumstances a man cannot make a mistake. (“Can” here is used logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those circumstances.) If Moore was to pronounce the opposite of those propositions he declares to be certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented.

what we have is uncertain propositions

there are no mistakes

it doesn’t matter what Moore says one way or the other –

it’s his claim to certainty that is demented

on certainty 156

156. In order to make a mistake a man must already judge in conformity with mankind.

for a start –

there are no mistakes –

our propositions are –

uncertain

the idea of ‘judging in conformity with mankind’ –

is rubbish

the fact is you can’t know for sure –

whether your judgment –

is in conformity with anyone –

or not

and whether it is –

or not –

is irrelevant –

once you get beyond the façade –

of what others supposedly think –

what you face –

with any judgment –

is uncertainty –

and further –

any judgment you make –

will be –

uncertain

on certainty 157

157. Suppose a man could not remember whether he had always had five fingers or two hands? Should we understand him? Could we be sure of understanding him?

should we understand him?

perhaps

could we be sure of understanding him?

no

on certainty 158

158. Can I make a mistake, for example, in thinking that the words of which this sentence is composed are English words whose meaning I know?

you can be unsure – not mistaken

any so called ‘mistake’ –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 159

159. As children we learn facts; e.g., that every human being has a brain, and we take them on trust. I believe that there is an island, Australia, of such and such a shape, and so on and so on; I believe that I have great-grand parents and the people who gave themselves out as my parents really were my parents, etc. This belief may never have been expressed; even the thought that it was so, never thought.

to take a proposition on trust –

is to not question it  –  to not doubt it –

it is to be fooled –

or to fool yourself

if I haven’t thought it I can’t believe it –

but if I have thought it – and believe it –

my belief – expressed – or not –

useful as it may be in the circumstances –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 160

160. The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief.

doubt may come after belief –

and it may – just as equally – come before belief

before or after – it doesn’t matter –

you don’t learn if you don’t question

on certainty 161

161.  I learned an enormous amount and accepted it on human authority, and then I found some things confirmed or disconfirmed by my own experience.

authority = authorship

if it is put that human authority –

is anything other than –

human beings’ authorship of their propositions –

then what is being put –

is a deception

it may have rhetorical value –

but such a pretence –

has no logical significance

what is confirmed –

is what is assented to –

for whatever reason –

by whoever

if a proposition is disconfirmed –

it is dissented from –

for whatever reason –

by whoever

any act of assent or dissent –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

‘my own experience’    -

is open to question –

open to doubt

is uncertain

on certainty 162

162. In general I take as a rule what I found in text books, of geography for example. Why? I say: All these facts have been confirmed a hundred times over. But how do I know that? What is my evidence for it? I have a world-picture. Is it true or false? Above all it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting. The propositions describing it are not all equally subject to testing.

‘I have a world-picture.’ –

then presumably you can state it –

in the form of a proposition

is it true or false?

if you assent to it – it’s true –

and presumably you do –

if you ‘have’ it

the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting?

if by ‘substratum’ you mean –

that which is beyond question –

beyond doubt –

there is no such thing –

no such proposition

the actual substratum of enquiry and assertion –

is uncertainty

we use many different ‘pictures’ –

many different propositions –

all of which are open to question –

open to doubt

and the testing of any proposition –

is an exploration –

of uncertainty

all propositions – all proposals –

are equally subject –

to doubt

on certainty 163

163. Does anyone ever test whether this table remains in existence when no one is paying attention to it?

We check the story of Napoleon, but not whether all the reports about him are based on sense-deception, forgery and the like. For whenever we test anything, we are already presupposing something that is not tested. Now am I to say that the experiment which perhaps I make in order to test the truth of a proposition presupposes the truth of the proposition that the apparatus I believe I see is really there (and the like)?

‘this table remains in existence when no one is paying attention to it’

this proposition – as with any proposition –

is open to question – open to doubt

‘Now am I to say that the experiment which perhaps I make in order to test the truth of a proposition presupposes the truth of the proposition that the apparatus I believe I see is really there (and the like)?’

yes –

we operate with presuppositions –

and any presupposition –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 164

164. Doesn’t testing come to an end?

testing comes to an end –

when you stop testing                                                                                                                                 

on certainty 165

165. One child might say to another: “I know that the earth is already hundreds of years old” and that would mean: I have learnt it.

what it means is –

‘I accept what someone has told me’

on certainty 166

166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.

it’s not that difficult

on certainty 167

167. It is clear that our empirical propositions do not all have the same status, since one can lay down such a proposition and turn it from an empirical proposition into a norm of description.

Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes experiments with substances in his laboratory and now he concludes that this and that takes place when there is burning. He does not say that it might happen otherwise another time. He has got hold of a definite world- picture – not of course one that he invented: he learnt it as a child.  I would say world-picture and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-course foundation for his research and as such also goes unmentioned.

how a proposition is described –

i.e. ‘empirical’ – or ‘norm of description’ –

or otherwise –

will depend on how it is used –

and in what circumstances it is used –

by whoever uses it

there is no definite description of a proposition –

and no definite use

if one has a world-picture as Wittgenstein suggests –

then presumably it can be put as a proposition –

and if so –

it is open to question – open to doubt –

it is uncertain

the ‘foundation’ of any research –

is the unknown

and any response to the unknown –

is uncertain

on certainty 168

168.  But now, what part is played by the presupposition that a substance A always reacts to a substance B in the same way, given the same circumstances? Or is that part of the definition of a substance?

what part such a presupposition plays –

will depend on the circumstance of its use

and the definition of a substance –

as with any definition –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 169

169. One might think that there were propositions declaring chemistry is possible. And these would be propositions of a natural science. For what should they be supported by, if not by experience?

whether chemistry is possible or not –

would I think be –

an odd argument to witness –

but any claim is open to question –

open to doubt

as to what supports the propositions of chemistry –

if your argument is ‘experience’ –

then clearly –

the ‘support’ for the propositions of chemistry is –

uncertain

on certainty 170

170. I believe what people transmit to me in a certain manner. In this way I believe geographical, chemical, historical facts etc. That is how I learn the sciences. Of course learning is based on believing.

If you have learnt that Mont Blanc is 4000 metres high, if you have looked it up on the map, you say you know it.

And can it now be said: we accord credence in this way because it has proved to pay?

‘of course learning is based on believing.’ –

belief is uncertain –

and learning –

is an exploration of uncertainty –

‘if you have looked up on a map, you say you know it’ –

what this means  –

is that you accept a supposed authority

‘we accord credence in this way because it has proved to pay’ –                 

if something works – it works –

‘according credence’ – saying you believe it –

is to pretend an authority for it –

the supposed authority of belief

is pretence –

unnecessary – irrelevant – and false

say what you have to say –

and spare yourself and others –

the rhetoric

on certainty 171

171. A principal ground for Moore to assume that he never was on the moon is that no one ever was on the moon or could come there; and this we believe on grounds of what we learn.

what we learn is uncertain

the pretence of certainty –

is a delusion –

or a deception

Moore was either deluded –

or deceptive

on certainty 172

172. Perhaps someone says “there must be some basic principle on which we accord credence”, but what can such a principle accomplish? Is it any more than a natural law of ‘taking for true’?

any ‘principle’ –

is open to question –

is open to doubt

is uncertain

what does it accomplish?

as much or as little –

as any proposal we put to use –

as to ‘natural law’ –

there are only propositions –

proposals

and a ‘law’ is only a law –

if you can con someone –

into obeying it

what we take for true –

are those propositions –

we give our assent to

on certainty 173

173. Is it maybe in my power what I believe? or what I unshakeably believe?

I believe that there is a chair over there. Can’t I be wrong? But, can  I believe that I am wrong? Or can I do so much as bring it under consideration? – And mightn’t I also hold fast to my belief whatever I learned later on?! But is my belief then grounded?

yes –

you can choose what you think about –

what you believe

‘unshakeable’ belief is a pretence –

the better you get at the pretence –

the more stupid you become

there is no right or wrong here –

what we deal with

in our perception and our description –

is uncertainty

belief –

is ‘grounded’ –

in uncertainty

on certainty 174

174. I act with complete certainty. But this certainty is my own.

to pretend certainty –

is to engage in deception –

and what we have here from Wittgenstein –

is an argument for –

self-deception

on certainty 175

175.  “I know it” I say to someone else; and here there is a justification. But there is none for my belief.

‘I know it’ I say to someone else –

is to just to try to persuade another –

of an authority –

you don’t have –

it’s an exercise in rhetoric

and deception

as to the belief –

Wittgenstein is right

there is no justification

on certainty 176

176. Instead of “I know it” one may say in some cases “That’s how it is – rely upon it.” In some cases however “I learned it years and years ago”; and sometimes: “I’m sure it is so.”

different versions –

of the claim to authority –

the only real authority –

is the authority of authorship –

and there is no need to state –

that you are the author –

of your assertion –

it is irrelevant

beyond authorship –

any claim to authority –

is false and pretentious

any such claim –

may have persuasive value –

however –

the ground of such persuasion –

is deception

on certainty 177

177. What I know, I believe.

look all that is required –

is that you say what you have to say –

and others can give their assent –

or they can dissent

‘I know’ and ‘I believe’ – and the like –

are just rhetorical devises

and their function is – at best –

persuasion

on certainty 178

178. The wrong use made by Moore of the proposition “I know” lies in his regarding it as an utterance as little subject to doubt as “I am in pain”. And since from “I know it is so” there follows “It is so” then the latter cannot be doubted either.

‘I am in pain’ – may be a good description –

of your state of being –

at a certain time and place

but it is not the only possible description –

and in any case who’s to say for certain –

what it means?

the point being –

this assertion – like any assertion –

is open to question –

open to doubt

‘I know’ – is a claim to an authority –

the only authority – is authorship

to claim authorship of your assertion –

is irrelevant and unnecessary

‘I know’ – is irrelevant and unnecessary

it might have a use in persuasion –

but that is rhetoric not logic

‘I know it is so’ –

without the useless preface – ‘I know’ –

comes down to – ‘it is so’

‘it is so’ – is just another assertion

open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 179

179. It would be correct to say: “I believe…” has subjective truth; but “I know…” not.

all propositions are uncertain –

the subjective-objective distinction  –

is a throw back to authoritarian –

and delusional epistemology

on certainty 180

180. Or again “I believe…” is an ‘expression’, but not “I know…”

if you see that all propositions are uncertain –

then both ‘I know’ and ‘I believe’ –

are logically unnecessary –

and the only value they have –

is rhetorical

on certainty 181

181. Suppose Moore had said “I swear…” instead of “I know…”

                                                                                                                                    

‘I swear…’ would in some ways have more intellectual integrity

we could ask – ‘you swear on what?

meaning what is the authority you are appealing to?

perhaps that is why Moore didn’t say ‘I swear…’ –

he would have to reveal what it is that he thinks is the ground of his authority

and then of course the matter would be open to dispute –

where’s the authority?

perhaps he would end up reverting to ‘I know’ –

and saying –

‘well I know – because I know’

this would be a good outcome

because it would have made clear –

that the ‘authority’ that Moore appeals to –

doesn’t exist

that his ‘authority’ –

is no more than his assertion

on certainty 182

182. The more primitive idea is that the earth never had a beginning. No child has reason to ask himself how long the earth existed, because all change takes place on it. If what is called the earth really came into existence at some time – which is hard enough to picture – then one naturally assumes the beginning as having been an inconceivably long time ago.

you can ‘naturally assume’ whatever you like –

any assumption –

is open to question –

open to doubt

the ground of assumption –

is uncertainty

on certainty 183

183. “It is certain that after the battle of Austerlitz Napoleon… Well, in that case it’s surely certain that the earth existed then.”

‘that after the battle of Austerlitz Napoleon …’ –

it is a conjecture –

the existence of the earth then –

is conjecture

and yes – implication too –

is conjecture

a conjecture is not a certainty –

a conjecture is open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 184

184. “It is certain that we didn’t arrive on this planet from another one hundred years ago. “ Well it’s as certain as such things are.

‘as certain as such things are’ –

means that in reality –

these matters are uncertain

on certainty 185

185. It might strike me as ridiculous to want to doubt the existence of Napoleon; but if someone doubted the existence of the earth 150 years ago, perhaps I should be more willing to listen, for now he is doubting our whole system of evidence. It does not strike me as if this system were more certain than a certainty within it.

whether you are talking about –

a simple proposition –

or a ‘system’ – of propositions

the proposition is a proposal –

and the proposal –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

                                                                                                                                   

on certainty 186

186. “I might suppose that Napoleon never existed, and it is a fable, but not that the earth did not exist 150 years ago.”

what do I ‘know’ here?                                                                                   

what I have been told –

the latest scientific theory –

do I have cause to doubt it?

right at this minute?

no

is it doubtable?

yes

on certainty 187

187. “Do you know that the earth existed then?” – “Of course I know that. I have it from someone who certainly knows all about it.”

this makes it perfectly clear –

that the ground of ‘knowledge’ –

is a supposed authority –

and all that amounts to –

is someone’s assertion –

or rhetoric –                                                                                                                                  

and someone else’s –

gullibility

on certainty 188

188. It strikes me as if someone who doubts the existence of the earth at that time is impugning the nature of all historical evidence. And I cannot say of this latter that it is definitely correct.

yes – historical evidence – is uncertain –

and the proposition – that the earth existed at this time –

is uncertain

any proposition we operate with –

is uncertain

if you say that one proposition implies another –

then you are saying –

one uncertain proposition –

implies another –

and by the way there is nothing definite –

about implication

in propositional reality –

we operate in – and with –

uncertainty

on certainty 189

189. At some point one has to pass from explanation to mere description.

logically speaking –

so called ‘explanation’ – is description –

the idea that you can account for a proposition –

and give final account –

is pretentious and false –

such ‘explanation’ –

is just rhetoric

the point is –

if you divest ‘explanation’ of rhetoric –

what you get is description – plain and simple –

and furthermore –

any description is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 190

190. What we call historical evidence points to the existence of the earth a long time before my birth; – the opposite hypothesis has nothing on its side.

                                                                                                                                    

you can’t say there’s nothing on its side –

unless it has actually  been put forward –

and argued for

there is nothing to stop someone doing this –

and if they did –

it would be interesting to see what their argument is –

and their evidence for it

as to the hypothesis –

that the earth existed a long time before my birth –

this hypothesis and the evidence for it –

as with any proposed opposite hypothesis and evidence –

is be open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 191

191. Well if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it – is it then certainly true? One may designate it as such. – But does it certainly agree with reality, with the facts? – With this question you are already going round in a circle.

if everything speaks for it and nothing against it –

it’s not an hypothesis –

it’s a prejudice

and this it seems is what certainty comes down to for Wittgenstein –

prejudice

can an hypothesis certainly agree with reality – with the facts?

reality – is what?

a response to the unknown –

a proposal or set of proposals

the facts – are what?

proposals

so does one set of proposals agree with another?

that’s the basic question

and any answer here –

will be open to question –

open to doubt –

uncertain

on certainty 192

192. To be sure there is justification; but justification comes to an end.

there is no justification –

there is simply argument from one proposition to another –

with the latter serving as an ‘authority’ –

for the former –

(the only ‘authority’ – is authorship)

this is just a language-game –

and it it’s name is –

rhetoric

on certainty 193

193. What does this mean: the truth of a proposition is certain?

a proposition is true – if assented to

truth = assent

to say the truth of a proposition is certain –

is to say –

the assent to a proposition –

is certain –

is not in question –

is beyond doubt

the fact is –

the ground of assent –

the nature of assent –

what assent amount to –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 194

194. With the word ‘certain’ we express complete conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby we seek to convince other people. This is subjective certainty.

But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn’t mistake be logically excluded?`

a proposition is a proposal – open to question –

open to doubt

if you express complete conviction and the total absence of doubt –

you do not express a proposition –

you express a prejudice

a proposition – whether characterized as objective or subjective –

is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

if you are certain – a ‘mistake’ – is not possible

and if you are uncertain – there are no mistakes –

what you have is uncertainties

the point being –

this notion of the ‘mistake’ –

has no role to play –

it’s a red herring

on certainty 195

195. If I believe that I am sitting in my room when I am not, then I shall not be said to have made a mistake. But what is the essential difference between this case and a mistake?

first up –

who’s to say you’re not?

someone apparently –

and perhaps they have the backing of others

logically speaking –

what you have here –

is a dispute 

what’s the difference between this case –

and a mistake?

there are no mistakes –

just uncertainties

what you have here  –

is different accounts – different proposals –

different propositions

what you are dealing with is –

uncertainties

if the dispute is settled –

it will be with rhetoric –

not logic

on certainty 196

196. Sure evidence is what we accept as true, it is the evidence we go by in acting surely, acting without any doubt.

What we call “a mistake” plays a quite special part in our language games, and so too does what we regard as certain evidence.

all evidence is open to question –

open to doubt – is uncertain

what we take as true –

is what we give our assent to –

and our assent – is open to question –

open to doubt

if we act surely – we act without thinking

what we call a ‘mistake’ –

has no ‘special’ role  in our language-games

in fact it really should be tossed out

if you hold with certainty – there can be no mistake

if on the other hand you hold with uncertainty –

there are no mistakes –

what you deal with is uncertainties

‘mistake’ is a commonly used word –

but so what?

‘ordinary’ unreflective language –

is where philosophical analysis begins –

not where it ends

on certainty 197

197. It would be nonsense to say that we regard something as sure evidence because it is certainly true.

any so called evidence –

is open to question –

a proposition is a proposal –

a proposal – is uncertain

what we take as true –

is what we give our assent to

assent – like dissent –

is never beyond –

question

on certainty 198

198. Rather we must first determine the role of deciding for or against a proposition.

if we decide for a proposition –

it is actionable – it’s live –

it is usable

if we decide against it –

we don’t act on it –

it’s dead weight –

it’s of no use

we drop it

however any decision we make –

either for or against –

is open to question –

open to doubt –

is uncertain

on certainty 199

199. The reason why the use of the expression “true or false” has something misleading about it is that it is like saying “it tallies with the facts or it doesn’t”, and the very thing that is in question is what “tallying” is here.

a proposition is true if you assent to it

false – if you dissent from it

as to the basis of your assent or dissent –

it is an open question